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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to identify and solve the agency problems in the life cycle of private equity 
(PE) investment under the commercial law system in China by comparing the legislative and 
adjudicative practices in the United Kingdom (UK) and other related jurisdictions. Based on 
transaction cost economics as the theoretical foundation of this research, the agency problems 
of PE investment derive from the two-level separation of ownership and control, one of 
which is the principal–agent relationship between the PE investors and the fund manager, and 
the other is the principal–agent relationship between the PE shareholders and the 
management of investee companies. As effective institutional solvers to agency problems, 
fiduciary duties as default rules have been widely developed and practised in common law 
countries to protect the interests of PE investors. Subject to the strong dependency on judicial 
practices, however, the economic function of fiduciary duties may not be fulfilled properly in 
the jurisdictions without a sound and independent judicial system such as that in China. 
Therefore, the logical purpose of this research was to find a series of feasible and cost-
efficient approaches to reduce the agency costs in governance of three organizational 
structures that are involved in PE investments under Chinese legal and regulatory regimes, 
namely the limited partnership, business trust and corporation.  
 
As the society and economy of the UK are developed along a free-market and liberalistic 
ideology, the contractual freedom as the core spirit of the UK‘s commercial law has been 
widely accepted and recognized in both legislative and adjudicative activities. Thus, both the 
decision-making rules in PE funds and corporate governance of portfolio companies in the 
UK are also labelled as showing high respect for contractual autonomy. The protective rules 
sprung from common law and equity in relation to the laws of business organizations and 
trusts also provide flexible approaches for reducing agency costs in PE investment. Hence, 
this thesis especially underlines the reference to, and transplantation of, the contractual 
techniques of the UK‘s business organization law for enhancing investor protection of the 
Chinese PE industry, by which the negative impacts of political intervention and uncertainty 
in judicial practices may be effectively constrained. In addition, in order to make this analysis 
more comprehensive and objective, this thesis also refers to the institutional transplantation 
of trusts and corporate governance in not only continental and mixed jurisdictions, but also 
several typical transitional economies in the world.  
  
Based on, and beyond, the aforementioned research, this thesis argues that the basic legal 
framework of PE has undoubtedly been established in China. This notwithstanding, the 
strong state capitalistic ideology and authoritarian interest pattern still seriously impede the 
legal reform towards a more market-directed and investor-protection-oriented institutional 
construction. In a broader sense, another conclusion may also be put forward, namely that the 
transplantation of different business organizations across jurisdictions are determined by the 
distribution of the costs of protecting investors. As a brief model, the costs of investor 
protection are divided into internal and external approaches; the former refers to the cost of 
contractual arrangements within business organizations and the latter to the costs that are 
generated from the judicial and regulatory activities outside business organizations. Based on 
a detailed economic analysis of the main types of business organizations, this research 
concludes that 1) when the organizational and non-organizational protective approaches 
generate equal costs, such an organizational form should be most widely applicable and 
transplantable; and 2) the success of such legal transplantation depends on whether the gross 
costs of protecting investors can be reasonably distributed by the organizations and regulatory 
and judicial systems. The developing path of the commercial law system in China may 
preliminarily illustrate the above thesis, while more detailed studies may be developed in 
future.  
 
Key words: private equity, agency problems, Chinese law, commercial organizations, 
comparative law 
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Introduction 
 
Since the mid-1980s, private equity (PE) investment has been playing an increasingly 
significant role in supporting corporate finance in the Chinese economy for more than three 
decades. Due to the immature capital market and legal protection in China, however, the 
agency problems in PE investment under the laws of business organizations of China are still 
serious which has increased transactions costs in the whole cycle of PE investment. As a 
response, this dissertation aims to find out feasible approaches to reduce the agency costs in 
Chinese PE investment by carrying out a series of comparative studies of limited partnership, 
investment trusts and corporate governance in China, UK and other related jurisdictions.  
 
Briefly speaking, the agency problems in private equity (PE) transactions exist on two levels. 
On the one hand, compared with traditional financing approaches, private equity is a kind of 
expensive financing sources, which mainly invest in the companies having difficulties to 
access bank loans or public capital market due to their high risk. Therefore, when the 
managers of private equity funds search the start-ups or other private companies to invest, the 
asymmetry of information between the private equity funds and entrepreneurs will also be 
severe. On the other hand, the privacy of PE funds makes it hard to directly observe the 
performance of the fund managers or PE firms and in a general sense, the investors do not 
directly control the management of PE funds and the continuous supervision of the fund 
manager is impractical as well.  
 
For the sake of discourse coherence, above research questions will be discussed on the basis 
of the contractual theory of the firm. As theoretical and methodological foundation of the 
research, the contractual theory of the firm conceives that the nature of the firm is a ‗nexus of 
contracts‘, by which the transaction parties in the firm are able to haggle over each specific 
provision in the agreements to anticipate all the future conflicts or potential problems. Due to 
the complexity and contingencies in real market, however, the complete contract is infeasible. 
As an alternative approach to reducing agency costs, the fiduciary duty rules which flexibly 
address the agency problems between the principal and agent have become a core legal 
mechanism in common law jurisdictions. In a practical term, the fiduciary duty rules in 
business organization law of UK were mainly developed by the judicial practices of court 
system in a long history. In contrast, the court in civil law or socialist states is less active than 
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the common law jurisdictions, where the role of fiduciary duties in solving agency problems 
may be limited. As a consequence, in the circumstance where the judicial system is inactive 
or restricted, the feasibility of transplanting fiduciary duties system for solving the agency 
problems in business organization laws will be problematic, or even though the fiduciary law 
is roughly adopted in such jurisdictions, the operation of it may generate high costs. In other 
words, in civil law and socialist jurisdictions, it may be more advisable to develop the 
internal governance approach to reduce the agency costs and to enhance protection for 
investors of business organizations.  
 
Although in Chinese legal system the fundamental legal regimes of business organizations 
has been established in recent two decades, the operation and is considerably influenced and 
restricted by the state will of China. That is mainly to say that the prioritized economic and 
legal status of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) would still substantively influence the 
developing path of the PE industry of China. Specifically, in light of the political influence of 
the interested groups, the legal reform of the business organization law of China is and still 
will be directed in the interest of SOEs. Against such background, this research will 
especially consider the relationship between the state control power of Chinese financial and 
industrial markets and the development of PE legal system.  
 
The limited partnership currently is widely adopted for organizing private equity and venture 
capital investment in western countries. In a typical limited partnership, there should be at 
least one general partner and one limited partner. The general partner who is entitled to 
exclusively manage the business of the partnership is required to be personally liable for the 
debts of the limited partnership by contrast, the limited partner is not allowed to involve in 
the management, as an exchange the limited liability protection is granted and once the 
limited partner actively involves in decision-making process, the limited liability protection 
will be waived. In such a governance structure, the limited partnership not only aligns the 
interests of both the manager (general partner) and the main owners (limited partners), but 
also enhances the independence of management.  
 
Due to the immaturity of Chinese private equity industry, however, the existing protective 
mechanism of the limited partnerships in China is imperfect. Firstly, in concern of the loss of 
state control the capital, the limited partnership law in China refuses to establish the ‗veil 
3 
 
piercing‘ rule of limited partners, by which when the SOEs as limited partners invest in the 
PE funds, they are able to actively intervene in the fund management without unlimited 
liability threat. Secondly, in Chinese law the effectiveness of unlimited liability on the 
responsible managerial staff of general partners is also limited, as the bankruptcy of 
individuals is not recognized by Chinese law. Thirdly, the contractual techniques in relation 
to the incentive of general partners in China‘s PE limited partnerships are also 
unsophisticated. Finally, because of the conflicts of the regulatory powers of different 
regulatory organs of Chinese government, the independence and effectiveness of the existing 
self-regulatory system is also problematic. As a consequence, above drawbacks in the 
governance of China‘s PE limited partnerships motivate the limited partners to actively 
intervene in fund management which seriously decreases the efficiency of the governance of 
the limited partnerships.  
 
In comparison of the Chinese limited partnership law, in UK‘s legal system, both the Limited 
Partnership Act 1907 and financial regulatory system of collective investment scheme (CIS) 
have established a legal framework of private equity funds which mainly focus on the 
protection of limited partners, in which both the liability mechanism and self-regulatory 
system of PE limited partnerships are relatively well-established.  Moreover,  as one of the 
important centre of financial activities in the world, the practices of private equity and 
venture capital investment have developed a series of more effective contractual provisions in 
arranging and balancing the rights, duties and liabilities for both general partners and limited 
partners. By reference to the experience of UK, to a large extent, the governance of the 
Chinese PE limited partnership may be improved and the protection for limited partners can 
also be enhanced. 
 
Due to the imperfect governance and protective mechanisms of the limited partnership, the 
trust as an alternative organizational structure are also popularly used to organize PE 
investment in China, through which the strict regulation of commercial trusts industry can 
provide better protection for PE investors. Nevertheless, because of the conservative attitude 
towards the collective lawsuits and special ownership structure of trust corporations, the 
judicial remedy for trustees is still problematic in China. Then the beneficiaries have to 
directly intervene in the trust management by actively exercising the voting rights of the 
beneficiaries‘ meeting under the financial regulations of China Banking Regulatory 
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Committee (CBRC) for protecting their interests in fund management. As a consequence, the 
trust corporation as trustee cannot independently exercise its shareholders‘ right in corporate 
governance of PE-held companies and eventually seriously impede the exit of PE investors 
by listing the investee companies on Chinese stock markets. To solve above problems, it 
would be useful to consider the economic functions of the trust as a kind of investment 
entities and protective mechanisms for beneficiaries in English trusts.  
 
From an economic point of view, the parties in a free market should be responsible for his 
own behaviours, the economic efficiency depends on not only the external regulation but also 
the market participants‘ awareness and judgement of risk. By reviewing the fiduciary duties 
in English trusts, it can be seen that the duty of care and duty of loyalty in English case law 
establish a series of rules which clarify the boundary of the market risk which should be 
assumed by the settler/beneficiary and the personal liability of the trustee. In contrast, due to 
the lack of dual-ownership system and inactive judicial system in civil law jurisdictions, the 
protective mechanisms in trust-like arrangements are based on contractual relationship where 
the principal and beneficiary or even other stakeholders can reserve the managerial powers in 
trust-like arrangements which may increase the transaction costs in management. In other 
words, the institutional advantages of English trusts is the trustee‘s independent management 
and exclusion of unprofessional investors‘ intervention, by which the transaction costs can be 
reduced.  
 
As for the reform of PE investment trusts in China, the following points will be discussed in 
details in the third chapter of the research: firstly, in terms of the governance structure of the 
trust, this thesis recommends that in order to break the ‗zero loss promise‘ in trust industry, 
the ownership structure of Chinese trust corporations should be diversified, by which the non-
state shareholders will have the inherent motivation to compel the investors to bear 
reasonable market risk. At the same time, by reference to the regulatory system of collective 
investment schemes (CISs) of UK, the ‗qualified investor‘ rules in the regulation of Chinese 
business trusts should be enhanced by introducing the qualitative test, the ‗qualified investor‘ 
should not only means the ability of risk tolerance but also the ability of risk judgment. 
Secondly, for enhancing the efficiency of the management of trust, the regulations of Chinese 
business trusts should remove the intervention power of beneficiary‘s meeting, by which the 
judicial practices may be developed as the main remedial approach for solving the agency 
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problems between the trustee and beneficiaries in private equity investment trusts. Finally, in 
order to enhance external supervisory power over the trust corporation, the laws and 
regulations of China should clarify the obligation and rights of the custodian banks of PEITs, 
which may push the custody to strictly supervise the performance of trust corporations.  
 
After discussing the agency problems between the investors and managers within PE funds, 
another issues discussed in this research is the function and agency problems in the corporate 
governance of PE-held companies. In a typical corporate governance model of PE-held 
corporations, PE funds will involve in corporate governance in two levels. Firstly, as the 
majority shareholders, the entrepreneurs (the founders of investee companies) are usually 
able to dominate the general meeting, therefore, the private equity and venture capital 
investors as minority shareholders might be oppressed. Secondly, it is quite common that the 
entrepreneurs or founders of start-ups or private companies are also nominated as the CEO or 
the president of the board. Therefore, the information asymmetry between the board and PE 
shareholders also increases agency costs.  
 
With the booming of high-tech and IT industry in China during recent two decades, the role 
of private equity and venture capital funds in corporate governance is being more and more 
important. The high premium of the public stock markets has attracted quite a large number 
of PE investors to get their return by listing the portfolio companies. Once the private 
company is listed, however, entrepreneur shareholders‘ control over the company will be 
significantly diluted. Because the culture in family enterprises is based on the acquaintance 
relationship rooted in traditional Chinese social ethics, the interpersonal relationship in 
Chinese family or private companies is commonly established on the entrepreneurs‘ personal 
authority, rather than the spirit of contract. Based on the above factors, a series of internal 
conflicts between private equity and venture capital shareholders and entrepreneurs of 
Chinese PE-held companies have drawn greater attention. In addition, due to the political 
restrictions, foreign investors are not permitted to invest in some special industries. As a 
response, foreign private equity and venture capital investors widely adopt the variable 
interest entities (VIE) which consists of a set of contractual arrangements to achieve overseas 
listing, however, the complexity of the VIE structure also exacerbates the agency problems in 
PE transactions. The chapter four of the dissertation will carry out a series of case studies to 
explore the nature of above problems of corporate governance of the PE-held companies in 
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China, especially, the social and political factors in relation to above problems will also be 
illustrated in details.   
 
Since the rise and rapid development of the Neo-liberalism in US and UK during 1970s, 
deregulation and liberalization of capital market and corporate governance has been the main 
idea and philosophy in common law countries. The company law system of UK can be 
regarded as the most typical legislative achievement in relation to such a change in corporate 
governance. Specifically, due to the complex changes in British economy and politics in 
recent half a century, the ownership structure of UK companies has been quite dispersed, 
which significantly promoted the rise and booming of institutional investors including the PE 
funds in UK who eventually labeled the British corporate governance as ‗shareholder-
centered‘ model. As a legislative response to that, the Companies Act 2006 provide a series 
of systemic rules for shareholders to actively participate in corporate governance, such 
approaches are convinced as an efficient way to enhance the self-protection of minority 
shareholders and reduce agency costs in corporate governance. By reviewing both the 
legislation and common law cases in UK company law and comparing the related experience 
and lessons of legal transplantation in Eastern European countries, this research will 
especially pay attention to the feasibleness of transplanting the shareholder-centered model of 
company law to Chinese legal system for improving the self-protection of PE shareholders. 
 
As a part of globalization, any legal transplant among different jurisdictions should never be 
regarded as a simple connection as ‗importer-exporter‘ of a given legal institution, instead, in 
most cases, making significant changes to the ‗imported‘ institutions in a country as the 
‗receiver‘ is inevitable1. And also, different social cultures, ideologies and histories may form 
the path of legal transplant more substantially than its political system
2
. Nevertheless, from a 
functional perspective, the comparative study of a shared legal issue in two legal systems 
may still be workable to find out the equivalent legal mechanisms to solve the same problems 
in different societies
3
. In the following chapters of this dissertation, the agency problems in 
the organizational laws of private equity in China will be discussed both theoretically and 
practically. By reference to the legal-economic analysis of the functions of different 
commercial entities, this research is expected to provide a proposal for comprehensively 
                                                          
1
 William Twining, ‗Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective‘ (2004) 49 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1, 35. 
2
 Ibid, 34. 
3
 Esin Örücü, ‗Methodological Aspects of Comparative Law‘ (2006) 8 European Journal of Law Reform 29, 33. 
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enhancing the protection of investors of PE funds in the context of business organizational 
laws in China. Beyond the comparative research of the governance of private equity, this 
research also attempts to explore a new way to explain the driving force of the evolution and 
institutional changes of business organizations, while at this stage this idea may only be 
preliminary and needs to be studied in further research.   
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Chapter 1: The Agency Problems in Private Equity Organizations 
 
1.1   Introduction 
 
Private equity (PE) funds commonly refer to a series of vehicles used in collective 
investments, all of which are generally themed that the capital is raised privately from 
qualified investors and is mainly invested in private firms, with the exception of public-to-
private funds used in privatizations.
1
 Generally, the so-called PE funds can be categorised as 
venture capital (VC), development capital funds, management buyouts and leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs)
2
. In historical terms, PE as a means of corporate finance in modern economies 
initially emerged in the mid-1940s and has flourished in the United States (US) since the late 
1970s to 1980s.
3
 In the history of PE in the United Kingdom (UK), reform of privatization 
led by the Conservative government during the 1980s also made the PE market in the UK 
quite vibrant and internationally significant by late the 1980s.
4
 From a legal and economic 
perspective, the emergence of PE, including venture capital as new players in global capital 
markets, also raised the question of how the rationale for PE should be explained 
academically in the context of corporate governance and the economics of laws.  
 
In this chapter the contractual theory of the firm and agency theory as the analytical basis of 
this research will be explained, and the agency problems in the life cycle of typical PE 
investment will also be discussed in detail. In the following section, both the advantages and 
drawbacks of fiduciary duty in common law jurisdiction as the main legal solver to the 
                                                          
1
 Brian Cheffins and John Armour, ‗The Eclipse of Private Equity‘ ECGI Working Paper Series in Law 82/2007 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=982114> accessed 15 January 2016.  
2
 Strictly speaking, private equity and venture capital are two different kinds of private investment funds. The 
distinctions of the two can be summarized as follows: 1) PE funds mainly invest in those well-profitable and 
reputable public corporations, whereas VC funds are interested in those start-ups or small private-owned firms 
who usually have technical innovations and reliable core team but the profitability of their business is uncertain 
and risky; 2) in terms of the governance strategies, PE funds in most cases are the controlling shareholders in the 
investee companies by purchasing majority portion of shares, whereas VC funds play a role as minority 
shareholders; 3) compared with venture capitalists, PE funds usually prefer financial leverage to facilitate the 
share purchase for controlling the target companies; 4) in aspect of regulatory requirement,  the main difference 
between the two types of investment funds is that, since PE funds are able to essentially impact large public 
corporations‘ decision-making, the regulations will focus more on the public interest such as the protection of 
employees of the investee companies and transparency of PE firms‘ decision-making process. In contrast, the 
law and regulations relating to VC investment will pay more attention on the protection for minority 
shareholders. Harry Cendrowski et al, Private Equity: History, Governance, and Operations (2
nd 
edn, Wiley & 
Sons  2012) 20-22, 173-175.  
3
 Ibid., 29–30. 
4
 Luc Renneboog, Tomas Simons and Mike Wright, ‗Why Do Public Firms Go Private in the UK?‘ 
(6 January 2006) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=873673> accessed 15 January 2016. 
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agency problems in commercial organizations will be illustrated in the light of legal 
transplantation. As this research is mainly aimed at enhancing the legal protection for 
investors in China‘s PE industry5, the status quo of the Chinese PE industry, especially its 
special connection with China‘s state power, is overviewed, and specific problems in relation 
to investor protection of China‘s PE organizations are summarized. Finally, in the 
methodological aspect of this research, a functional comparison is made between the legal 
systems of PE organizations in China, the UK and other jurisdictions as the primary approach 
to carry out the detailed study in this dissertation. Some recommendations are made and 
advice is provided for improving the investor protection mechanisms in the Chinese PE 
industry. 
 
1.2 The Nature of the Firm and Agency Problems in Private Equity Organizations 
 
1.2.1  The Contractual Theory of the Firm in the Context of Social Transformation 
 
1.2.1.1  The Firm as a ‘Nexus of Contracts’  
 
The landscape of the global economy and politics experienced dramatic change during late 
1970s and 1980s. As a response to the stagflation in this period and competition with new-
born economies such as Japan and West Germany, so-called neoliberalism, which is 
commonly characterized as a turning point in individualism and classic theory of market 
economy in academia, was established in the US and UK. In a practical sense, neoliberalism 
as a new ideology was also quickly adopted by the authorities of most common law 
countries.
6
 Against this background, the development of the theory of the firm in law and 
economics also transformed. In stark contrast to the entity theory of the corporation 
supporting state intervention in internal governance of business organizations, the contractual 
theory of the firm particularly prioritizes the contractual freedom between the participants in 
                                                          
5
 It needs to be clarified that in this thesis, the term ‗PE‘ which is related to China is generally include private 
equity and venture capital, although academically there are important distinctions between the two. The main 
reasons for this technical issue are given as follows: firstly, although at present VC funds still account for 
majority of the Chinese market, the typical PE funds especially those industrial buyouts funds have emerged and 
steadily developed in recent years. Secondly, both the PE and VC funds in China are organized in limited 
partnership and commercial trusts, in other words, the agency problems which are discussed in this research are 
generally applicable to both the PE and VC industry in China.   
6
 See details in David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP 2005)10-45. 
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the free market,
7
 which has been developed as a mainstream doctrine for legal–economic 
analysis of business organizations.  
 
Generally speaking, contractarian scholars view the nature of business organization as the 
‗nexus of contracts‘.8 The original idea that regards the firm as ‗a nexus of contracts‘ between 
the parties to a transaction was first raised by Ronald Coase in his distinguished work The 
Nature of the Firm (1937). Coase construed the emergence of firms as a substitution of 
‗transaction contracts‘ (or the ‗price mechanism‘) in the market, by which the transactions 
costs
9
 generated from market coordination would be reduced.
10
 On the one hand, the 
utilization of the firm would reduce the costs in the market and, on the other, however, the 
utilization of a firm or organizations would not be free, and the information asymmetry and 
administration of employees in the hierarchical structure in the firm would also be costly. 
Hence, in theory, the profit of a firm would reach the optimal point where the costs of using 
the organizational structure are equal to the expenses of organizing such a deal in the 
market.
11
 A little earlier than Coase, in 1932, Berle and Means came up with the thesis that 
due to the separation of ownership and control in public corporations, the shareholders should, 
but actually do not, play a significant role in scrutinizing the managers,
12
 then the main theme 
in governance of business organizations would focus on how maximally to protect the owners‘ 
interests from managers‘ opportunistic behaviour.  
 
In the 1970s, the contractual theory developed more practically and paid more attention to the 
economic rationale of different organizational forms and the agency problems in corporate 
governance. Alchian and Demsetz regarded the firm as a team production, which would be 
more efficient than those members working individually.
13
 The agency problem would 
inevitably arise if the separation of ownership and control existed, therefore how to monitor 
the members in a production team or firm would be essential. Because of the different 
                                                          
7
 Henry N. Butler, ‗The Contractual Theory of the Corporation‘ (1989) 11 (4) George Mason University Law 
Review 99, 100. 
8
 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‗Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure‘ (1976) 3 The Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
9
 The term ‗transaction cost‘ commonly refers to the costs generated from the process of actions between the 
participants in the market, including the costs of negotiating, contracting and monitoring. Supra n 7, 103. 
10
 Ronald Coase, ‗The Nature of the Firm‘ (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction 
Publisher 1968).  
13
 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‗Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organizations‘ (1972) 
62 The American Economic Review 777. 
11 
 
relationships between the team members, the choice of organizational forms would be varied. 
For example, the partnership structure would be preferred by professional concerns such as 
firms of solicitors and accountants, in which the self-monitoring between the members may 
improve the efficiency in such small professional businesses and enhance the trust among one 
another.
14
 In the corporate form, however, because in most cases the shareholders are unable 
to monitor the management layer all the time and due to the existence of the public market, 
the trust between the shareholders and managers may not be stable enough. As a response to 
this issue, it was argued that entitling a part of residual claim to the managers would align the 
manager‘s interests with the residual claimants‘ interests;15  in other words, the incentive 
mechanism for managerial staff may reduce the agency costs.  
 
1.2.1.2  The Statutory Form of Firms as Standardized Contracts 
 
In terms of the legal structure of business organizations, contractarians deem the statute as a 
kind of ‗standardized contract‘ that provides a set of fixed contractual terms for the parties in 
organizations. Taking the corporation as an example, the limited liability protection sets a 
clear boundary between the company and shareholders; the statutory obligation and rights of 
the board of directors and general meeting of shareholders provide a default governance 
structure for the managers and owners. Although most company laws provide a wide range of 
contractual freedom in articles of association and ownership structure,
16
 the existence of the 
laws of corporations as standardized contract and ‗public goods‘ can significantly save on 
negotiation costs.
17
 Similarly, the joint liability and unlimited liability of the members fixed 
by partnership laws also provide a special legal mechanism that can enhance the protection of 
the partners and reduce the agency costs by triggering the personal liabilities of general 
partners in given circumstances. Despite the fact that traditionally the trust may not have been 
regarded as a business organization, based on the widely used trust-like structure in financial 
investment, the organizational feature of trusts is also noteworthy.
18
 Owing to the high-level 
flexibility in management and decision-making in a trust, the business trust has been applied 
                                                          
14
 Ibid. 
15
  Butler (n7).  
16
 Specific illustration and economic analysis of the articles of associations and class shares are available in 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
17
 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, ‗The Corporate Contract‘ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416, 
1444-1446.  
18
 Steven L. Schwarcz, ‗Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: An Invitation to Comparatists‘ (2003) 13 
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 321.  
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as the organizational foundation in alternative investment. In specific terms, the pension 
funds, mutual funds and even venture capital can be organized in a trust structure, and the 
relevant legislation tends to provide clearer and fixed governance structures for both fund 
managers and investors (beneficiaries). In such a way, the balance of the flexibility in 
drafting trust deeds between the parties and the statutory structures of modern business trusts, 
especially the laws of investment funds, makes the trust-like investment vehicles more 
contractual and the statutory structure of trusts also plays a role as the cost-saver in creating a 
trust-like vehicle for commercial purposes.
19
 
 
1.2.2   The Agency Problems in Private Equity Investments 
 
Before the boom of PE in the US and UK since the 1980s, the ownership structures of  
companies in two such typical common law countries were highly dispersed. In other words, 
a single shareholder could hardly effectively control the firm or protect his or her economic 
interests by monitoring the managers or making influential decisions in shareholders‘ general 
meetings. As a response to such problems in corporate governance, the various shareholders 
needed to concentrate their shares collectively to enhance their control over the company. 
However, even though the shares in the hands of the minority shareholders can be 
concentrated by acquiring the equities from other shareholders, due to the limited time, 
energy and professional experience in corporate management, the operational experts in both 
financial investment and business management were strongly favoured by the owners of US 
and UK companies. Against this background, the most influential PE firms initially emerged 
in Wall Street and then in the UK by the late 1980s.
20
  The agency problems also arise 
through every phase of PE/VC investments, PE investments are commonly made within 
complicated business organizational forms.  
 
On the level of the internal governance of PE funds, limited partnerships are the most widely 
used legal form in PE and VC investments which can provide a more suitable and efficient 
governance structure.
21
 Briefly, capital contributors such as pension funds, insurance 
                                                          
19
 John H. Langein, ‗The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts‘ (1995) 105 The Yale Law Journal 625.  
20
 Mike Wright et al, ‗Leveraged Buyouts in the U.K. and Continental Europe: Retrospect and Prospect‘ (July 
2006). ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 126/2006; CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2006-70 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=918121> accessed 20 January 2016.  
21
 A detailed analysis of the agency problems in PE limited partnerships is available in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
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companies and wealthy individuals contribute capital to a limited partnership. In this limited 
partnership, the contributors are limited partners who are protected by limited liability in the 
extent to which they contribute and, usually, these partners are not allowed to participate in 
the decision-making of the limited partnership. At the same time, the fund manager, mostly a 
PE or VC management firm, acts as the general partner who only contributes 1–2% of the 
capital of the PE fund but is exposed to the unlimited liability and is responsible for making 
decisions in fund management through the whole life cycle of the PE fund.
22
 Furthermore, as 
one of the basic principles of the laws of limited partnerships, once the limited partners 
actively participate in the governance of the partnership, the limited liability protection will 
be waived. Under such pressure, the limited partners who actually contribute most of the 
capital of the PE funds will lose control over the management; in other words, the agency 
costs in the management of a PE limited partnership is still an important issue that should not 
be ignored. Similarly, in particular circumstances, such as China, the business trust will also 
be applied to PE and VC investment due to the high-level separation between the ownership 
and control over the capital in the PE investment trust funds. The agency costs in such 
organizational structure are much higher than the limited partnership structure.
23
 
 
It is widely accepted that the emergence of PE, especially LBOs, may play an active role in 
reducing the agency costs in the companies with dispersed ownership structures. In practice, 
however, the protection of investors in PE and VC funds in the level of corporate governance 
still need to be further considered and improved: firstly, most PE firms (excluding VC funds) 
mainly do buyouts such as LBOs in which the high level of debt financing will be used to 
maximize their returns, in this method the high rate of leverage in the structure of corporate 
finance may distort the motivation of the decision-making of the investee companies‘ 
management layer. As a result, because the buyout funds mainly focus on the return rate of 
the investment from the portfolio companies in a fixed period (e.g., commonly ten years for a 
typical PE fund) instead of long-term development of the company, management‘s 
opportunistic behaviour in corporate governance may not be prevented. Again, owing to the 
high level of leverage, once the investment fails, the loss to both the PE shareholders and 
                                                          
22
 Steven N. Kaplan and Per Strömberg, ‗Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity‘ (July 2008) NBER Working 
Paper No. 14207 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1190356> accessed 20 January 2016. 
23
 A detailed analysis of the agency problems in PE investment trusts is available in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
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other owners of the investee companies may be disastrous.
24
 Secondly, venture capital funds, 
usually provided by the minority shareholders in start-ups, may also be oppressed by the 
entrepreneurial controllers. As a result, the transaction costs including the agency and 
negotiating costs generated from drafting the contractual terms for enhancing the protection 
for the venture capitalists in corporate governance are also noticeable.  
 
1.3  Fiduciary Duties as Solvers to Agency Problems in Business Organization Law 
 
1.3.1  Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules in Commercial Law 
 
Based on the contractual theory of the firm, the governance rules of the firm mainly depend 
on the agreement between the parties. Theoretically, the parties to a contract can optimize the 
governance structure by drafting specific contractual provisions, by which all circumstances 
will be predicted and stipulated in contracts. In fact, however, it is impossible to predict all 
the contingencies in future and even if it were possible, the costs of drafting such contracts 
would be insufferable; that is to say, the contract of the firm would be incomplete. In such 
circumstances, the primary issues that need to be considered is how to deal with the 
uncertainty generated from the incompleteness of firms‘ contracts.  
 
As a response to the uncertainties, two main approaches may be useful. The first is that the 
legislators are expected to draft more specific and detailed statutes to provide solutions for 
the parties in the market in advance. However, aside from the problematic feasibility, owing 
to the complexity and volatility of business in modern society, over-detailed legislation may 
seriously limit the flexibility and adaptability of the laws in the real commercial world. 
Additionally, no matter how accurate the written laws can be, it is difficult to avoid the 
vagueness of definition in the statutes. For example, different parties may have different 
understandings of the same term in a law; or a given circumstance may lie out the definition 
                                                          
24
 In this regard, the mass-scale LBOs during 1980s by LBO tycoons such as KKR and Blackstone in the US 
perfectly illustrate the details of the transactions and especially the star case of LBO also shows how the PE 
fund can destroy the fate of a promising company. Moreover, owing to the boom of complex structured financial 
instruments in the past two decades, the opportunistic behaviours in LBOs may also transfer the risk in 
corporate decision-making to the public via collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). Charles R. Geisst, Deals of 
the Century: Wall Street, Mergers, and the Making of Modern America (John Wiley & Sons 2004) 179–232; 
Viral V. Acharya, Julian Franks, and Henri Servaes, ‗Private Equity: Boom and Bust?‘ (Fall 2007) 19 (4) 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 1.  
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provided by the present legislation;
25
 in other words, it is obvious that pursuing the 
completeness of legislation is still not efficient.  
 
The second approach to addressing the uncertainties in commercial law is the intervention 
and remedy of external institutions. In the context of common law jurisdictions, fiduciary 
duties as default rules developed by the judiciary play an underlying role in dealing with the 
uncertainty in business law. In general, the fiduciary duty system is one of the core concepts 
in the law of business organizations in the Anglo-American jurisdiction. Although the 
fiduciary duties generally can be summarized as the duty of care and duty of loyalty which 
are imposed on persons such as the director in the company, the trustee of the trust fund or 
the managing partner in a partnership, the precise meaning of the fiduciary duties might not 
be understood correctly without a reference to the voluminous case law. From an economic 
point of view, the fiduciary duty system plays a role as a gap-filler for reducing or correcting 
the uncertainties in incomplete contracts, in which the contractual parties can spend more 
time on issues for their own specific needs and leave the broader issues to the court.
26
 
Moreover, judicial sanctions against a manager‘s breach of fiduciary duties also convince the 
parties of the firms that the external pressure of fiduciary duties is able to supervise the 
managers effectively to perform properly.
27
 In summary, the application of fiduciary duty 
rules in the laws of commercial organizations has provided a flexible and costless way to 
extend the freedom of participants in transactions and to improve economic efficiency.  
 
1.3.2  The Limitations of the Fiduciary Duty Regime 
 
1.3.2.1  The Uncertainty in Application of Fiduciary Duties 
 
Although the fiduciary duty regime as the default rules can save on transaction costs by 
allocating a part of the legislating power to the judicial system, which can make negotiation 
among the parties of the firm more efficient, every legal institution is a double-edged sword, 
the fiduciary duty rules of commercial organizations still have inherent shortcomings. Taking 
                                                          
25
 Iain G. MacNeil, ‗Uncertainty in Commercial Law‘ (2009) 13 Edinburgh Law Review 68, 76. 
26
 Iain G. MacNeil, ‗Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory‘ 
(2001) 1 (1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 107, 119. 
27
 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University 
Press 1991) 92.  
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the securities investment fund (such as unit trusts in the UK or mutual funds in the US) as an 
example, the duty of care requires the trustees to manage the trust assets prudently and 
professionally in the interests of beneficiaries exclusively. In the instance where a loss occurs 
and beneficiaries or investors file a lawsuit, it may be too difficult for a judge to decide 
whether or not a specific investment decision was reasonable. Moreover, owing to the time-
consuming process of judicial review, even though the court provides adequate remedies for 
investors, the loss in specific investments involving stock market indexes, for instance, or 
financial derivatives, may still be exacerbated before the eventual adjudication.  
 
Furthermore, imposing strict fiduciary duties on some given business organizations may 
decrease the advantages of such given investment entities; for instance, in a family 
partnership, the over-strict fiduciary duty may undermine kinship and trust between family 
members.
28
 In terms of the limited partnership, in a general sense, limited partners do not 
manage the firm, which justifies the strict fiduciary burden on general partners. Because of 
the existence of unlimited liability on the general partners, however, the costs and benefits of 
the managing partners‘ fiduciary duties should still be balanced. Specifically, limited 
partnerships are usually used in risky investments, the flexibility of decision-making is 
essential for successful investment. In sum, the liability mechanism and governance structure 
within the limited partnership can be more efficient than the fiduciary duty system. As a 
response in practice, US courts have permitted the waiver of fiduciary duty in limited 
partnerships within limits.
29
 Similarly, in the UK, although there are fewer judicial practices 
clearly permitting the full waiver of fiduciary duties via the drafting of contractual terms, the 
scope of fiduciary duties can be modified by contractual terms has been a basic principle.
30
 
Specifically, in  consideration of the high costs involved in both the contracting and judicial 
practices of fiduciary duties, the rigid fiduciary duties of general partners in the UK‘s venture 
capital funds have been criticized, and it is argued that alternative mechanisms such as 
                                                          
28
 Larry E. Ribstein, ‗Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements‘ (2004) 37 Suffolk University Law 
Review 927, 942; similarly, although some US judges also tried to impose fiduciary duties on close friends and 
one another, in a general sense, the relationship between friends should be distinct from the fiduciary 
relationship, as the business between friends is mainly based on the personal trust instead of professional 
relationship, the over-use of fiduciary law in personal social life may also break the basic human affection that 
constitutes the harmony in society. Ethan J. Leib, ‗Friends as Fiduciaries‘ (2009) 86 (3) Washington University 
Law Review 665, 700–701. 
29
 Ribstein (n 28).  
30
 Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205. 
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reputation
31
 and contractual adjustment
32
 have been playing an important role in preventing 
opportunism.  
 
In addition, the judicial attitudes towards directors‘ fiduciary duties stipulated in the articles 
of association in public corporations also still differ in different regions. The courts in the US, 
for example, tend to regard public corporations as ‗public contracts‘. 34 Therefore, the waiver 
of fiduciary duties as freedom to contract may be restricted or invalidated by judicial 
review.
35
 As for the company law in the UK, though the Companies Act 2006 (CA2006) does 
not allow any provisions amending directors‘ liability in the articles of association,36 directors‘ 
liabilities in certain circumstances may still be mitigated or waived by judicial discretion. 
Firstly, according to the CA2006, British judges are vested with the power to grant relief to 
directors of a company in certain cases regarding the directors‘ breach of fiduciary duties.37 
Secondly, in a practical sense, UK judges have accepted the mitigation or relief of directors 
or senior staff‘s duties to the company for nearly a century, directors may be exonerated from 
their liability through specific provisions in articles of association
38
 and the court may 
mitigate or exempt a director‘s liability at its discretion on a case-by-case basis;39 in other 
words, although basically it is still one of the most significant and unique legal regimes in 
common law jurisdiction, at least the strictness of fiduciary duties in commercial law is being 
more and more flexible, instead of overly rigid. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Joseph A. MaCahery and Erik P.M. Vermeulen, ‗Limited Partnership Reform in the United Kingdom: A 
Competitive, Venture Capital Oriented Business Form‘ (2004) 5 European Business Organization Law Review 
79, 82. 
32
 A  recent case decided by the High Court of Justice has shown that the duties of the general partner in a 
limited partnership can be narrowed down by contractual provisions in a limited partnership agreement (LPA), 
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the partnership. Inversiones Frieira SL v Colyzeo Investors II LP [2012] EWHC 1450. 
34
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Teaches Us About Default Rules‘ (2006) 33 Florida State University Law Review 697, 713–718. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Section 232 (1). 
37
 Section 1157. 
38
 Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 425; Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co 
[1925] Ch 407. 
39
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1.3.2.2   The Barrier to the Legal Transplantation of Fiduciary Duties 
 
Aside from the uncertainties in judicial interpretation, the legal transplantation of fiduciary 
duty regime across jurisdictions is also problematic. Some comparativists have stated that so 
far in transitional economies, the legal reforms brought about by the authorities were mainly 
focused on the statutory laws in European or US legal systems, while reforms of the judicial 
system was still unsatisfactory.
40
 Even though the judicial practices were introduced in some 
emerging markets, the limited experience in coping with decision-making in business 
organizations (e.g., Poland)
41
 and politically driven adjudications (e.g., Russia)
42
 can hardly 
provide adequate protection for investors. What‘s more, as the analysis above shows, the 
basic function of fiduciary duties in commercial law is providing flexible and efficient 
protection for investors, whereas in some transitional jurisdictions the functions of 
commercial laws are not protective but are more political.
43
 The over-dependence on 
transplanting the fiduciary duties in other jurisdictions may cause high social costs and the 
protective functions of fiduciary laws may be substantially weakened. It is obvious that the 
costs of any legal transplantation would not be nil, thus a mixture of indigenous or alternative 
solutions may be more efficient to the same legal problem in a given society and the 
convergence or divergence in legal transplantation is determined by the competition between 
different regimes.
44
 In a nutshell, the limitations of the uncertainty and impracticality of 
fiduciary duties may lead to alternative legal reforms as more cost-efficient and favourable 
solutions to agency problems in a given jurisdiction. 
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1.4  The Political Economy of China’s Private Equity Sector 
 
Since the mid-1980s, the Chinese authority officially decided to build up a healthy market for 
developing science and technology which served as an important component of the market 
economy reform and opening up policy in China. PE and VC funds as effective financial 
support for innovative economy were introduced in China. Through around thirty years‘ rapid 
growth, PE has been playing an irreplaceable role in the Chinese economy. Although the 
legislator promulgated and improved financial regulatory and commercial organizational 
laws, the conflict between emerging private entrepreneurship and the unshakable status of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still seriously increases transaction costs in PE investments in 
China. In this section, the following political-economic review of Chinese PE industry is an 
attempt to briefly draw a whole picture of political economy of the PE market in China and to 
explore the potential legal risks for the detailed analysis later. 
 
 1.4.1    The Economic and Financial Transitions in Contemporary China 
 
After nearly thirty-five years‘ massive economic growth, the economic institution reform in 
China is at a turning point. During the last three decades, China‘s huge achievement in GDP 
growth attracted attention of the world, which mainly relied on government-led 
infrastructural investment, exports and real estate industry. From the year of 2012, however, 
Chinese economy has been changing dramatically. The over-unbalanced economic and 
industrial structure has become a serious obstruction of sustainability of Chinese economy
45
.  
Against such a macro background, China‘s State President Jinping Xi took over the power in 
March 2013, after which a series of important reforms in the fields of financial regulation and 
capital market were launched.  
                                                          
45
 See the changing of GDP growth rate of China during the recent decade from figure 1.1.  
20 
 
 
 
 
 
Ever since the Decision on Major Issues concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms of 
China Communist Party (CCP), the supreme guide for present-day social reform of Chinese 
authority, was promulgated in November 2013
46
, encouraging the private sector in Chinese 
economy and mixed ownership reform of SOEs are the two primary goals of current wave of 
social transition in China. Specifically, the following two dimensions constitute the whole 
picture of the economic and regulatory in contemporary China.  
 
First of all, in order to optimize the governance efficiency of SOEs, the acquisition of the 
ownership of Chinese listed companies by private capital has been encouraged continuously, 
even though most of Chinese listed firms are still controlled by the state
47
. Almost at the 
meantime, the mixed ownership investment in the area of infrastructural construction are also 
widely permitted and encouraged by both the central and local Chinese governments
48
.  
 
Secondly, the legal and financial regulatory reforms also aim to fuel the development of 
private economy.  As the starting point of the legal reform of Chinese non-state-owned sector, 
                                                          
46
 Hereinafter referred to as ‗the Decision (2013)‘ [中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定（2013 年 11
月 10 日审议通过）]. 
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the new revision of the Company Law of China in 2013 removed over-high threshold for 
capital registration and essentially reduced the cost of registering small start-ups
49
. The 
internet finance as a new star in Chinese financial market is also playing an increasingly 
important role in Chinese economy which has the potential to become the pillar industry of 
Chinese economy in international competition, as state-owned capital in this sub-market is 
the lowest. In terms of the financial regulatory system, the new Law of Securities Investment 
Funds (2012 Revision) firstly made huge effort to unify the regulatory power of Chinese 
investment fund industry. As one of the result, the emerging Chinese private investment fund 
industry is regulated by the central regulator
50
 and the protection for public investors is also 
essentially enhanced by the law.  
 
1.4.2  The Status quo of Private Equity in China 
 
If it is said that petroleum is the ‗blood‘ for industry, capital can also be assimilated as the 
‗blood‘ for enterprises. There are currently four main sources providing the finance for 
Chinese companies to expand their businesses, namely (i) loans from banks, (ii) the private 
lending market, (iii) the public stock market and (iv) the debt market. First of all, as regards 
loans from commercial banks, considering most commercial banks in China are owned by the 
state
51
, Chinese commercial banks prefer to lend money only to the SOEs or medium to large 
enterprises with a good reputation and clean credit record
52
. For start-ups, without stable cash 
flow or adequate collateral, however, lending from commercial banks is quite difficult.
53
 The 
second source is private lending, which may be more flexible for small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). However, private lending is also not reliable for most private enterprises 
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in China, because the risk of illegal fund-raising and interest rates are very high.
54
 Thirdly, 
nevertheless the public stock markets regulated by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) can provide a safer source of finance, for most private firms, however, 
the high requirements of listing have, in fact, blocked their access to China‘s stock market. 
As a consequence, at present nearly 75% of the companies listed on China‘s domestic stock 
exchange are SOEs.
55
 In parallel, the debt market in China also extraordinarily prioritizes  
SOEs, whereas the bonds issued by the SMEs only constituted 10% or less of the bond 
market in the past five years.
56
 Overall, the mainstream financial sector in China can hardly 
meet the demands of SMEs for financing.  
 
As an alternative financing channel for SMEs, PE funds have been developing rapidly in 
China during the past two decades. Generally speaking, the Chinese PE industry can be 
divided into two phases. The first phase is before 2009, during which China‘s PE industry 
was dominated by US dollar-dominated funds. Owing to the serious recession caused by the 
global crisis, the local PE funds (renminbi- (RMB) dominated funds) gradually replaced 
foreign PE tycoons and became the leaders in Chinese PE market from 2009 (see Figure 1.1). 
As for the significance of the PE industry for the economic development in China, the 
continuous expansion of PE as an effective means of addressing the financing constraints for 
China‘s SMEs has also made a positive contribution to the economic growth of China (see 
Figure 1.2). 
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1.4.3  The Role of State in Chinese Private Equity Industry 
 
PE investment in China initially emerged during the same time in which the Chinese 
government advocated a ‗socialist market economy‘. The first PE-related legal document, 
Figure 1.3: Growth in private equity fundraising and investment eclipses GDP growth rate  
(2003–2008) 
Source: Leeds and Satyamurthy (n 55) 172. 
Figure 1.2: Number of investments in USD and RMB (in %) (2000–2014)  
Source: Justin Robertson, Localizing Global Finance: The Rise of Western-style Private Equity in 
China (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 47. 
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namely the ‗Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology Management System‘,57 
was issued by the CCP in 1985. The first wave of Chinese PE and VC investments were 
dominated by the Chinese governments and SOEs. On a provincial level some local 
governments had also established more than 90 funds in 24 provinces with total capital of 
over US$45 billion for the purpose of supporting technical innovations.
58
 In order to master 
the use of the capital powerfully, the Chinese PE market was controlled by state-owned 
capital via the organizational structure of the limited liability company, in which the Chinese 
government could directly control the PE funds by exercising the shareholders‘ power of the 
general meeting of the fund management companies.  
 
Owing to the high rate of taxation and inefficient management, since the Law of Partnership 
Enterprises had been revised in 2006, the limited partnership rapidly replaced corporate PE 
funds as the dominant legal structure for PE investment in China.
59
 The local investors as 
limited partners in China‘s private equity limited partnerships (PELPs) are mainly the local 
government, securities companies, listed companies, state-owned commercial banks, most of 
whom use publicly owned capital to invest in PE and VC projects, and assume limited 
liability.
60
 Owing to the lack of domestic professional fund management firms, unlike 
Western PELPs, the state-owned ones in China are always willing to get involved in PE 
management in the name of maintaining and appreciating the value of state assets.
61
 
 
In comparison with democratic countries, owing to the short history of democratization and 
marketization of Chinese society, the separation of politics from economy in China is still not 
well developed. The first wave of privatization reform of SOEs (particularly the management 
buyout (MBO) of SOEs) during the 1990s has made it possible for individuals, especially 
ones who have personal relationships with senior officials in the Chinese government and 
CCP, to control SOEs or their subsidiaries in different forms. Hence, research needs to be 
conducted on China‘s top domestic PE firms staffed at senior levels by the family members 
or relatives of the senior officials of Chinese government (or so-called ‗princelings‘) or that 
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 [中共中央关于科学技术体制改革的决定(国发 1985 第 6 号)].  
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 According to the latest statistics issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of 
China, the number of PE limited partnerships has surpassed the number of corporate PE funds since 2012. See 
details in Figure 2.1 & 2.2 in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
60
 Yong Zhen, China’s Capital Markets (Chandos Publishing 2013) 113. 
61
 In this regard, a detailed analysis is available in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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are affiliated with large SOEs (see Table 1.1), which could assist to understand the hidden 
dimension of the legal problems in the Chinese PE industry. PE, especially the VC industry, 
is a high-risk business: the profitability of PE is determined by the prediction and control of 
market uncertainties. Having a princeling in the PE senior management layer is an obvious 
advantage in establishing close relationships with the Chinese government or even the 
regulators. In practical terms, the function of princelings in PE firms would be to enhance the 
possibility of listing investee companies on the Chinese stock exchanges for the purpose of 
exiting and cashing in shares.
62
 For instance, the investee company may choose a princeling 
partner-mastered PE fund, in consideration of the relationship between such applicant 
company and the interested groups in the Chinese government and the CCP. The CSRC will 
give higher priority to such companies given that the officials of the CSRC are also reluctant 
to reject a company with a special relationship with princeling families.
63
 In sum, it is 
possible that the political factors in the Chinese PE industry will also significantly influence 
the development of legal and regulatory frameworks for PE funds.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.5  Agency Problems of Private Equity and Limitations of Judiciary in China 
 
As mentioned earlier, modern firms feature separation between ownership and control, which 
gives rise to agency problems within firms. In the process of PE investment under Chinese 
law, agency costs are generated on two levels, the one is the agency problem between the 
fund managers and investors and the other is the agency problem between the entrepreneurs 
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 Justin Robertson, Localizing Global Finance: The Rise of Western-style Private Equity in China (Palgrave 
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Table 1.1: Ten Chinese private equity firms with senior princelings in management 
Source: Justin Robertson, Localizing Global Finance: The Rise of Western-style Private Equity in China 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 56. 
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and PE shareholders in corporate governance of portfolio companies. As for the legal 
structure of PE funds, presently most PE funds are organized in the forms of limited 
partnership and commercial trust. Firstly, in terms of the governance of PE funds, owing to 
the inadequacy of experienced institutional investors and professional PE firms, both the 
limited partners of PELPs and beneficiaries of private equity investment trusts (PEITs) tend 
to intervene actively in the management of the fund which has considerably increased the 
transaction costs and risk of investment failure.
64
 Secondly, the main problem in corporate 
governance of Chinese companies is the weak protection for minority shareholders. In 
specific terms, currently PE funds mainly pay attention to the non-state companies in China, 
in which the entrepreneurs (or the controlling families) as controlling shareholders and senior 
managers of the investee companies may oppress the PE minorities.
65
 Although some 
empirical studies of the relationship between PE intervention in firm management and the 
efficiency of corporate governance show that the sophisticated and active role of PE 
shareholders in corporate governance can optimize the decision-making process in family-
owned firms,
 66
 in the situation where PE shareholders are minority shareholders the balanced 
legal protection mechanisms are still essential for decreasing agency costs and avoiding 
serious conflicts between management and PE shareholders.  
 
The analysis of the economic functions of the fiduciary duty system in promoting financial 
markets shows that the case-by-case method in settling the disputes in fiduciary-like 
relationships can expand the range of contractual freedom for the parties and save on 
transaction costs, the success of which mainly depends on the independence and 
professionalism of the judicial system. Although the adjudicative reform based on the case 
law model in common law jurisdictions has been officially pushed by the authorities of China 
in the past two decades, the rejection of separation of powers and the emphasis on both the 
socialist nature of Chinese society and the CCP‘s leadership make it difficult to develop 
independent adjudication as a dominating remedial means for protecting investors in financial 
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markets like that in common law countries in the near future.
67
 In the practical sense, because 
of the loose regulatory environment of private investment funds, the real-time supervision is 
not as strong as public-traded funds, and the proof of causation of the loss and 
mismanagement may be very costly and difficult for investors of PE funds. Finally, due to the 
costly procedures of lawsuits, the rational apathy of individual investors may also impede the 
application of class lawsuits in China‘s PE and VC market.68  
 
1.6  The Methodological Aspects of the Research: A Response to Chinese Economy  
 
The above summary and analysis of the status quo of private equity in the context of the 
economic reform in contemporary China illustrates that the legal issues of investor protection 
or tackling with the agency problems in organizational governance should be considered in a 
very close connection with the political economy of China. Accordingly, as a response to the 
agency problems in Chinese private equity investment, the methodology of such a research 
should be compatible with the particularity of Chinese social background. Prior to the 
detailed studies, two issues are worthy to be further illuminated. 
 
1.6.1    The Appropriateness of the Theoretical Foundation 
 
It is not surprising that one may doubt the appropriateness of using ‗the contractual theory of 
the firm‘ as the doctrinal foundation for this research, because to how large extent the 
Chinese economy is market-oriented is still debatable. In fact, this research primarily 
involves three departmental laws of commercial legal system, namely the laws of 
partnerships, business trusts and corporations. Since the first company law was promulgated 
in early 1990s, the liberalistic and market-oriented reforms of commercial organization laws 
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in China have been carried out respectively
69
. Even though the effectiveness of the present-
day reform of Chinese SOEs is still not clear and of course, the political nepotism may still 
impede the marketization of Chinese economy, the unbalanced economic structure and 
serious corruption in the SOEs has pushed the authority to weaken the monopolistic status of 
state-owned enterprises and state control over private economy substantively
70
.  
 
Therefore, in regard of the institutional reform of private equity in China, contractualization 
and marketization are expectable. Specifically, in relation to the agency problems in Chinese 
PE and VC industry, the marketization may facilitate the following institutional changes: 
firstly, the clearer recognition of market economy will encourage the confidence of private 
economy of China, as an important sector of private economy, more sophisticated contractual 
techniques will be developed by both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists or PE experts. 
Secondly, the rapid expansion of asset management industry has been a dynamic of 
establishing a more reasonable regime of qualified investors and of promoting a more 
effective self-regulation of PE in China. Thirdly, the staged privatization of the SOEs will 
gradually dilute the political control of those state-owned PE firms, especially the investment 
trust corporations. As a result, the changes of the SOEs‘ ownership structure may not only 
facilitate the contractualization of Chinese company law but also rectify some distorted 
phenomenon in Chinese PE market. Of course, all of these expected reforms may be realized 
in several stages, instead of in an immediate process.  
 
Moreover, in respect of social culture, the re-identification of Chinese individualism has been 
a remarkable, irresistible and widely influential transition in Chinese society. In the fourth 
chapter, readers will have an opportunity to see how the Chinese culture of ‗rule of man‘ can 
be a barrier to fostering the contractual spirit in Chinese corporate governance
71
. However, it 
is not to say that the awareness of contract and the respect of market do not exist in China, 
nor to deny the substantive progress in Chinese civil society. Actually, some scholars has 
correctly pointed out that the present-day Chinese ideology is a complexity of liberalistic 
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market, the authoritarian politics and Confucian traditions
72
. The individualistic awareness of 
human rights, equality and contractual freedom in civil society is rapidly developing and the 
progress of liberalistic reform depends on the extent to which the social stability and 
economic growth rely on the private sector of China. The overview of Chinese political 
economy in above section evidently suggests that the encouragement of non-state-owned 
sectors is not only a political promise of Chinese government for its consideration of 
international reputation but also a realistic and urgent demand for domestic development in a 
long-term future.  
 
1.6.2    The Appropriateness of the Referential System for Analysis 
 
As the title of this research shows, comparative law as the basic methodology will be 
employed through the whole structure of this dissertation. Therefore, the selection of an 
appropriate referential system for analysis is crucial for the persuasiveness of the research. It 
is obvious that this research mainly aims to develop a coherent and feasible proposal for 
institutional reforms for China‘s private equity market. It is undeniable that there are more 
similarities in legal tradition between China and some countries with characteristics of 
continental law, such as Germany and Japan, especially in China and Germany or Japan, the 
ownership structures of corporations are highly concentrated, whereas the shareholding 
structure UK corporations is dispersed
74
. In other words, it is suggested that the continental 
legal tradition may be more suitable for China.  
 
In consideration of the details of the institutional background of China, however, the above 
hypothesis will be refuted. First, owing to the existence of developed banking market and 
relatively conservative attitude towards high risks in Germany and Japan, there are much 
more financing sources in the market of banking loan for companies, therefore the banks 
have motivation to actively monitor the decision-making of the borrowers ex ante, interim 
and ex post
75
. Moreover, for keeping both the safety of loan and commercial co-operation, the 
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commercial banks in Germany tend to keep long-term relationships with the companies. As a 
consequence, the commercial banks are willing to be shareholders and to participate in 
corporate governance by direct voting and by casting proxy votes in borrowing corporations
76
.  
By contrast, the financing from Chinese commercial banks are extremely inadequate, as the 
threshold of mortgage loan is very high, which is insufferable for most start-ups. Moreover, 
even though the Chinese banks are vested with voting rights in shareholders‘ meeting of 
borrowing companies, the absolute state control over the commercial banks will inactivate 
their incentives to monitor the performance of borrowing companies
77
.  
 
Second, as another unique monitoring mechanism in German corporate governance, the co-
determination plays a significant role in reducing the agency problems. For enhancing the 
protection of stakeholders in German companies, not only shareholders but also employees 
are vested voting rights in corporate governance, by which employees are able to exert 
influence on corporate decision-making at the level of supervisory board
78
. The feasibility of 
such kind of protection mechanism to a large extent is determined by the long history and 
tradition of social democratic ideology
79
, hence the function of the German co-determination 
system are rooted in the unique social and cultural background of Germany which does not 
exist in China. This is especially true for the PE-held firms in China. 
 
Again, the uniqueness of each jurisdiction should never be ignored and its path dependence in 
institutional transition can hardly be changed or replaced in a short term. Compared with 
other major developed economies, the UK model in the area of private equity and business 
organizations may be more suitable as a reference for cotemporary China. Firstly, owing to 
the very special political and economic factors, both the limited partnership and business trust 
are widely used as the organizational forms for Chinese private equity funds
80
. Although the 
US is the largest market of PE, however, the corporation is the most typical organizational 
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form for the private investment funds of the US
81
 which may not be really referential for 
Chinese existing legal system. By contrast, the legal regime of unit trusts in British financial 
law which has been quite mature for collective investment is particularly useful for China. 
Moreover, as the most important institutional foundation for Chinese private investment 
funds, the existing Law of Securities Investment Funds of China (2012 Revision) clarifies 
that the securities investment funds in China are organized on the basis of trust law
82
, thus it 
is obvious that the British law is more compatible for China. Second, in comparison with the 
‗director primacy model‘ of corporate governance in the US, the UK-style ‗shareholder 
primacy model‘ is more feasible and suitable for institutional transition in China. For the 
SOEs‘ stake, it is naive to believe that the Chinese authority‘s political control over the 
institutional transition of company law can be essentially weakened in an expectable future
83
. 
The state as the majority shareholders of SOEs has the motivation to impede the 
diversification of shareholding structure of Chinese companies. In other words, in the present 
stage of economic reform, the British model may be more feasible and practical for China.  
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 Chapter 2: The Protection for Limited Partners of Private Equity Limited Partnerships 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Generally speaking, the limited partnership has been widely adopted for organizing PE and 
VC investment in developed countries. In a typical limited partnership there should be at least 
one general partner and one limited partner. The general partner who is entitled to manage the 
business of the partnership exclusively is required to be personally liable for the debts of the 
limited partnership. By contrast, the limited partner who is not allowed to be involved in the 
management is protected by limited liability. In terms of the profit distribution mechanism, 
the general partner is entitled to share a substantial amount of the profit of the limited 
partnership, which aligns the interests of the manager and investors. In the commercial law 
system of the UK, both the Limited Partnership Act 1907 and the financial regulatory system 
of collective investment schemes (CISs) established a legal framework of PE funds that 
mainly focuses on the protection for limited partners in PE limited partnerships (PELPs). 
Similarly, in the Chinese PE and VC market, since the Law of Partnership Enterprises of 
China was amended in 2007, the limited partnership has also been increasingly preferred by 
investors in the PE and VC industry. Owing to the immaturity of the Chinese PE and VC 
industry, however, the existing protective mechanism of the limited partnerships in China is 
imperfect. By means of legal–economic analysis of the limited partnerships and comparing 
the legal structure of PELPs in China and the UK, this chapter aims to explore a series of 
feasible approaches to improve the internal governance and ownership structures to reduce 
the agency costs in limited partnerships.  
 
Specifically, the following issues are discussed in this chapter: Firstly, by reviewing the 
evolution of the limited partnership in the commercial law of the UK and comparing it with 
the economic and legal features of the company and business trust, this chapter argues that 
the combination of limited and unlimited liabilities, the efficient governance structure of the 
limited partnership and the effective incentive mechanism for the general partner make the 
limited partnership more advantageous in organizing risky transactions. The basic principles 
of the regulatory system of PELPs under UK law are then summarised, especially as a 
supplement to the official regulation. The self-regulatory rules of the British Private Equity 
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and Venture Capital Association (BVCA) are also analysed. By reviewing the history and 
evolution of PELPs in China (section 3), the legal framework of PELPs in China is outlined 
and it illustrates that the Chinese government‘s control power in economic reform plays a 
significant role in shaping the regulatory system of PELPs in China. In section 4, main legal 
problems in Chinese PELPs are summarised in three domains, from which it can be seen that 
the nature of the legal problem of the PE and VC funds in China is the unprofessional limited 
partners‘ intervention in management, which is caused by the lack of trust between the 
general partners and limited partners and the imperfect liability and incentive mechanisms in 
the limited partnership.  
 
With reference to the experience of the legal regime of PELPs in the UK, this chapter 
proposes that the legal reform of PELPs in China should be carried out in the following 
respects: First, in order to align the interests of general partners and limited partners, the 
profit distribution approach between general partners and limited partners should be 
structured. Second, by enhancing the personal liabilities of responsible directors of PE and 
VC firms, the risk of opportunism by general partners may be reduced. Thirdly, to improve 
the efficiency in the management of PELPs, the ambit of limited partners‘ personal liability 
should be clarified in the statutes. Finally, in order to enhance the reputational mechanism 
within the PE and VC market in China, it is recommended that the self-regulatory system be 
rearranged.  
 
2.2  The Features of Limited Partnerships: Historical and Legal–economic Analysis 
 
2.2.1  The Origins of Limited Partnership in the History of English Law 
 
In a world-wide sense, the origin of the limited partnership can be traced back to the 
commenda which was, firstly, used for maritime ventures in medieval Italy.
1
 In the legal 
history of the UK, however, the emergence of the limited partnership was quite late: the 
official statutes of both the general partnership and limited partnership were not enacted until 
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recent centuries. The dominating business organization in England was the joint stock 
company since the seventeenth century, which was exclusively chartered by the English 
Crown. In order to protect creditors and minority shareholders, however, the English 
Parliament tended to grant the corporate charters only to those enterprises with large fixed 
assets,
2
 which meant that only a small number of corporations could be chartered to run their 
businesses. By the late seventeenth century, the aforementioned situation had driven English 
entrepreneurs to seek new forms of commercial organizations
3
. Although there was no 
specific statute regulating partnerships in the UK before the Partnership Act 1890,
4
 the basic 
rules of general partnerships had been developed in common law and equity. The legal rules 
regarding contracts in common law are applicable to partnerships.
5
 A partnership will not be 
created unless there is a consistent binding declaration of will among its partners.
6
 Moreover, 
the common law rules relating to variation are also applicable to partnerships.
7
 In addition, 
the mutual agent rules in common law were also transplanted to partnerships; the difference 
is that in the partnership each partner is also the principal of the other partners.
8
 Furthermore, 
the case law rules applied to partnerships are not limited to contract law; the rules of fiduciary 
duties developed by the courts of equity are also applied to the partnership. That is to say, 
each partner owes a fiduciary duty to his or her co-partners and all the partners are expected 
to perform with due care and good faith towards each other or one another.
9
 Correspondingly, 
according to the definition of partnership under the Partnership Act 1890, the essence of a 
partnership is ‗the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common 
with a view of profit‘10; in other words, the English law regards the partnership as a kind of 
‗relationship‘ rather than an ‗entity‘. Therefore, a series of existing rules in case law 
regarding contracts, agency or trust are also applicable to the legal issues in partnerships.
11
  
 
As a basic rule, all the partners in an English general partnership should bear unlimited 
liability for all debts of the partnership.
12
 With the complication involved in the division of 
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labour during the nineteenth century, however, it became imperative that a new enterprise 
providing limited liability protection that could better attract capital and professional 
employment be developed.
13
 The Limited Partnership Act 1907, firstly, enabled the limited 
partnership to be formed in the UK, which provides that in a limited partnership, there should 
be (i) at least one general partner who controls the limited partnership and bears unlimited 
liability and (ii) one or more limited partners whose liability is only limited to amounts of 
their contribution
14
 and who are totally excluded from the management of the partnership.  
 
The evolution of partnership law in the UK at the introduction of partnership in the UK is 
based on two main factors. Firstly, the demands of the flexibility of formation of a 
partnership can generate more opportunities for entrepreneurs to establish a firm to run their 
business. Secondly, the unincorporated body nature of partnerships makes it possible to adopt 
existing rules in common law and equity of other laws to efficiently develop the legislation 
on partnerships. Finally, the emergence of the law of limited partnerships in the UK shows 
that the separation of control and ownership, and the mixture of limited and unlimited 
liabilities among general and limited partners can more efficiently integrate monetary and 
human capital to suit the needs of economic development.  
 
2.2.2  The Legal-economic Analysis of Limited Partnerships: Security and Efficiency 
 
From the review of the origin of the limited partnership in history, one can see that the 
fundamental social factor of the emergence of the limited partnership was the demand for a 
new organizational form that could effectively enhance the protection of investors in high-
risk businesses. In modern times, PE and VC investment is also one of the most risky 
financial activities in the world economy, which is also mainly organized in the form of 
limited partnership. The next section of this research is a legal–economic analysis and a 
comparison between the main commercial organizations, namely the general partnership, 
corporation and business trust, and explores the unique economic characteristics of limited 
partnerships and explains why parties choose limited partnerships to conduct business.  
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2.2.2.1  The Moderate Separation of Ownership and Control 
 
a.  The Exclusion of Unprofessional Intervention: Management Efficiency 
 
Ever since the industrial revolution in the eighteenth century, the business scale of enterprises 
has expanded extensively and ownership has diffused extensively, because no individual or 
family was able to provide sufficient capital to sustain the growth of enterprises.
15
 In such a 
situation, with the increase of owners, the ownership of the corporation was diluted, which 
meant that none of the owners could dominate the business affairs of the company. For 
management efficiency, the separation of ownership and control came about.
16
 In the classic 
model of modern corporate governance, in principle the substantive decisions on the business 
affairs of the company should be determined by directors who actually play a role as the 
agent of shareholders. However, the information asymmetry between the principals and 
agents motivate the owners to be vigilant against directors. As a result, a series of 
participating powers of shareholders in corporate governance were developed as a part of 
basic principles of modern company law. 
 
Generally speaking, shareholders of a company may have powers and rights with regard to 
the participation of corporate management. Although the independent managerial power of 
the board of a company can theoretically save negotiation costs, for protecting the interest of 
shareholders, modern UK company laws tend to accord veto and approval rights to 
shareholders where a transaction proposed by the directors involves conflict of interests for 
directors;
17
 in other words, the approval procedures of significant transactions of the firm can 
be regarded as the cost for solving agency problems in corporate governance. 
 
Similarly, in terms of general partnerships, it is the common governance rule that all the 
partners have an equal right to participate in firm management.
18
 Thus, the decision-making 
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process of the general partnership will be run on the basis of majority rule among all the 
partners. In contrast, the basic rule of the governance of limited partnerships is that as the 
passive owner of the enterprise, limited partners are forbidden from participating in any 
substantive decision-making matters, which means that the managing partner can 
independently act without the consent of limited partners. In this governance structure, the 
management will be able to deal with any emerging or unexpected issues more efficiently 
without intervention or procedural restrictions by the members. In consideration of the 
importance of high-level professional judgment in a risky financial market, the above 
advantage of limited partnerships exactly meets the demands for flexible management of the 
firm.  
 
b.  The Profit Sharing between GPs and LPs: Reduction of Agency Costs 
 
In principle, the limited partners must not be allowed to participate in the managerial affairs 
of the limited partnership, otherwise they will assume unlimited liability for the debt of the 
partnership.
19
 In this regard, theoretically, the degree of the exclusion of non-professional 
intervention is almost the same as business trusts where beneficiaries and settlers are 
prohibited from firm management or decision-making. However, one of the essential 
problems in a trust is the lack of incentive mechanism for the trustee. Thus, in a trust, the 
agency problem can only be mitigated by means of external protection, such as judicial 
practices in respect of fiduciary duties. Although in trusts, theoretically, the fixed rate of 
management fees can make trustees benefit from the business, nevertheless, the irrelevance of 
the manager‘s performance and personal income has significantly limited the efficiency of 
the trust in high-risk transactions.
20
  
 
In comparison with trusts, the limited partnership can provide a more effective and efficient 
incentive mechanism to reduce agency costs. Firstly, because both the general partner (active 
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partner) and limited partner (passive partner) hold shares in the enterprise, the general partner 
who is in charge of the management of the firm will be directly motivated to work hard in the 
interest of the firm; in other words, to a large extent, the moderate separation of ownership 
and control in a limited partnership mitigates the agency problem. Although in a general 
partnership the profit is also distributed in accordance with the proportion of each partner‘s 
contribution, the governance structure of general partnerships, however, is based on all the 
partners‘ participation in management, which may increase the negotiation costs in decision-
making. Secondly, as a common rule in the law of limited partnerships, the managing partner 
(general partner) is entitled to share a proportion of the profit of the business. Therefore, in 
limited partnerships the conflict of interest between the principal and manager can be 
mitigated significantly. Compared with the ownership structure of business trusts, it is 
evident that the incentive mechanism makes limited partnerships more advantageous in 
solving the agency problems between a manager and owner. 
  
2.2.2.2  Organic Bond of Limited and Unlimited Liabilities: Transaction Security 
 
a. Limited Liability of Contributors: Efficient Fund Raising  
 
From a historic point of view, a limited liability regime has been widely adopted for quite a 
long time. Not only limited partners of limited partnerships, but also equity investors of other 
business organizations such as corporations and trusts can enjoy limited liability protection.
21
 
The main advantages of limited liability in commercial activities have been widely 
recognized and can be summarised as follows:  
 
First of all, in the case of a rational person who engages in commercial business, the higher 
the risk he or she takes, the stronger his or her motivation to monitor his or her agent. 
Accordingly, compared with the unlimited liability structure, limited liability can fix the peak 
value of the investor‘s loss, thus the investor does not need to spend too much on monitoring 
the agent‘s behaviour.22 In the circumstance where all the equity investors of an enterprise are 
exposed to unlimited liability, each investor will be motivated to monitor other investors for 
ensuring that they do not withdraw or transfer their assets, because all the wealth of each 
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investor may be available for paying the debt of the firm.
23
 By contrast, limited liability fixes 
and identifies the scope of each contributor‘s liability, thus the costs of monitoring for each 
one is reduced.  
 
Secondly, limited liability can fix the share price of the enterprise, by which the market price 
of shares can reflect the additional information of the firm‘s value. Conversely, if the liability 
of equity holders is unlimited, the equity or shares are not the homogeneous commodity in 
the public market. As a consequence, investors have to explore more information to examine 
the potential risk to, and value of, the firm;
24
 in other words, the limited liability can improve 
the efficiency of information utilization. Furthermore, the transferability of shares makes it 
possible to replace the manager, if the performance of the manager is unsatisfactory to the 
new owners. It can be seen that limited liability plays a positive role in improving the 
performance of managers.
25
 
 
Thirdly, the protection mechanism of limited liability enables the owners of the firm to 
engage in diversified investment, including those risky transactions that may generate high 
return for the firm, but not to be restricted to those conservative investment strategies. In this 
regard, compared with unlimited liability, the limited liability regime also contributes to the 
efficiency of investment.
26
 
 
Finally, from a social point of view, the emergence of limited liability in commercial 
organizations enables individuals of relatively modest means to act as entrepreneurs, which 
optimizes the allocation of social resources.
27
  
 
In terms of limited partnerships, the advantages of the limited liability of passive investors 
can also be illustrated by reviewing the evolutionary path of the commercial partnership in 
medieval Italy. The Italian household in the Middle Ages is deemed the progenitor of modern 
general partnerships, in which both the sons and father of a family jointly managed the family 
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assets.
28
 With the accumulation of wealth among Italian families and development of 
commerce, the said household gradually evolved into a new sort of organization, namely the 
so-called compagnia, in which the business of the family was managed not only by family 
members, but also those entrusted persons who did not have a relationship with the family. 
The liability of all the members of the compagnia was joint and several.
29
 However, the 
unlimited joint and several liability imposed a heavy burden on individual merchants, 
especially on those individuals who were not rich enough to hedge against such liabilities. As 
a consequence, the unlimited liability regime was a substantive obstacle of fund-raising in 
risky businesses. Against this background, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the maritime 
ventures with higher risk were organized in the form of limited partnership or commenda, 
rather than general partnerships or compagnia. 
 
b.  Unlimited Joint and Several Liabilities of Controllers: Efficient Management 
 
The separation of control and ownership is one of the most significant legal features of 
modern enterprises. However, this causes serious agency problems. In particular, the profit 
distribution mechanism of limited partnerships will considerably motivate the controller to 
engage in high-risk transactions for the purpose of gaining high return. As a result, compared 
with general partnerships, opportunism on the part of the managing partner in the limited 
partnership may give rise to greater loss to the owners of the business. The application of 
unlimited joint and several liability to general partners can, to some extent, balance the risk 
and efficiency of the management of limited partnerships. 
 
The unlimited joint and several liability deterrence can make the controller of a firm work 
prudently and maintain awareness of risk all the time, otherwise he or she may have to repay 
the debt of the firm in person, by which the protection of passive partners or limited partners 
can be enhanced and the agency risk may be reduced. Additionally, as a general rule in 
partnership law, once the limited partner or passive partner substantially participates in the 
management of the partnership, the limited liability protection will be lost;
30
 in other words, 
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the existence of unlimited joint and several liabilities in a firm can not only refrain the 
opportunism of the controller, but also prevent the non-professional contributors from 
intervening in firm management. The dual functions of the unlimited joint and several 
liability regimes are particularly suited to high-risk business activities, such as maritime 
trading in the past and venture capital at present.  
 
Furthermore, from the creditor‘s point of view, the existence of unlimited liability of the 
dealer can also enhance the worthiness between creditors and general partners of limited 
partnerships. This thesis can be illustrated by the banking business run by the Medici family, 
the most influential merchant group in medieval Italy. With the prosperity of inland trading in 
Italy, the demand for banking financing was increased remarkably. By the fifteenth century, 
the Medici bank had expanded its business by creating its branches in cities other than 
Florence where the bank was based. To control the risk inherent in these diverse locations, 
the central Medici bank was a limited partner and the managers of local branches were the 
general partners,
31
 that is, the banking business at that time was run in the form of commenda 
or limited partnership. Once the reliability of the local manager was established, the 
organizational structure of the banking partnership would be changed into compagnia or 
general partnership, because at that time personal liability was important for 
creditworthiness.
32
 By contrast, the commercial law in Siena, which was the dominant 
banking centre of Europe during the Middle Ages, refused to recognise joint and several 
liability; in other words, the liability of the members of Sienese firms was restricted to their 
pro rata share of the debt. Consequently, to some extent, the lack of trust accelerated the 
fading of Siena in its competition with Florence, which finally replaced Siena as the heart city 
of European banking by the late Renaissance.
33
 In sum, the existence of unlimited joint and 
several liabilities of the owners can enhance the creditworthiness of a firm participating in 
high-risk businesses, which is one of the advantages of limited partnerships over corporations 
in complex and risky financial investment.  
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2.3  The Legal System of PE Limited Partnerships in the UK 
 
As summarised above, the limited partnership has emerged in the history of commercial law 
for centuries. In the UK, which is regarded as one of the most influential financial centres in 
the world, however, the first official legislation of limited partnerships was not enacted until 
early twentieth century. Currently, with the rise and quick boom of PE and VC investment in 
the middle of the twentieth century, the limited partnership has been adopted as the primary 
organizational structure of PE and VC funds in the UK.
34
 In the section that follows, both the 
evolution and legal principles of PELPs under UK laws will be examined and the practical 
effect of the self-regulation regime of PELPs in the UK will be analysed as well. 
 
2.3.1  The Framework of Limited Partnerships in the United Kingdom  
 
The first official statute on partnership in the UK was the Partnership Act 1890 (PA1890), 
which has remained unchanged through the century and remains valid. However, this Act 
only laid down a legal framework for general partnerships rather than limited partnerships.
35
 
In the early twentieth century, the Limited Partnerships Act 1907, which is the only separate 
statute creating limited partnerships was enacted in the UK. For the first time, this statute 
permitted individuals to organize a limited partnership enterprise by distinguishing the 
‗limited partners‘ who are afforded limited liability protection and ‗general partner(s)‘ who 
are required to be liable for all the debts or obligations of the firm.
36
  
 
According to s 4 of the Partnership Act 1890, it provides that, unlike in English partnerships, 
a firm registered in Scotland is a legal person which is distinct from its partner, at the same 
time, s 7 of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 provides that the provisions of the Partnership 
Act 1890 are also applicable to limited partnerships, unless otherwise provided by the law. 
Therefore, the limited partnership in Scotland has its own independent personality. Today, 
the legal personality of Scottish limited partnerships has been a special advantage of Scottish 
partnership enterprises in cross-jurisdictional financial investment, which enable the Scottish 
limited partnership fund to invest in the enterprises directly and to hold equities, avoiding the 
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risk of more complex organizational structure. The converse is not true, because both the 
Limited Partnerships Act 1907 and Partnership Act 1890 require that all the partners in any 
English partnership enterprise should be a person (natural or legal person).
37
 In contrast, if a 
general or limited partnership registered in any other jurisdictions where a partnership is not 
recognised as a separate legal entity, the opportunities for investment will be restricted.  
 
In comparison with general partnerships, the fundamental characteristic of a limited 
partnership is the separation of the control and ownership between the general partner (GP) 
and limited partner (LP), in which the pool of the capital is managed by the GPs on behalf of 
all partners. In pursuance of the definition of collective investment schemes (CISs) under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000,
38
 limited partnerships may be regulated as CISs by 
the Financial Conduct Authority.
39
 Moreover, in terms of PELPs, because the regulation only 
allows those sophisticated investors who are regarded as being capable of understanding and 
tolerating the huge risk inherent in investing in PE, in most cases, PELPs are exempted from 
FCA regulation.
40
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2.3.2  The Protective Mechanisms of Limited Partners in the UK Partnership Laws 
 
2.3.2.1  Directors’ Personal Liability of Corporate GPs in PE Limited Partnerships 
 
As a basic and statutory rule of limited partnership law, the general partner is liable severally 
and unlimitedly for all the debts of the limited partnership in the circumstance where the 
limited partnership goes bankrupt. To some extent, the unlimited liability may restrict the 
general partner from engaging in overly risky or wrongful activities. However, since the 
limited partnership is mainly used in high-risk financial activities, such as PE and hedge 
funds, in most cases only those corporate bodies with enough capital and entity shielding are 
willing to act as a general partner of PELPs. Practically, a PELP is universally managed by 
the individuals who are the directors
41
 of the fund management corporation (the corporate 
general partner).  
 
Generally speaking, a director owes a duty of care to the company and may assume personal 
liabilities for the loss that is caused by his or her wrongdoing. Specifically, the case law has 
established that a director must exercise his or her managerial power with ‗reasonable care‘, 
which means that an ordinary person will also be expected to exercise managerial power with 
such a level of care and skills in the same circumstances.
42
 At the same time, the corporate 
general partner also assumes the duty of care to other partners. Thus, if the director(s) 
wrongfully or negligently make a business decision for the PELP and eventually cause losses 
to the limited partnership, the limited partners of the PELP are entitled to be repaid by the 
general partner and then the PE management corporation or corporate general partner has the 
right to claim against the responsible director(s) to assume personal liabilities for the 
corporate general partner.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the economic function of fiduciary duty rules in 
commercial law is a kind of default rules that can save on the contracting costs and the court 
should be involved routinely in determining the boundary of the personal liability of the 
fiduciary, agent or director. However, from an economic perspective, the court should also 
consider whether the costs of making a decision that may cause losses is less than the 
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potential profit it may gain.
43
 In terms of PE and VC firms, because the risks in start-ups are 
higher than ordinary mergers and acquisitions, accurate judgement of the prospect of a 
portfolio company or certain industries is sometimes unrealistic.  
 
In practical terms, the three basic principles for judging a director‘s personal liability were 
established by common law before the ‗objective reasonable standard‘ was adopted in the 
Companies Act 2006
44
: first, a director should not be expected to act as an expert, but only 
needs to display the skills and knowledge he or she actually possesses; second, a director is 
not bound to continuously devote attention to the affairs of the company, because commonly 
his duty is to attend periodical board meetings by which he is not expected to continually gain 
all the information of the company
45
; third, in the absence of suspicious circumstances, a 
director is entitled to determine the exigencies of the business by resorting to the expertise 
and experience of his or her colleagues or co-directors. However, the director‘s fiduciary 
duties as a kind of default rule should be as certain and express as it can, otherwise its gap-
filling function in business organizations would not be properly fulfilled.
46
 Therefore, for the 
sake of clarifying the duties of the directors of companies, the Companies Act 2006 of the 
UK
47
 adopts the ‗objective reasonable standard‘ to judge the duties and personal liabilities of 
a director of a company. According to the CA2006, the director of a company is required to 
exercise his or her managerial power with reasonable care, skill and diligence, which ‗would 
be exercised by a reasonably diligent person‘48 and, at the same, the specific knowledge and 
skills that the director has should be considered in judging the director‘s performance.49   
 
From the above brief analysis of the personal liability of directors under the company law in 
the UK, in the circumstances where a director of a PE and VC firm wrongfully makes 
decisions in a portfolio company and causes the bankruptcy of the PELP, it is clear that the 
PE firm may claim against the responsible director. In this way, the deterrence of personal 
liability may drive the director who is a representative of the PE firm in the board of the 
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portfolio company to work diligently and carefully. At the same time, both the common law 
and official legislation leave leeway to limit the extent of the director‘s personal liability.  
 
2.3.2.2  The Incentive Mechanism of PE Limited Partnerships in the UK 
 
As discussed above, the profit of the partners in general partnerships is distributed in 
proportion to the capital subscribed by each partner, unless they agree otherwise. The 
foundation of this principle is that because all the partners are entitled to take part in the 
management of partnership, the residual control aligns with the residual claim of the firm 
asset which can, to some extent, mitigate the agency problem. By contrast, the managerial 
power over the limited partnership is exclusively controlled by the general partner. However, 
the profit will be distributed between the limited partner(s) and general partner(s), which 
means that the agency problem here is more distinct than in general partnerships. The extra 
incentive mechanism for managing partners is necessary. In general, the income of general 
partners from managing PELPs in the UK is composed of three parts: (i) the management fee, 
(ii) capital gains and (iii) carried interest, the contractual arrangements of which play a 
significant role in motivating the general partner to work on behalf of the firm.  
 
Firstly, the management fee is usually charged annually at a rate of 1–2.5% on investors‘ 
commitments,
50
 which will mainly be used to cover the expenses of the fund operation. In 
order to enhance the incentive mechanism of PELPs, the total amount of the management fee 
will be paid separately in several investment periods, rather than being paid in a lump sum.
51
 
Furthermore, the management fee can also be counted based on the amount of the invested 
commitments rather than the total commitments.
52
 In this way, there will be an effective 
incentive effect motivating the GP to actively and efficiently select projects for investment, 
rather than expanding the scale of the fund or raising new funds. Secondly, the GP also 
contributes around 1% of all the commitments, which can bring a deal of capital gains for the 
GP, if the PELP generates profit.  
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The main body of the GP‘s return made by the fund is the carried interest. In the UK there are 
commonly two models for calculating the carried interest, the one is the ‗deal-by-deal‘ model 
where the carried interest will be separately calculated on the basis of every individual 
investment project and the other is the ‗whole-of-fund‘ model where all the profit and loss of 
the PE fund will be assessed together by the end of the fund lifecycle.
53
 It is obvious that the 
incentive mechanisms in each model is different, in the ‗deal-to-deal‘ model, the fund 
manager can be continually motivated to manage each project diligently, because it is 
expectable of the GP to make profit from each project immediately. By contrast, the ‗whole-
of-fund‘ approach will incentivise the GP to pay more attention to the projects that may bring 
higher profit, because there is no short-term incentive for the GP to maximize the potential 
return of each investment.  
 
Although the ‗deal-to-deal‘ model is advantageous for continually incentivizing the general 
partner through the whole process of fund management, the problem is that if the return of 
some projects is negative, a part of the profit that should be distributed to the limited 
partner(s) is actually allocated to the general partner in advance. From a limited partner(s)‘ 
perspective, it is necessary to set out some legal arrangements taking back the profit to which 
the limited partners are entitle that has been paid as a proportion of the GP‘s carried interest 
by the end of each project. In practice the so-called claw-back provision can effectively solve 
the problem. Firstly, this provision entitles the limited partner (s) to claw back the return paid 
by means of carried interest from the general partner, when a loss occurs in some projects 
invested by the fund. Practically, the limited partnership agreement commonly requires the 
GP to deposit a proportion of carried interest of each project into an escrow account, which 
can be distributed only if limited partners have received a certain level of profit.
54
  
 
2.3.2.3  The Proposed ‘Safe Harbour’ Provisions: LPs’ Power in Decision-making 
 
The Limited Partnership Act 1907 provides that in a situation where the limited partner 
intervenes in the firm‘s management, he or she is required to assume unlimited liability.55 
From the perspective of enterprise governance, this rule operates as deterrent precluding 
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unsophisticated investors from firm management which can promote efficiency of 
management. In recent decades, however, owing to the development of collective investment 
in financial markets, this rule has been adjusted. For example, according to section16(4) of 
The Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (Contractual Scheme) Regulations 2013 in the 
situation where a collective investment scheme is formed as limited partnership, the exercise 
of rights conferred on limited partners does not constitute taking part in the management of 
the partnership business. 
 
Similarly, given the high-risk activities of PE and hedge fund limited partnerships, the agency 
problem between limited partners and general partners has become increasingly noteworthy. 
Influenced by the lobbying efforts from those qualified investors of PE and VC and real 
estate funds, it was proposed that ‗safe harbour‘ provisions be introduced, which may make it 
permissible for limited partners to take part in the decision-making process of the partnership 
without incurring liability.
56
 In fact, the existing partnership law system in the UK has 
actually left a space for limited partners‘ participation that does not cause any loss of limited 
liability protection.
57
 Against this background, the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission recommended a series of provisions, the so-called ‗safe harbour rules‘ that 
allowed limited partners‘ limited participation in partnership management without causing 
unlimited liability.
58
  
 
To recap, the scope of recommended ‗safe harbour‘ provisions can be classified into two 
categories: (i) direct participation and (ii) indirect participation in firm management. 
According to the suggestions of the Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, firstly, 
it was recommended that the following direct decision-making activities in which limited 
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partners participated should not be regarded as taking part in management: (i) a change in the 
partnership agreement; (ii) approval or rejection of a class of investment by the limited 
partnership; (iii) the change of the general nature of the business, such as the altering of 
duration or capital of the firm; (iv) the winding up of the limited partnership; (v) the disposal 
of the assets of the limited partnership; (vi) engagement in contracts for the limited 
partnership; (vii) enforcing the limited partner‘s right under the partnership agreement; 
(viii) investigating, reviewing and approving the accounts of the limited partnership; (ix) any 
actual or potential conflicts of interest between a limited partner(s) or general partner(s); 
(x) acting as a director, employee or shareholder in a corporate general partnership.
59
 
Secondly, in respect of indirect participation in decision-making processes, limited partner(s) 
are also allowed to provide consultation and advice regarding the activities or account of the 
limited partnership for a general partner (or general partners).
60
 In sum, the recommended 
‗safe harbour‘ provisions generally permit limited partner(s) to participate in the decision-
making of non-day-to-day managerial affairs.  
 
The noteworthy issue about the ‗safe harbour‘ provisions is whether entitling limited partners 
to approve or disapprove a class of investment or permitting limited partner(s) to be directors, 
employees or shareholders in a corporate general partner, may decrease efficiency of firm 
management? In fact, some professionals in PE and VC industry or lawyers have expressed 
concern that the proposed safe harbour provisions may increase the decision-making costs.
61
 
Correspondingly, the Law Commission‘s opinion is that, firstly, deciding a class of 
investment is actually a ‗high-level‘ decision, which is mainly about the strategic direction of 
the activities of the partnership.
62
 Thus the specific day-to-day managerial affairs are still in 
the control of a general partner. Secondly, in the situation that the limited partner acts as an 
employee, director or shareholder of a corporate general partner, the limited partner must 
demonstrate the limited partnership itself is acting in a capacity rather than the limited partner, 
otherwise the unlimited liability may be triggered.
63
 Although the dual role of limited 
partners may make it possible for limited partners to control the management of the firm,
64
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however, the requirement of demonstration at least can restrict the abuse of limited partners‘ 
managerial power. 
 
2.3.3  The Self-regulation of PE Limited Partnerships in the UK 
 
Private equity funds in the UK are commonly unregulated by the FCA. This raises the risk 
that the authority may not detect the financial activities of PELPs that may impact on the 
interests of the public, market stability and PE investors in time. To recap, the following risks 
in PE funds have been identified by the regulators: first of all, the excessive leverage used by 
PELPs may be a severe burden to PE-owned companies, which may give rise to a series of 
public problems, including corporate distress and massive layoff.
65
 Second, owing to the 
long-term lockup period of PELPs, the lenders will be motivated to transfer their exposure to 
other market participants by, for example, credit derivatives, which means that the 
unregulated financing activities of PELPs may also significantly spread the risk to the public. 
In this regard, the lesson from the global financial crisis in 2008 has shown that the over-use 
of credit derivatives can make it hard to identify and judge the ownership of the risk of 
underlying assets.
66
 As a consequence, default events of some individual transactions may 
result in the fall of the market. Third, the exemption of the disclosure requirement of PELPs 
may also harm PE investors. Because of the exclusion of limited partners‘ participation in 
fund management, the asymmetry of information between the limited partners and general 
partner will be serious, even though the limited partners are qualified sophisticated investors, 
it is also difficult to effectively monitor the general partner‘s investment decisions.67  
 
The British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (BVCA), which has been the 
leading self-regulatory body of PE and VC funds in the UK, was established in 1983. The 
membership comprises over 500 influential firms, including VC firms, professional 
consultancies and international associations.
68
 The major mission of the BVCA is to promote 
integrity and transparency in the UK‘s PE and VC market, and enhancing communication 
between the members internationally. In response to the above public concern about the PE 
industry, the BVCA has been playing an increasingly important role in mitigating the risks in 
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PE transactions. In terms of the regulatory functions of the BVCA, the Regulatory Committee 
of the BVCA plays an important role in the self-regulation of PE and VC firms in the UK, 
whose main mission is to ensure that all members can keep abreast of any changes of the 
regulatory and policy environment in a timely manner.
69
 In order to guarantee the consistency 
between the practices of the PE and VC practitioners and authorities, providing regular 
consulting research with regulators or policymakers is another key function of the Regulatory 
Committee of the BVCA.
70
  
 
In November 2007, under the leadership of Sir George Walker, the Guidelines for Disclosure 
and Transparency in Private Equity
71
 were published which outlined the self-regulatory 
approach of PELPs in the UK. They are the leading self-regulatory rules of the BVCA. In the 
first place, PE and VC firms should timeously publish the details of their (i) investment 
strategies; and (ii) background of professional staff; and (iii) a description of UK portfolio 
companies in the portfolio of PE firms on their website, which should be accessible to the 
public and investors.
72
 PE firms are also obliged to report on the record of the investment of 
their portfolios to the association, by which the BVCA can assess the performance of each PE 
firm both on an annual and industry-wide basis.
73
 In the second place, the portfolio 
companies are required to disclose the composition of their board, including the 
representatives of the PE firms on the board,
74
 which is in support of mitigating the 
information asymmetry between general partners and limited partners. In order to keep the 
flexibility and adaptability of the soft law regulatory system, the BVCA tends to regulate the 
PE funds on a ‗comply or explain‘ basis, which means that the firms who do not comply with 
the above rules must provide an acceptable and reasonable statement to the BVCA.
75
  
 
After the publication of the Walker Guidelines 2007 an independent monitoring committee, 
which plays a role in implementing the rules, namely the Guidelines Monitoring Group 
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(GMG)
76
 was established. In a practical term, the effectiveness of the self-regulation by the 
BVCA mainly works on the basis of a market reputation mechanism. For instance, the GMG 
will publish a Review of Conformity with the guidelines annually which will name the non-
compliers for the public. In this scenario, both the limited partners and any other parties in the 
PE market can directly judge the reputation of the non-complying firms;
77
 in other words, the 
market reputation deterrence will provide incentives for the PE management corporations 
who are covered by the Walker Guidelines 2007 to comply with the requirements of 
disclosure and transparency.  
 
2.4  The Landscape of China’s PE Limited Partnerships 
 
2.4.1  Chinese Legislators’ Early Attitude towards Limited Partnerships (1990s) 
 
The history of business partnerships in Western countries has been as long as many hundreds 
of years. Nonetheless, the legislation regarding business partnerships in China did not appear 
until the mid-1990s. There were two main factors that delayed the introduction of limited 
partnerships in China. On the one hand, the establishment of VC investment enterprises was 
officially recognized by Chinese government as early as 1985 as an important policy for 
pushing scientific and technological reform in China,
78
 Nevertheless, owing to the lack of 
non-legal person organizations in China at that time, VC investment enterprises were only 
formed as limited liability companies.
79
 On the other hand, because VC investment 
enterprises in China were initiated and led by the government during the 1980s, the 
governance structure of limited liability companies guaranteed the governmental domination 
in the management of VC investment enterprises. Firstly, quite a large proportion of the VC 
investment enterprises were contributed by the Ministry of Finance of the Central 
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 MacNeil (n 67) 30. 
77
 According to the Review of Conformity with the Guidelines 2014, two PE firms, namely Camelot (Ontario 
Teachers‘ Pension Plan) and Viridian Group (Arcapita) who failed to comply with the requirement of the 
Walker Guidelines have been disclosed. Guidelines Monitoring Group, Seventeenth Report, December 2014, 24 
<http://walker-gmg.co.uk/sites/10051/files/141204_gmg_guidelines_final.pdf> accessed 20 May 2015. 
78
 In March 1985, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the Decision on the Reform 
of Science and Technology Management System [中共中央.《关于科学技术体制改革的决定》], in which the 
concept of venture investment was officially stated for the first time in China.  
79
 The first company law of China was not enacted until 1993. Before that, enterprises in China were 
incorporated mainly referring to the Law of the People‘s Republic of China on Chinese–Foreign Equity Joint 
Ventures (1979) [中华人民共和国中外合资企业法（1979）], which was the first statute recognizing the legal 
status of limited liability companies in China. 
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Government of China or stated-owned commercial banks. Secondly, the reform of Chinese 
public finance system in the 1980s made it possible to increase the fiscal revenue of local 
government by running public-owned business. Consequently, it is apparent that during the 
early stages of the Chinese VC industry, state power kept a firm hand on the management of 
VC funds by exercising the voting right as shareholder of limited liability companies.
 80
  
 
The above situation did not change significantly until the 1990s. With the establishment of 
the Chinese stock market in 1990,
81
 some foreign institutional investors perceived a golden 
opportunity to earn big money from China‘s VC industry. As early as 1993, the first cross-
border PE and VC fund was set up by IDG Partners, and the Committee of Science and 
Technology of China in Shanghai.
82
 During the following years, other international PE and 
VC firms such as Walden International and H&Q Asia-Pacific also launched their Chinese 
VC funds.
83
 However, the foreign PE and VC firms were extensively concerned that if PE 
and VC funds in China were only being organized in the form of limited liability company, 
the economic interests of foreign investors would be seriously threatened by political power 
of Chinese authorities.  
 
In consideration of continually attracting international VC to support the development of 
China‘s scientific and technological industries, since mid-1990s more and more Chinese 
government legislators and scholars have widely realized that officially recognizing the legal 
status of partnership enterprises in the Chinese business law system had been a very urgent 
and practical demand. The first partnership law in China was not enacted until early 1997. 
Unfortunately, this statute excluded limited partnerships and corporate partners.
84
 The 
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 Ruimin Zhong, ‗Research on China‘s Venture Capital: From the Perspective of Contracting Theory‘ (Doctoral 
thesis in Economics, Fudan University 2011) 48 [仲锐敏. 中国风险投资研究：基于合约理论的分析. 复旦大学
2011 年经济学博士学位论文，第 44–47 页].  
81
 In Mainland China, there are two main branches of the stock market: (i) Shanghai Stock Exchange and (ii) 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, both of which were established in December 1990.  
82
 The first cross-border PE and VC fund in China was the PTV–China Funds, which was jointly contributed by 
IDG Partners and Shanghai Science and Technology Committee (SHSTC). Xirui Lian. ‗International PE/VC 
Funds in China‘ (Money China, 7 March 2013) [连希蕊. ‗外资 PE/VC 的中国之路‘. 财经界，2013/03/07] 
<http://pe.hexun.com/2013-03-07/151816907.html> accessed 22 May 2015; Biwen Lee, ‗Why IDG Is Going 
Down: The Difficult Transition in China‘ (Money Weekly, 31 March 2014) [李碧雯. ‘IDG资本为什么暗淡了：转
型之痛‘.理财周报，2014/03/31] <http://www.licai.com/pe/201403/56807.html> accessed 22 May 2015. 
83
 Beijing Docvit Law Firm, Foreign PE in China (CITIC Press 2011) 34 [北京道可特律师事务所. 外资 PE 在中
国的运作与发展. 中信出版社，2011，第 34 页]. 
84
 According to the Law of Partnership Enterprises of the PRC (1997), all the partners shall bear unlimited joint 
and several liabilities for the debts of the limited liability partnership enterprise (Article 8) and all the partners 
must have complete civil capacity (Article 9), in other words, only natural persons can be the partners of a 
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question here is that although the basic reason and motivation for legislating partnership law 
in the mid-1990s was to encourage international PE and VC investment in China, ironically, 
the final version of the law excluded limited partnership which is the most favourable 
organizational structure for PE and VC investment.  
 
In fact, in several versions of legislative drafts of the Law of Partnership Enterprises (1997), 
the provisions regarding limited partnerships have been included. In consideration of the lack 
of a partnership enterprise registration system in China, however, the legislators had 
eventually deleted the provisions of limited partnerships in 1997.
85
 Besides the exclusion of 
limited partnerships, most legislators also strongly feared that the limited liability of 
corporate partners might threaten domestic creditors, therefore, in the final version of the law 
only natural persons were permitted to invest in general partnerships in China.
86
 Finally, in 
political terms, at such very early stage of the market economy reform in China, the Chinese 
government was greatly reluctant to waive powerful control of enterprises. That is to say, the 
ideology of the authority was ‗state entrepreneurism‘ but not really in the spirit of the free 
market, thus the rapidly developing PE and VC funds were regarded as a threat to state-
owned enterprises.
87
 As a result, the proposed limited partnership law eventually died on the 
vine: most Chinese PE and VC funds in the 1990s (including domestic and international 
funds) were organized as corporations but not limited partnerships.
88
  
 
2.4.2  Early Practices of Limited Partnerships in China’s PE Market (2001–2005) 
 
Although in China‘s legal system there was no general law89 recognizing limited partnerships 
as a kind of business organizations in China before 2006, some local governments 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
partnership. Finally, the statute clearly prohibits any use of terms such as ‗limited‘ or ‗limited liability‘ (Article 
5), which means that at that time there was no possibility of legally establishing limited partnerships in China. 
The full text of the Partnership Law (1997) is available at http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-
08/31/content_68746.htm. 
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 Xiaotao Zhang, ‗The Significant Necessity of Introducing Limited Partnerships in China‘ (People‘s Daily, 21 
November 2005) [张晓涛. ‗在我国建立有限合伙制度大有必要‘. 人民网，2005年 11 月 21日] 
<http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49154/49155/3873914.html> accessed 23 May 2015. 
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 Ibid. 
87
 Lin Zhang, ‗Corporate Governance of Chinese State-Controlled Listed Companies: A Revisit Through the 
Lens of Venture Capital‘ (2014) 15 (1) European Business Organization Law Review 107. 
88
 Zhang (n 85). 
89
 According to the Law on Legislation of the People‘s Republic of China (2015 Revision) [中华人民共和国立法
法（2015 年修订）], in the legal system of the PRC, the legislation is divided into five main hierarchies, briefly 
speaking, all the general laws, regulations, local statutes and department rules of the People‘s Government 
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innovatively broke the prohibition in the Partnership Law (2007) and promulgated a series of 
administrative regulations that permit the use of limited partnerships in the PE industry. For 
instance, as early as January 2001 the Rules of Beijing Zhongguancun Science and 
Technology Park (2000),
90
 the first legislation that clearly permitted both PELPs, came into 
force and shortly afterwards, another similar regulation legislated by the local government of 
Zhuhai Special Economic Zone
91
 also recognized the basic principle of limited partnerships. 
In addition, both of the above two regulations permitted the corporation to be a partner in a 
partnership enterprise. Sky-Green Investment L.P., the first practice of PELPs in China was 
established in July 2001. However, owing to the conflict between the local regulation and the 
Partnership Law (1997), this PELP was banned by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission
92
 in 2002.
93
  
 
These legislative activities have shown that the limited partnership as a kind of efficient 
financing instrument has been highly in demand in China. However, any disregard for the 
conflict between the lower level administrative regulations and the general law would be 
unwise. Against this background, in 2003 and 2005 the Central Government of China 
successively promulgated two specific nationwide regulations that preliminarily specified the 
application of PELPs in China, namely the Provisions on Administration of Foreign-invested 
Venture Capital Investment Enterprises (2003)
94
 and Interim Provisions for the 
Administration of Start-up Investment Enterprises (2005).
95
 The basic legal structure of 
limited partnership was prescribed by the Interim Provision 2003. According to s 4 and 7 of 
the Interim Provisions 2003, the FIVCIE is allowed to be formed as an unincorporated 
organization, in which the contribution of the ‗requisite investor(s)‘ ‗shall not be less than 1% 
of the total capital contribution‘; the requisite investor(s) ‗shall undertake joint and several 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
should not conflict with the Constitution, and the regulations should not conflict with any general laws (ss 78 
and 79). 
90
 [中关村科技园区条例, 2000]. The full text of this regulation is available at 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/4077953.htm. 
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 The Interim Provisions on Science and Technology Venture Capital of the City of Zhuhai (2001) [珠海市科技
创业投资暂行规定 (2001)]. Available at http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/p_1/90932.html. 
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 Hereinafter referred to as the ‗CSRC‘. 
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 Jun Zhang & Fengqiao Wei, The Governance of PE Limited Partnerships: The Game Between General 
Partners and LPs (Wuhan University Press 2012) 28–29 [张钧、韦凤巧，有限合伙制 PE 治理：LP 与 general 
partner的博弈焦点，武汉大学出版社，2012，第 28–29 页]. 
94
 Hereinafter referred to as the ‗FIVCIE Provisions 2003‘. The full English version is available at: 
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/3f08912358fb770bf78a5548.html. 
95
 Hereinafter referred to as the ‗Interim Provisions 2005‘. The full English version is available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=4738&CGid. 
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liability for the debts of the Venture Investment Enterprise‘ and ‗the liability of other 
investors shall be limited to the amount of capital contribution to which they subscribed‘.96 
Similarly, the Interim Provision 2005 also clearly permits start-up investment in the form of 
non-legal person enterprises and encourages the start-up investment enterprises to establish 
suitable incentive systems for the management of the enterprises.
97
 In fact, the two 
experimental regulations were the preparation for the official recognition of limited 
partnerships in the later legal reform.  
 
2.4.3  The Limited Partnerships under the New Partnership Law (2006–2010s)  
 
2.4.3.1  Basic Principles of Limited Partnerships in China 
 
The most significant legal reform of China‘s PE and VC industry is the new Partnership Law 
(2006 Revision) which officially recognised the legal status of limited partnerships and 
provided detailed guideline of the governance of limited partnerships. According to Chapter 3 
of the Partnership Law (2006 Revision), firstly, to prevent illegal fund-raisings, s 61 provides 
that the number of partners of any limited partnership shall be between 2 and 50 persons. 
Secondly, pursuant to s 67 of the law, the business of limited partnerships should be managed 
and operated by general partners only
98
 and ‗where it is reasonable for a third person to 
believe a limited partner as a general partner and make a transaction with him, this limited 
partner shall bear the same liabilities for this transaction as a general partner shall do‘.99 
Thirdly, the law also clarifies that the partners who do not participate in the execution of 
partnership affairs have the right to supervise the managing partner‘s implementation of these 
duties. The stipulations above have outlined the fundamental governance structure of China‘s 
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 Sections 4 and 7(6) of the Interim Provision 2003. 
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 Sections 6 and 18 of the Interim Provisions 2005. 
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 It should also be noted that the Partnership Law (2006 Revision) also illustrates that the following conduct of 
limited partners will not be regarded as the execution of partnership affairs:  
(1) To participate in making a decision about the admission or withdraw of a general partner; (2) To put 
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 Section 76. 
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PELPs which mainly aims to enhance the professional management of the enterprise and 
prevent limited partners‘ unprofessional intervention.  
 
Moreover, this revised partnership law is also encouraging PELPs by improving a series of 
details of the old version of partnership law. In the first place, companies or other corporate 
bodies are now permitted to be partners of any kind of partnership enterprise.
100
 This means 
that ever since the Partnership Law (2006 Revision) came into force in June 2007, much 
more capital controlled by institutional investors can be contributed to the PE and VC funds. 
In the second place, this revised statute clarifies that the taxation of PELPs is only imposed 
on partners and the partnership enterprises are exempted from corporate income tax,
101
 which 
also makes the limited partnership more attractive than the corporation. Finally, some of the 
special rules for limited partnerships also break some of the general prohibitions: (i) in any 
general partnership agreement, the stipulation that all the profit will be distributed to some of 
the partners is not permitted.
102
 By contrast, because practically most partners of PELPs are 
likely to agree on a ‗hurdle rate‘103 which serves as a part of the incentive mechanism for 
general partners, the law particularly permits partners of limited partnerships to 
autonomously determine the specific rules regarding profit distribution;
104
 (ii) because in 
most circumstances limited partners do not manage the partnership affairs, the law therefore 
particularly permits limited partners to deal with the limited partnership
105
 or run their own 
business which may compete with the limited partnership enterprise.
106
  
 
2.4.3.2  An Overview of the PE Limited Partnership in Contemporary China  
 
Since 2006, with the continual improvement in the legal and policy environment of the PE 
and VC industry, especially due to the obvious advantages in respect of an efficient 
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governance structure, taxation and relatively loose regulatory environment,
107
 PELPs have 
gradually replaced limited liability companies as the primary organizational structure of PE 
funds. The charts in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, which are based on the National Development and 
Reform Commission‘s108 official statistics,109 show the dramatic change in the practices of 
PE and VC funds in China during the recent decade.  
 
Figure 2.1: The number of private equity and venture capital limited partnerships and private equity 
and venture capital limited liability companies filed with the National Development and  
Reform Commission (2008–2013) 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The proportion of private equity and venture capital limited partnerships and private 
equity and venture capital limited liability companies filed with the National Development and 
Reform Commission (2008–2013) 
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 Although since 2012 the regulatory system of PELPs has been stricter than before, compared with other 
types of collective investment vehicles such as investment trusts, the statutory requirement of the governance 
structure and information disclosure of PELPs is still quite loose. This point can be better illustrated by 
comparing the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.  
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 Hereinafter referred to as the ‗NDRC‘. 
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 The original statistics of Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are available at: 
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In general, the governance structure of PELPs consists of three sections, namely (i) partners‘ 
general meeting,
110
 (ii) limited partners meeting
111
 and (iii) investment decision-making 
committee,
112
 each of which has different functions through the entire process of fund 
management.
113
 Firstly, the PGM is composed of all the limited partners and general partners, 
in the circumstance where any partner is an incorporated body, its representative should be a 
member of the PGM. According to s 31 of the Partnership Law (2006 Revision), the matters 
regarding altering the name, business scope of the PELP or assigning or disposing of the real 
estate and intellectual property of the PELP should be subject to the unanimous consent of all 
partners. Moreover, the issues in relation to (i) the admission of a new partner; (ii) the 
withdrawal of a partner(s); (iii) the transfer of shares between different partners and (iv) the 
mutual conversion of general partners and limited partners are also commonly determined by 
all the partners of the PELP.
114
 Generally speaking, the decision-making power of the PGM 
does not involve the specific investment or professional management affairs of PELPs.  
 
Secondly, in principle, for the purpose of the professional management of PE funds, the 
investment decision-making of PELPs should be exclusively decided by general partners. 
However, practically some PELPs also allow a limited number of limited partnerships‘ 
representatives to be the members of the IDMC. For example, in the IDMC of the Oriental 
Fortune Capital Private Equity Fund (2007), which was the largest Chinese PELP in 2007, 
any investment decision must be voted by three representatives from the general partner and 
one representative of the ranks of the limited partners, any of whom has a one-vote veto in 
any decision-making.
115
 Although the above practice may, to some degree, reduce the 
efficiency of fund management, this alternative decision-making model, which can partly 
enhance the trust relationship between general partners and limited partners, has been widely 
adopted in present-day China.
116
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 Hereinafter referred to as the ‗PGM‘. 
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 Hereinafter referred to as the ‗LPM‘. 
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 Hereinafter referred to as the ‗IDMC‘. 
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 A typical governance structure of PELPs in China can be illustrated as in Figure 2.3. 
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2014. 
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 Wei Zhang. ‗How Should Lawyers Provide Professional Legal Services in Private Equity Business: The 
Practical Matters in the PRC Market‘ In Renmin University of China School of Law (ed), Legal Practices of 
Venture Capital and Private Equity (Law Press China 2014) 73–77 [张伟. ‗律师如何为 PE提供法律服务——私募
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Finally, if the representatives of certain limited partnerships consider that there may be 
potential conflicts of interest, affiliated transactions or competitive businesses between 
general partners and limited partners, then the limited partner representatives are entitled to 
convene the LPM to determine the related issues, and in most cases the related matters should 
be passed by simple majority. It is not hard to see that the main function of the LPM of 
PELPs is only a protective mechanism for limited partnerships, but not a major decision-
making body in fund management.  
117
  
Figure 2.3: Private equity limited partnership governance structure 
 
2.5  The Main Drawbacks in the Governance of PE Limited Partnerships in China 
 
Although the basic legal system and governance structure of PELPs have been established in 
China, and an increasing number of investors tend to prefer PELPs to other organizational 
structures to organize PE and VC investment, there are still, however, some noteworthy 
drawbacks regarding the regulation of the general partners in Chinese PELPs. These 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
股权实务操作中的法律问题‘ 载 人民大学律师学院组（编），风险投资与私募股权律师实务，法律出版社，2014，
第 73 至 77 页]. 
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drawbacks can be summarised as legal issues in three respects: (i) the liability mechanism, 
(ii) incentives and the (iii) efficiency of governance. Finally, all the problems mentioned 
above have seriously weakened the economic advantages of limited partnerships.  
 
2.5.1  The Ineffective Unlimited Liability Deterrence of the Practitioners of GPs  
 
As mentioned above, the deterrence of unlimited liability of general partners is widely 
regarded as one of the important advantages of limited partnerships that could effectively 
prompt the fund manager to perform diligently and prudently for the sake of the fund. In 
terms of PELPs, theoretically, in the circumstance where a PELP goes bankrupt, limited 
partners only assume liability to the extent of their respective contribution in the fund. In the 
meantime, the general partner should assume unlimited liability to creditors which may cause 
losses to the general partners‘ private fortune. In this way, the extreme pressure can, to some 
extent, mitigate the opportunism in investment activities and enhance the safety of 
transactions.  
 
In practice, however, the vast majority of general partners of PE funds are corporations rather 
than natural persons, which means that in reality the general partner practitioners can always 
be protected by limited liability in an incorporated body.
118
 In this situation, the deterrence of 
unlimited liability of individual managers of PE firms must be weakened. Moreover, at 
present some PE firms even establish wholly-owned subsidiaries which usually play a role as 
general partner of certain PE funds, and the director (s) of the board of the subsidiary firm 
will be nominated as the representative (s) of the managing partner who are actually in charge 
of managing the PE fund.
119
 The problem here is that if the representative of the subsidiary is 
not a shareholder of the general partner, the unlimited liability mechanism may not impose 
effective restrictions on the managing partner‘s overly risky investment activities. 
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 In fact, since the company law was revised in 2005, the one-member company has been recognized legally 
(Section 59 of the Company Law (2005 Revision) provides that ‗The minimum amount of registered capital of a 
one-person limited liability company shall be RMB 100, 000. The shareholder shall, in a lump sum, pay the 
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2.5.2  Inefficiency of the Incentive Mechanism of PE Limited Partnerships 
 
As mentioned above, the alignment of residual control and residual ownership is an effective 
approach to mitigate the agency problem. Accordingly, the Partnership Law (2006 Revision) 
makes it possible to freely entitle general partners to performance awards or carried interest, 
which can play a crucial role in motivating general partners to perform well for the purpose 
of maximizing the interest of the PELP. This is also one of the reasons why after the 
promulgation of the new partnership law, the number of PELPs in China dramatically 
increased by nearly seven times within only one decade.
120
  
 
Generally speaking, the profit for general partners of PELPs in China is composed of a 
management fee, capital gain and carried interest, each of which plays a different role in 
motivating general partners to fulfil the duties and diligently manage the fund. Firstly, in 
most cases, PE and VC firms will contribute around 1% of total capital in a PELP.
121
 If the 
PELP is successful in future, the general partner can make profit from the proportionate 
capital gains. Secondly, PE firms also unconditionally earn a management fee in the amount 
of 1.5 to 2.5% of the fund
122
 as their fixed income. Finally, the major profit of PELPs for 
general partners is the carried interest priced in the rate of around 20% of the whole earnings 
of the fund, which can be gained only when the profit of the PELP is higher than a hurdle rate. 
From an economic point of view, the above profit model can effectively motivate general 
partners to perform well and bind the interests of general and limited partners together. 
Practically, however, owing to the lack of specific legal arrangements and restrictions, the 
incentive of general partners is still inadequate.  
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 For accurate statistics, refer to Figure 2.1.  
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 In practice, however, some of China‘s domestic PE and VC firms tend to contribute much more than this 
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As for the management fee, because the level of the fee is not dependent on the general 
partners‘ performance but determined by the scale of the capital, once the full amount of 
contribution is raised from limited partners, the fixed management fee will be unconditionally 
earned by the general partners. Therefore, the management fee can hardly motivate the 
general partner to perform optimally. Moreover, as one of the results of the negotiation 
between general partners and limited partners, in some PELPs the actual amount of the 
management fee is charged by the fund that has been invested. Although, to some extent, this 
approach can mitigate limited partners‘ short-term financial burden, this sort of pricing 
approach may motivate the general partner to urgently and carelessly select new projects in 
which to invest the remaining capital as soon as possible, which will obviously increase the 
risk of the upcoming investment.
123
  
 
As for the carries for general partners, the common practice is that all the expected carried 
interest will be paid to the general partner when all the investments of the fund are ended. In 
this way, investors can get all the expected income all at once. However, owing to the long-
term duration of the fund, it may hardly motivate the general partner to concentrate on the 
management of each individual project continually. To solve this problem, some limited 
partnership agreements (LPA) stipulate that the carries for the general partner should be paid 
respectively when each project ends.
124
 It is obvious that this kind of distribution approach 
can continually motivate the general partner to diligently and carefully manage each 
transaction. However, in the circumstances where the gross return of the PE fund is negative, 
the general partner in fact has gained the income to which the limited partners are entitled 
before the fund is cleared. The above analysis indicates that the current approaches to income 
distribution of Chinese PELPs are imperfect so that the incentive mechanism of PELPs does 
not work well by constantly motivating fund managers or properly maximizing investors‘ 
benefit.  
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2.5.3  LPs as Replacement for GPs: A Governance Model with High Transaction Cost 
 
2.5.3.1  Limited Partners’ Intervention and General Partners’ Response 
 
As mentioned above, owing to the lack of trust between limited partners and general partners, 
to enhance the protection of limited partners‘ interests, a large number of PE investors 
participate in the managerial affairs of PELPs. However, in practice this sort of alternative 
approach can hardly play a positive role in protecting investors‘ interest. In most cases, the 
general partner is able to weaken limited partners‘ active intervention by making a series of 
arrangements in the decision-making procedure of the IDMC. Firstly, the general partner may 
employ several external experts as members of the IDMC in the name of professionalizing 
fund management, most of whom are, for example, partners of law firms and accounting 
firms or scholars from academic institutions. Nonetheless, because most external experts are 
selected by the general partner and do not represent the majority in the IDMC,
125
 the external 
members of the IDMC therefore may not independently make decisions even though they can 
provide professional and objective suggestions for investment decision-making, the final 
result of investment decision-making is still determined by the general partner.  
 
Secondly, according to s 68 (2) and (7) of the Partnership Law (2006 Revision), limited 
partners are entitled to (i) make suggestions for fund management and (ii) urge the general 
partner to fulfil the duty of management on behalf of the limited partners when the general 
partner fails to do that. However, under the current partnership law system, limited partners 
are not statutorily entitled to make decision on the management of PELPs. Therefore, the 
direct participation in fund management is at the risk of being invalid. To sum up, the 
decision-making procedure in the IDMC of PELPs described above is not effective enough. 
However, remarkably, it increases limited partners‘ supervisory cost.  
 
2.5.3.2  The Governance Collapse of PE Limited Partnerships: A Case Study 
 
Although sometimes general partners can actually control the decision-making process by 
adjusting specific voting rules of the IDMC, for the purpose of raising enough capital, those 
PE and VC firms who have not established a good professional reputation have no other 
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choice but to allow limited partners to substantially manage and control the fund. However, 
this abnormal governance model has been proven to be a failure in practice. This issue can be 
clearly illustrated by a case study of Oriental Venture Capital (2007).
126
 
 
As one of the earliest practices of PELPs in China,
127
 OVC was established in July 2007, nine 
limited partners and one general partner, the James & Hina Capital Management Corporation 
jointly contributed.
128
 It was difficult for such an inexperienced fund manager to raise as 
much as RMB 1 billion in such a short period, as J&H was a very young player in China‘s PE 
market,
129
 and the Partnership Law (2006 Revision) was only effective on 1 June 2007. As a 
compromise with limited partners, the general partner agreed to set a so-called ‗joint meeting 
of partners‘ (JMP) as the supreme decision-making body of the fund, 130  whereby any 
investment decision would be subject to the capital majority rule.
131
 In such a situation, since 
the general partner only contributed around 1% of the total amount of funds, the OVC fund 
was directly controlled by the limited partners. As a consequence, owing to the stalemate 
among all the partners in decision-making process, the OVC was dissolved by all the partners 
in October 2007 after only three months since its establishment.
132
  
 
From this typical failed case, one can see that the lack of effective remedial and protective 
approaches under the current Chinese partnership law system have not only increased 
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supervisory and negotiation costs, but have also led to the failure of fund operation. In 
addition, it has been more serious that such an abnormal governance model in the 
aforementioned case has been adopted by many other PE funds in China. For example, in 
some cases, the entrepreneurs will incorporate a ‗private equity asset management firm‘ as 
the general partner in which he/she is the sole shareholder, and then his/her industrial 
company invests in the PE fund as the sole limited partner
133
. In such an extreme case, 
actually there has been no any separation of ownership and control, however, most of such 
entrepreneurs are unprofessional in financial investment, only reason for doing so is the very 
low level of trust between GPs and LPs in Chinese PE market.  
 
Although some lawyers from a pragmatic point of view suggested that the ‗LP activism‘ in 
the governance of Chinese PELPs is a more realistic and practical response to the imperfect 
institutional environment in contemporary China
134
, the above analysis potently proves that 
the LP activism will give rise to huge risk of inefficient governance or even the failure of 
investment. Even though to some extent, the activism seemingly is a pragmatic way to solve 
the agency problem in PE limited partnerships, however, the economic functions and the 
inherent advantages of the limited partnership have been unduly disregarded. Again, it has 
been emphasized at the outset of this research that the emergence and development of a given 
form of business organization has its corresponding social demands. If the unique governance 
structure of an organizational form is unduly distorted in doing the same business, the 
transaction cost inside such business organization will be increased. Therefore, the legal 
reform of the partnership law and its associated regulatory regime should be an unshakable 
direction of the reform for Chinese PE industry. 
 
2.6  A Proposal for the Legal Reform of China’s PE Limited Partnerships 
 
According to the analysis above, it can be seen that the inherent legal features of the limited 
partnership, namely the unlimited liability deterrence and super-profit incentive for general 
partners, limited liability protection and specified ‗safe harbour‘ rules for limited partners, 
can construct an effective risk control regime for not only protecting limited partners‘ 
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interests, but also guarantee the efficient management of limited partnerships. Particularly, 
owing to the unregulated and private legal status of PELPs, the problem of information 
asymmetry between general partners and limited partners will be serious. Correspondingly, 
the self-regulatory system that fills the gap between hard law and the market by establishing a 
professional reputation in the PE market is also necessary. In terms of the legal system of 
PELPs in China, further reform should also be proposed based on the above key features of 
limited partnerships and the self-regulatory system. 
 
2.6.1  Improve the Effectiveness of Corporate General Partners’ Unlimited Liability 
 
As discussed above, the potential high return of PE and VC investment may motivate the 
general partner to exhibit opportunistic behaviours. Furthermore, the limited partners‘ lack of 
power to control will incentivise the limited partners to interfere in the decision-making of 
the limited partnership. As a result, it is significant to make sure that the general partner‘s 
unlimited liability can be effectively enforced. To this end, the following two points are 
recommended for establishing the unlimited liability of general partners in Chinese PELPs. 
 
First, some general partners in PELPs are the subsidiaries of PE management corporations. In 
this circumstance, the unlimited liability will only be imposed on the affiliated entities of the 
PE firm, whereas the actual management team of the PELP is delegated by the parent PE firm. 
It is obvious that the liability of the PE firm will be reduced. However, the fund management 
is actually in the hands of the parent PE firm. To enhance the protection function of general 
partners‘ unlimited liability regime, it is recommended that if the PE firm insists on 
authorising its associated entity to be the general partner of a PELP, the LPA should require 
the PE firm and its associated entity to assume joint and several liability. In this way, if the 
fund eventually goes bankrupt, both the PE firm and its associated entities (GP) will be 
obliged to repay the debt of the limited partnership fund. More importantly, as the buyout 
fund in China has emerged in latest years, such contractual arrangement can effectively press 
the management team of the GP to decrease leverage ratio of the buyout fund, by which the 
unreasonable or overly risky investment will be discouraged. Otherwise, the unlimited 
liability will be imposed on the parent PE firm and in such scenario, the shareholders of the 
PE firm will have strong motivation to avoid such high risk investment.  
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Second, as mentioned previously, in most cases the general partners of PE funds are 
corporate bodies, at the same time the decision on fund management is made by the 
individual representatives who are delegated by the PE firm. Therefore, in fact, in the 
circumstance where the PELP becomes insolvent, the unlimited liability can hardly be 
enforced on the responsible individuals.
135
 With reference to the experience of the UK, 
introducing a series of clearer and more practical judging rules of directors into Chinese 
company law practices may be a cost-efficient way to impose individual liability on 
individuals which can play a role in restricting opportunism.  
 
According to the Company Law of the PRC (2013 Revision), ‗[d]irectors, supervisors and 
senior officers shall abide by laws, administrative regulations and the articles of association 
of the company, and have a fiduciary obligation and obligation of diligence to the 
company‘136 and ‗[i]f a director, supervisor or senior officer violates the provisions of laws, 
administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company in the execution of 
company duties, thereby causing losses to the company, he shall be liable for 
compensation,‘ 137  the shareholders of the company are entitled to request the board of 
supervisors in writing or, in the case of a limited liability company without a board to 
institute proceedings, to a people‘s court.138 In other words, if the director makes a decision 
that violates the duty of care and thus causes loss to the company, the company law makes it 
possible to order the director to make good the losses. 
 
The problem here is that although above stipulations provide a framework to implement the 
director‘s individual liability, in practice, however, it is still quite difficult to judge and 
measure a director‘s personal liability for the losses incurred by a company in China. 
Pursuant to the above provisions, the determination of a director‘s personal liability in 
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decision-making is based on (i) the violation of law, administrative regulation or the articles 
of association of the company and (ii) the incurrence of losses to the company. However, 
such a rule of liability omits the specified subjective judgement benchmark of director‘s 
behaviours in decision-making; in other words, if a decision made by certain director(s) 
causes losses to the company, how can the court judge whether or not the responsible director 
has violated the duty of care? The current company law of China provides no direction for 
this.  
 
In this regard, the Companies Act 2006 in the UK provides some useful inspiration for China 
to establish a practical standard for judging directors‘ behaviour and liability. In the first 
place, it is recommended that the standard of duty of care in decision-making should be 
classified in accordance with different positions of the respective directors.
139
 For example, 
some directors are executive directors who are in charge of corporate management, therefore 
the duty of care on them should be higher than non-executives. Similarly, if a director who 
has specific professional skills such as a solicitor or certified accountant, such a director may 
be expected to perform as competently as a person who has the same professional 
qualification, skills and experience.  
 
Furthermore, in order to vest discretionary judgment on the court, the company law in China 
should also add the provision clarifying the power of the court to grant relief to directors in 
certain circumstances. With reference to s 1157 of the Companies Act 2006, in some specific 
circumstances the court can relieve the director who has been found to be in breach of a duty 
of care.
140
 In practice, the liability relief for a director who breaches the duty of care should 
be given by the court considering the following requirements: (i) the director must act 
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honestly; (ii) his or her decision should be reasonable and (iii) in respect of all the 
circumstances in a certain case, the director ought to be excused. Moreover, the court will 
presume that the director has acted faithfully and reasonably, unless evidence to the contrary 
is provided by the claimant (the company or shareholders).
141
 By adding similar rules to 
Chinese company law, in the circumstance where a corporate general partner causes losses to 
the PELP in China, the responsible individuals who were delegated by the PE firm can be 
enforced to assume personal liability. 
 
In sum, it is argued that in the situation where a PELP goes bankrupt, the corporate general 
partner should repay the debt to the creditors, and only then is the PE management 
corporation, namely the PE firm, entitled to assess whether the losses to the PE firm were 
caused by the responsible individuals who are in charge of or substantively participated in the 
related decision-makings. By means of introducing a clearer and more practical judging rule 
into the company law of China, the responsible individuals delegated by the corporate general 
partner can be restricted by deterrence of personal liability. In the meantime the specified 
benchmark of personal skills, experience, qualifications or the positions in the decision-
making process can also guarantee the responsible individuals‘ flexibility in fund 
management.  
 
2.6.2  Rearrange the Fee Flows and Profit Distribution System for GPs 
 
In terms of the profit distribution system of PELPs in China, the main problem is the lack of 
continuity in motivating the general partner to perform well on behalf of the LPs. Inspired by 
the structured profit distribution system in the PE funds in the UK, the following 
improvements are recommended for the general and limited partners in China‘s PELPs, 
which can be achieved by contractual autonomy in certain limited partnership agreements.
142
 
Specifically, the improvements can be carried out by structuring the payment systems of both 
management fees and carried interest. 
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2.6.2.1  Structured Payment System of Management Fees  
 
First of all, if the management fees are calculated on a pre-fixed percentage of invested 
commitment, the general partner would be incentivised to efficiently search target projects 
and carry out investment. However, the pursuance of short-term interest may give rise to 
insufficient due diligence before the decision-making. Therefore, the restructuring of the fee 
flows of PELPs is necessary. In order to guarantee the quality of investment decision-making, 
the management fee in the early period of the fund can be calculated on the committed capital, 
instead of invested capital. In this way, the general partner will have sufficient funds to 
support the operation of the PELP, and does not tend to select and invest the funds hastily 
into projects that may be risky. At the second stage when the portfolio companies have been 
targeted, the management fees can be calculated on the basis of invested commitment, by 
which the general partner will be motivated to invest the capital of the PELP in the projects 
efficiently.  
 
2.6.2.2  Structured Distribution System of Profit between GPs and LPs 
 
In motivating the general partner to perform well, the carried interest plays a more important 
role that constitutes the main body of the general partner‘s return. At present in China, the 
most common contractual restriction on profit distribution between general partners and 
limited partners is that the general partner will be granted carried interest only when limited 
partners have gained a given rate of return (namely the ‗hurdle rate‘), otherwise all the profit 
will be distributed to the limited partners.
143
 As a measure for optimizing the protection of 
limited partners, by reference to the Explanatory Note of Limited Partnership Agreement 
issued by the BVCA,
144
 a structured allocation system of profit may guarantee the priority of 
limited partners in profit distribution. Firstly, it is advised that before the general partner 
gains the carried interest, the limited partners should be repaid with the capital that they have 
contributed to the PE fund and then receive the hurdle rate of return. In the second stage, the 
remaining profit (if available) will be distributed between the general partner and limited 
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partners on a set ratio.
145
 Moreover, for encouraging the general partner‘s on-going good 
performance, it is also advised that a floating rate of carried interest would be useful in this 
regard, which means that the rate of carried interest will depend on the actual return rate of 
the PELP by the end of the fund or each individual investment. For instance, if the internal 
rate of return
146
 is lower than the hurdle rate (e.g., 8%), all the profit will belong to the 
limited partners; if the IRR of the fund or project is between the hurdle rate and another pre-
agreed rate (e.g., 8% to 10%), limited partners get the hurdle rate of profit. The rest will be 
distributed to the general partner. In the circumstances where the IRR is above a certain 
interval, all the profit will be distributed between the general partner and limited partners on a 
set ratio, mostly around 80% and 20%. In this way, the interest of the general and limited 
partners will be better aligned.  
 
Secondly, as discussed above, the ‗deal-to-deal‘ model may more effectively encourage the 
general partner to diligently manage the investment in each individual portfolio. This 
notwithstanding, the claw-back provision is necessary for PELPs in China, which ensures that 
the limited partners can be prioritised to get the hurdle rate of return to which they are 
entitled. In practice, it is advisable that a proportion of profit generated from each individual 
deal be deposited into an escrow account. In the circumstances where any loss occurs by the 
end of the PELP, the monies in the escrow account should be returned to the limited partners, 
until the limited partners‘ contribution is paid back.  
 
2.6.3  Specify the Liabilities of Active Limited Partners 
 
From an economic point of view, the exclusion of limited partners‘ participation in the 
managerial affairs of limited partnerships is a foundation for the efficient management of 
PELPs, which may cut down the costs of negotiation in decision-making processes. To this 
end, when limited partners intervene in the management of the limited partnership, their 
unlimited liability will be triggered. In addition, it can be seen from the experience of limited 
partnership law in the UK that the proposed ‗safe harbour‘ provisions intended to permit 
limited partners to participate in the management of limited partnerships without losing 
limited liability protection, are mostly in consideration of the increasingly stronger lobbying 
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effort among investors in the PE and VC industry.
147
 Therefore, the basic function of the safe 
harbour provisions of PELPs is mitigating the tension between the general partner and limited 
partners in fund management, whereas the substantive power of fund management is still 
controlled by the general partner.  
 
In terms of the relationship between general partners and limited partners, the immature 
market environment and imperfect liability and incentive mechanisms of the limited 
partnership law of China jointly causes the lack of trust between the general partner and 
limited partners. As a consequence, the managerial intervention by limited partners is quite 
common in Chinese PE funds. Problematically, assuming that the proposed reform of the 
incentive and liability mechanism of Chinese limited partnership law is achieved, whether the 
limited partners‘ intervention in fund management can be prevented or reduced effectively? 
The answer here is probably in the negative.  
 
In fact, as an exception to the exclusion of limited partners‘ participation in limited 
partnership management, similar ‗safe harbour‘ provisions exist in the partnership law of 
China.
148
 However, the statute does not clarify in the circumstance where a limited partner 
takes part in limited partnership management that is not within the scope of above ‗safe 
harbour‘ clauses what the legal consequence of the active limited partner is; in other words, if 
no adverse legal consequence will be triggered when a limited partner participates in the 
management of a limited partnership, how can the law effectively restrict limited partners‘ 
intervention in executing partnership affairs? Based on the current Chinese partnership law, 
the only provision that associates the unlimited liabilities and acts of limited partners is s 67 
of the Partnership Law (2006 Revision) which stipulates that ‗[w]here it is reasonable for a 
                                                          
147
 MaCahery and Vermeulen  (n 56) 79. 
148
 Section 68 (2) of the Partnership Law (2006 Revision) provides that the following acts of limited partners in 
a limited partnership should not be deemed as execution of partnership affairs: ‗A limited partner may not 
execute the partnership affairs, nor may he represent the limited partnership enterprise before outsiders.‘  
The following acts of a limited partner shall not be deemed as execution of partnership affairs:  
(1) To participate in making a decision about the admission or withdraw of a general partner; (2) To put 
forward a proposal on the business management of the enterprise; (3) To participate in choosing an 
accounting firm to handle the audit business of the limited partnership enterprise; (4) To obtain a 
financial report of the limited partnership enterprise upon audit; (5) To consult the account books of the 
limited partnership enterprise and other financial materials which concern the limited partner‘s own 
interests; (6) To file claims or lodge a lawsuit against the liable partner(s) when this limited partner‘s 
interests in the limited partnership enterprise are impaired; (7) When the partner(s) responsible for 
executing the partnership affairs is (are) fails to exercise his (their rights), to urge them to exercise their 
rights or initiate a lawsuit for protecting the interests of this enterprise; and (8) To offer a guaranty for 
this enterprise in accordance with the law. 
74 
 
third person to believe a limited partner as a general partner and concludes a transaction with 
him, this limited partner shall bear the same liabilities for this transaction as a general partner 
shall do‘. Therefore, it is commonly accepted in China that in the situation where the limited 
partner participates in executing the business of limited partnership with a third party who 
believes that the executive partner is the general partner of limited partnerships, such an 
active partner should assume the same liability as the general partner.
149
 The outstanding 
issue here is that if a limited partner did not carry out any transaction with a third party but 
has substantively influenced the decision-making within the limited partnership, such as the 
selection of investment targets, once the certain investment fails, should the limited partner 
assume the same liability as a general partner? According to the current Chinese partnership 
law, the answer is uncertain.  
 
By contrast, the Limited Partnerships Act 1907, the loss of limited liability protection for 
limited partners is not contingent upon a third party‘s knowledge of who enters into deals 
with the limited partnership.
150
 Although in some other jurisdictions such as Delaware in the 
US,
151
 the trigger of an increased liability burden of limited partners depends on the position 
of third parties. However, in the UK both the Limited Partnership Act 1907 and the Law 
Commission and Scottish Law Commission‘s report152 do not regard the knowledge of third 
parties who enter into transactions with the limited partnership is a prerequisite for increasing 
the liability of a limited partner, because the ‗management‘ is ‗primarily internal issues that 
do not undermine the positions of third parties‘.153 
 
Similarly, the intervention by limited partners in Chinese PELPs is one of the most serious 
problems in relation to PE funds in China. As a proposal for reform in future, the legal 
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business. However, if the limited partner does participate in the control of the business, he or she is liable only 
to persons who transact business with the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited 
partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner.‘  
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 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (n 58) 282. 
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 Timothy Spangler (n 56) 138. 
75 
 
consequence of a limited partner who executes the partnership affairs beyond the scope of the 
‗safe harbour‘ provisions it should be clarified that such a limited partner shall bear the same 
liability as the general partner. In this way, the deterrence of unlimited liability may 
particularly make limited partners reluctant to intervene in the decision-making of PELPs, by 
which the cost of fund governance can be decreased.  
 
2.6.4  Enhance the Self-regulation of PE Limited Partnerships: Reform in Progress 
 
It is widely recognized that due to the inadequate disclosure of PE, the external protection for 
investors in PE and VC funds is necessary. In China, currently the regulatory system of 
PELPs can be discussed in two domains: (i) official regulation and (ii) self-regulation. On the 
one hand, at present the functional regulatory system in China is not established and official 
regulation over private investment funds is controlled by different regulatory bodies,
154
 thus 
the compliance cost in the Chinese financial sector is relatively high. On the other hand, 
although the self-regulatory system of PELPs has been established, however, owing to the 
inadequate reputational mechanism in the market, the further reform of the self-regulation of 
PELPs is also needed. In this section, the inherent conflict between different financial 
regulators of Chinese PE and VC will be discussed in comparison with the experience of the 
BVCA. This chapter argues that the establishment of a unified self-regulatory body is a 
feasible way to enhance the protection of investors in Chinese PELPs. 
 
2.6.4.1  The Competition between Official Regulators: High Regulatory Costs  
 
Basically, the official regulatory system of PELPs in China is structured on two levels: the 
regulation of VC funds led by the NDRC, the general regulatory system of private investment 
funds controlled by CSRC. Nonetheless, owing to the political conflict between the NDRC 
and CSRC in financial regulation, actually the current Chinese regulatory regime of PELPs to 
a great extent fails to satisfactorily normalize the PE and VC market or effectively protect 
limited partners‘ interests. Fortunately, the reform of the regulation over PELPs has been 
launched since 2012 and further reform is expected.  
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 Owing to the separated financial regulatory system in China, PE and VC funds are not regulated by a single 
regulator. Specifically, the regulation of private equity investment trusts (PEITs) is separately regulated by the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), which will be discussed in the Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
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Prior to discussing the implementation of the regulatory power, one should roughly consider 
the legal status of the NDRC within China‘s economic and political regimes. In fact, the 
predecessor of the NDRC was the National Planning Commission,
155
 which was established 
in 1952. The main function of NPC was (i) to create macro-economic policy for different 
industries and (ii) to supervise the implementation of national economic plans of Chinese 
government at all the levels. From a legal perspective, before the institutional reform of the 
Chinese economy was launched in the late 1970s, the legal status of the NPC was that it was 
actually the most powerful department of the State Council of China; almost any proposed 
economic or industrial activities (e.g., industrial planning, foreign investment, price control, 
financial activities and infrastructure) had to be approved by the NPC; in other words, 
historically, the nature of the NPC was as a very general social administrative body but not a 
special or professional regulator of specific economic activities. With the liberalization of the 
economy, however, the over-broad administrative power of the NDRC has been a barrier to 
Chinese economic reform. To reduce the administrative intervention in the market economy, 
two waves of reform of the NPC led by the State Council were launched in 1998 and 2003 
respectively.
156
 At present a series of the most substantive approval powers associated with 
financial regulation are still in the hands of the NDRC. Accordingly, the NDRC‘s regulation 
over the PE and VC industry is also not specialised, and the protection of investors is 
insufficient as well. 
 
Since the promulgation of the Interim Provisions for the Administration of Start-up 
Investment Enterprises (2005),
157
 the domestic PELPs in China are regulated by the NDRC
158
 
who has the power to examine and supervise the operation of PELPs at any time. In the 
situation that a PE and VC firm does not comply with the law, the NDRC has the power to 
revoke its licence (s 27). However, the Interim Provision (2005) does not clarify any legal 
liability or substantive punishment imposed on fund managers who carry out inappropriate 
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 Hereinafter referred to as the ‗NPC‘. 
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 During the 2000s, the State Council of China cancelled or simplified 2614 administrative approvals and the 
further simplification of the administrative approval power of the NDRC was proposed. For more detail, see 
Youliang Yan, ‗A Leviathan? The NDRC is Being Powerful Again‘ Sina Finance News (Beijing, 30 May 2013) 
[ 严友良 , ‗ 发改委被指越改革权力越大 : 副省长不敢反驳处长 ‘. 新浪财经， 2013 年 5 月 30 日 ]. 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130530/082015636012.shtml> accessed 22 April 2015.  
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 Hereinafter referred to as ‗the Interim Provisions 2005‘. 
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 According to the Interim Provisions (2005), all PE and VC funds shall be filed with the NDRC or other 
related administrative departments of the provinces (s 4) and registered with the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC) or local departments of the SAIC (s 8).  
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behaviours. In such a loose policy circumstance, many unqualified fund management firms 
were motivated to raise funds from unqualified investors and invest in risky projects.
159
  
 
Since 2012, however, the CSRC has been actively competing with the NDRC in regulating 
PELPs. The revision of the Securities Investment Fund Law of China (2003) was completed 
by the end of December 2012. One of the key debates in the process of amending this law 
was whether PELPs should be officially regulated by the Securities Investment Fund Law.
160
 
According to the first version of the Consultation Draft issued by the Standing Committee of 
the National People‘s Congress,161 the new law tries to regulate PE and VC funds formed as 
limited liability companies or limited partnerships.
162
 It is evident that if this Consultation 
Draft can be successfully enacted into a statute, the regulator of PELPs will be changed, 
which means that the CSRC and courts will be able to substantially share the power of 
regulation over PELPs. More importantly, because the legal status of statutes issued by the 
National People‘s Congress is in the top position in the Chinese legislative system, both the 
legal force of the Provisions (2005) and the NDRC‘s regulatory authority of PE and VC may 
be ended in the short term.
163
 Therefore, the NDRC was dissatisfied with this Consultation 
Draft. In the process of the second and final rounds of discussion on revising the SIFL, as a 
consequence, the NDRC and the 25 professional associations in the PE and VC industry 
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 For instance, the so-called First Judicial Case of China’s PE Funds was adjudicated by the First Intermediate 
People‘s Court of Shanghai in 2010, in which a 28-year-old fund manager, Hao Huang, was accused of fraud in 
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 Hereinafter referred to as ‗SIFL‘. 
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 In this early version of the Consultation Draft (July 2012), private investment funds (excluding investment 
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the revised SIFL; in other words, not only public investment funds, but also privately raised investment funds, 
including hedge funds, PE and VC funds, will also be regulated by the new SIFL. [全国人大常委会, 证券投资基
金法（修订草案）全文, 2012 年 7 月 6 日]. The official version of this interim legislative document is available 
at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2012-07/06/content_1729072.htm. 
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 Clifford Chance LLP, ‗The Amended Securities Investment Funds Law‘: Significant Changes but More 
expected‘ (25 January 2013) 
<http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2013/01/the_amended_securitiesinvestmentfundslaw.html > accessed 
28 April 2015; Dongying Wang, ‗The Regulatory Power of PE/VC Funds: NDRC PK CSRC‘, South Weekly 
(2013) [王冬颖, ‗PE 监管权：发改委 PK证监会‘，南都周刊，2013 年第 22 期] 
<http://www.nbweekly.com/news/business/201306/33414.aspx > accessed 28 April 2015. 
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across the country jointly signed a statement to the SCNPC arguing that the high-level 
regulation over PE and VC funds would cripple the development of the Chinese PE and VC 
industry.
164
 As a result of the departmental competition in the jurisdiction, in the final 
revision of the SIFL (2012 Revision), PELPs were eventually excluded from the regulatory 
ambit of the SIFL (2012 Revision).
165
  
 
Under the above circumstances, driven by the competition between the NDRC and CSRC, 
the further regulatory reform of China‘s PELPs continued. In June 2013, the State 
Commission Office for the Public Sector Reform of China
166
 clarified the division of powers 
in the PE and VC regulatory affairs between the NDRC and CSRC: (i) the NDRC should be 
in charge of making macro industrial policies for development of PE and VC funds and 
coordinating the relationship between the government and PE and VC market; and (ii) the 
CSRC should be responsible for the regulation of PE and VC firms and the protection of PE 
and VC investors.
167
 Based on this administrative order, the most important regulatory reform 
of PE and VC funds went further in 2014. On one hand, the NDRC has stated that the annual 
review of PE and VC funds with the NDRC was no longer required.
168
 On the other hand, 
more importantly, the Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Privately-
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 Ibid.; Dong Liu, ‗The New Law of Securities Investment Funds: Private Equity and Venture Capital Funds 
Are Still Free from Regulation‘ China Business News (Beijing, 25 December 2012) [刘冬, ‗新基金法三审：
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the term securities therein refers to any publicly issued stocks, bonds and any other types of financial derivatives 
that can legally be exchanged or circulated in China. It is evident that the change in terms of the regulatory 
scope of private investment funds between the first draft and the final revision of the law, the limited definition 
of the term ‗securities‘ frees PELPs from the CSRC‘s high level of regulation 
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 The Notice of the Division of Regulatory Functions Regarding Private Equity Funds issued by SCOPSR, 
June 2013 [中央机构编制委员会办公室. 关于私募股权基金管理职责分工的通知，2013 年 6月]  
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 The Notice of the Issues Regarding Further Development of Venture Capital Investment Enterprises issued 
by the General Office of NDRC, May 2014 [发改委. 国家发展改革委办公厅关于进一步做好支持创业投资企业发
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accessed 10 June 2015.  
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Raised Investment Funds (2014),
169
 which is the first detailed administrative regulation of 
PELPs issued by the CSRC, came into force in August of the same year. 
 
According to the Interim Measures (2014), the CSRC is the general regulator of all kinds of 
private investment funds in China with the exception of investment trust funds which are 
regulated by the CBRC.
170
 However, because the administrative hierarchy of the NDRC and 
CSRC is at the same level and the Provisions (2005) are still legally valid, currently any 
PELPs registered in China have to comply with the requirements issued by the two regulators. 
Obviously, such a dual-level regulatory system may reduce the efficiency and unnecessarily 
increase PE and VC practitioners‘ compliance costs. Further regulatory reform of PELPs is 
expected to reasonably simplify the compliance requirement of PELPs by enhancing the 
CSRC‘s regulatory power in the PE and VC market, and finally remove the unprofessional 
regulatory power of the NDRC.  
 
2.6.4.2  Rearrange the Functions of the Industrial Associations of PE Funds in China 
 
The above analysis indicates that owing to the lack of coherent and unified regulatory system 
of PE funds in China, the enforceability of the law and the effectiveness of the protection for 
investors of PELPs are imperfect. Although further reform of the official regulatory system is 
expected, in order to fill the gap between the regulation and practice, the self-regulation of 
the PE industry is especially necessary. Generally speaking, the self-regulatory system of 
PELPs is organized on both the national and provisional levels.  
 
One the one hand, pursuant to the Interim Measures (2014), the Asset Management 
Association of China,
171
 founded in June 2012, is the unified self-regulatory body of private 
investment funds in a nationwide scope.
172
 As a self-regulatory body in financial market, the 
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 Hereinafter referred to as ‗AMAC‘. 
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 It is provided in Chapter 6 of the Interim Measures (2014) that AMAC is obliged to make self-regulatory 
rules and examine the performance of its member institutions and related practitioners (s 29); in the 
circumstance where any member institutions or related practitioners violates the laws, administrative regulations 
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primary function of the AMAC is improving information transparency and normalizing the 
managerial conducts of the Chinese asset management industry. As a subset of private 
investment funds, PELPs are also required to register with the AMAC, which means that any 
violation of laws or regulations by the fund management corporations (mostly general 
partners) or individual practitioners may be punished by the AMAC. At present, the AMAC 
developed a system of information sharing on its official website, where the public can 
directly access all information on violations, punishment and blacklisting of members and 
related individuals who have failed to comply with the laws, regulations or self-regulatory 
rules.
173
  
 
On the other hand, the industrial associations of PE and VC led by the NDRC also play a role 
in the regulation of PELPs. By the end of March 2015, there were two main state-level self-
regulators
174
and 23 local-level self-regulators.
175
 Most of these associations are expected to 
perform as a platform for information sharing for the public and authorities. In terms of the 
self-regulation, however, the effectiveness of the professional associations‘ regulatory 
function is unsatisfactory. The substantive reputational mechanism of self-regulation is 
insufficient. For example, most articles of association only provide that in the circumstances 
where a member violates the law or the articles of association, the association may 
permanently revoke the membership of the non-compliant member.
176
 In most cases the PE 
and VC associations are reluctant to expose any illegal, inappropriate or immoral behavior of 
the members. In other words, the reputational deterrence of the members of PE and VC 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
or self-regulatory rules, AMAC is entitled to take actions and publish the violations to the public via website (s 
29); AMAC shall establish a complaint-handling mechanism to accept investor complaints and mediate disputes 
(s 30).  
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协会章程，第 13 条] <http://www.szape.org/CompanyConstitution.aspx> accessed 17 June 2015; s 12 of the 
Articles of Association of Beijing Association of Private Equity [北京股权投资基金协会章程，第 12 条]  
< http://www.bpea.net.cn/article/ljxh/xhzc/> accessed 17 June 2015. 
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associations is still insufficient. Although the two nationwide self-regulatory bodies of 
Chinese PE and VC industry were founded in 2001 and 2002, the function of standardization 
of the industrial self-regulation is also imperfect. For instance, the China Association of 
Private Equity
177
 released the Principle Guidelines for China‘s PE and VC Industry178 in 
November 2011, which is regarded as the official professional standard of the Chinese PE 
and VC industry. However, this guideline only provides a series of very general principles 
regarding the self-regulation of PE and VC funds, but no practical rules that can substantively 
establish a reputational mechanism in the market.  
 
As a response to above shortcomings, the recommendation is that the main direction of 
reform should focus on the establishment of a nationwide reputation system in the PE and VC 
market, by which public investors can access information on any violations and immoral 
behaviors of general partners, as it has been tested and acknowledged that reputational record 
of PE and VC firms has a remarkable correlation with not only the scale of fundraising
179
 but 
also the bargaining ability of GPs
180
.  
 
Specifically, owing to the existence of the dual-level regulatory system, the functions of the 
industrial associations of PE and VC and the AMAC should be differentiated, by which the 
self-regulation of PELPs can be more efficient. At the national level, the AMAC should play 
a leading role in the self-regulation of PELPs in a nationwide scope. According to s 7 and 8 
of the Interim Measures (2014), all private investment funds (excluding investment trusts) are 
required to register with the AMAC and file the main legal documents including the articles 
of associations of corporate funds or partnership agreements of limited partnership funds, the 
basic information of senior managers
181
 and the main information of the investment targets 
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 Stephen D. Prowse, ‗The Economics of the Private Equity Market‘ (Third Quarter 1998) Economic Review 
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 Section 7 of the Interim Measures (2014) provides that  
A manager of Privately-raised Funds of any type shall, in accordance with the provisions of the AMAC, 
apply for registration to the AMAC and submit the following basic materials: (1) Photocopies of the 
originals and duplicates of its industrial and commercial registration certificate and business license; (2) 
Its articles of association or partnership agreement; (3) The list of its major shareholders or partners; (4) 
Profiles of its senior management personnel; and (5) Other materials required by the AMAC.  
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and prospectus (if applicable).
182
 Therefore, the AMAC is expected to collect the substantive 
information of each PELP, which means that the AMAC will have advantages in judging the 
violations of laws and regulations, and inappropriate behavior of fund managers of each PE 
and VC fund.  
 
At the industrial level, the existing professional associations in the PE and VC industry can 
also play an ongoing role as significant platform for reputational regulation of fund managers 
within the PE and VC market. Firstly, it is recommended that the industrial associations 
should establish co-operation with the AMAC, by which all the information regarding the 
performance of the industrial associations‘ members should also be accessible on the 
websites or public information platforms. In this way, the reputational regime in the PE and 
VC market can be widely enhanced. Secondly, in a technical regard, more detailed and 
practical guidance such as model rules of profit distribution, the recommended practices of 
LPAs and the standard of judging the general partner‘s behaviors in fund management should 
be advised and developed by industrial associations of PE/VC of China, which may make a 
contribution to the standardization of the practice of PELPs
183
.  
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 Section 8 of the Interim Measures (2014) provides that 
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accredited to the PE/VC associations at provincial level. Attending a given number of hours of training courses 
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facilitate information sharing of the self-regulators and different practitioners of PE/VC market. Such activities 
will be beneficial for developing a series of coherent and widely applicable standards for PE/VC investment in 
China.  
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     Chapter 3: The Protection for Beneficiaries in Private Equity Investment Trusts 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Though the limited partnership has been used as the dominant organizational form for 
conducting PE and VC businesses in China, prior to the promulgation of the new Partnership 
Law in 2006, there was no formal legal foundation for limited partnerships in China. Against 
this background, the legal structure of investment trusts has been applied by Chinese trust 
corporations to organize PE and VC funds which are strictly regulated by both the Law of 
Trusts of the PRC (2001) and China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)‘s regulations. 
Hence, owing to its relatively sound protective mechanism for beneficiaries, private equity 
investment trusts
1
 have also developed rapidly since around 2006. However, because of a 
series of inherent economic and political factors, the governance structure of PEITs under the 
Chinese legal system is still problematic, which seriously impacts the effectiveness of the 
protective mechanism of business trusts.  
 
In this chapter, the historical origins and economic features of English trust law will be 
reviewed. It is argued in this section that the nature of the equitable title of trust assets is 
actually judicial rights providing flexible remedies for beneficiaries. All the advantages of 
English trusts will not apply unless an independent, strong and professional judicial system 
exists. In the second section, the key protective mechanisms for beneficiaries in English trusts, 
namely the duty of care and the duty of loyalty rules, are examined by reviewing and 
comparing a series of leading cases throughout the development of English trust law. Owing 
to the conceptual incompatibility of the common law and civil law systems, the institutional 
functions of English trusts can only be transplanted partially by alternative approaches in the 
jurisdiction without an equity system. In the third section, the trust-like regimes in mixed and 
continental jurisdictions are discussed, followed by a comparison of the transaction costs 
generated from managerial and remedial approaches in the trust-like regimes of all the above-
mentioned jurisdictions. In the next sections the basic legal structure and short history of 
China‘s PEITs are summarized, and the following problems in practice are discussed in detail: 
(i) the beneficiaries‘ power to intervene in general meetings; (ii) the zero-loss promises of 
trustees and the distorted trust market in China; (iii) the ineffective monitoring of custodian 
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 Hereinafter referred to as ‗PEITs‘. 
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banks; and (iv) the barrier to initial public offering
2
 of PEIT-involved companies in China‘s 
domestic stock markets. Finally, withy reference to the financial regulatory system of 
collective investment schemes
3
 in the UK, this chapter tries to put forward a series of advices 
for enhancing the protection of beneficiaries of PEITs in China. 
 
3.2 The Institutional Features of Trusts: Origins and Economic Functions 
 
3.2.1 The Origins of Dual Ownership in English Trusts 
 
Trust as the most typical legal regime in common law jurisdiction sprung from a series of 
fortuitous products in medieval English law, the most important of which was the formation 
of equity system. During the medieval period in England, judicial or legal issues were 
regulated and organized by a writ system, which means that anyone who failed to get the 
proper writ for a specific type of remedy, any compensation was unable to be granted by 
common law.
4
 As early as the fourteenth century, more and more individuals could not be 
fairly remedied by the courts. When such unfair circumstances became intolerable, the 
Chancellor was required by the King‘s decrees to grant remedies in personam to the parties in 
disputes,
5
 which were gradually developed as today‘s so-called equity in England and Wales. 
The dual system of common law and equity was not born until the Court of Chancery was 
established by the fifteenth century.
6
  
 
Most legal historians believed that English trust law originated from Uses in medieval ages, 
which was initially applied by Englishmen for some specific speculative purposes. The most 
important reason for the emergence of Uses is that in the middle ages lords had the right to 
sub-feu the lands to tenants. In turn, the latter were bound to render a variety of services and 
‗incidents‘ to the lords. One of these incidents was a duty to make payment to the superior on 
succession to the land after the death of a former tenant. To avoid this expense, tenants 
invented the so-called Use by which they alienated the land to a third person who promised to 
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manage the land and pass the benefit of the land on to the heir. As a consequence, the 
payment of feudal incidents could be prevented.
7
 Secondly, as a great number of English 
knights went off to the Crusades in the thirteenth century, the Uses were also applied to 
maintain the life of the family members of the knights: for instance, the knight vested his 
estate in land to a trustworthy friend who had to possess the estate in the interests of the 
knight‘s family.8 In addition, in English feudal law only the eldest son was entitled to be the 
heir; the Englishman could not leave the lands to other offspring by will, therefore, the 
application of Uses made it possible to leave the land to daughters and younger sons of the 
Englishman.
9
 The typical English trust was not developed from medieval Uses until 1535 
when the Statute of Uses was promulgated.
10
  
 
The trouble with Uses or the trust-like relationship is that, under common law, the ownership 
of the managed estate is fully owned by the ‗manager of the property‘ (or the trustee). 
Consequently, in the circumstance where the trustee unfaithfully transfers the managed 
property to a third party, neither the settlor nor the beneficiary could turn to the court for a 
remedy.
11
 On the contrary, equity recognized beneficiaries‘ interests in the trust property; if 
the unfaithful trustee breaches the duty under the deed between him and the settlor, the 
beneficiary would be protected by the equitable remedies.
12
 At the same time, the manager 
(trustee) still obtains the ownership fully under common law. This ownership structure in 
English law is known as the ‗dual ownership structure‘ between the common law and equity.  
 
In practical terms, on the one hand, since the beneficiary obtains the equitable ownership of 
the trust property, in principle the beneficiary is entitled to trace the interests in the trust 
against anyone who obtained the property through the trustee‘s improper disposition, unless 
the purchaser is bona fide and paid the true value of the trust property. On the other, the 
trustee obtains the legal ownership of the trust property and once the property is transferred to 
the trust fund, the trustee is the only party who has the power to dispose or administer the 
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trust property exclusively; neither the settlor nor beneficiary can meddle in the management 
of trust.  
 
Based on the dual ownership structure, the nature of trust can be construed as follows: firstly, 
the beneficiaries‘ proprietary right of trust assets is a supplementary remedy for the loss of 
proceeds or ‗benefits‘13 of trust assets but not for the loss of ‗ownership‘ or control of trust 
assets. That is to say, the beneficiary‘s ‗equitable ownership‘ is essentially a proprietary right 
of the advancement from trust assets but not the property right of the trust asset itself. 
Secondly, the ‗legal owner‘ of the trust property means that the trustee‘s management should 
not be influenced by anyone including the beneficiary, unless the trustee breaches the duties.  
 
3.2.2 The Functions of Trust Law 
 
3.2.2.1 Fiduciary Duty as Flexible Protection for Beneficiaries 
 
As discussed in Chapter one of this research, fiduciary duty rules are widely applied as 
default rules for cost-efficiently protecting beneficiaries‘ interests in a trust. In a modern 
economy, the division of labor in different professions makes it impossible to require market 
participants to understand all the details, techniques and knowledge in each deal; Particularly 
in professional financial activities, the complexity in assets management has increased risks 
and uncertainties in investment. To promote economic efficiency, fiduciary duty rules are 
developed as default rules in trusts, by which settlors and trustees can accomplish their deals 
more efficiently.  
 
The fiduciary duty rules automatically provide gap-filling protection in drafting trust 
agreements. For example, when a settler entrusts capital to a fiduciary for investment, the 
duty of care requires the person who is acting as a fiduciary to make decisions prudently and 
the duty of loyalty is aimed at minimizing the conflicts of interest between the trustee and 
beneficiary. Although some scholars and judges have recently found that in practice investors 
have tended to agree to waive or at least mitigate the manager‘s (including trustees, directors 
of companies, etc.) fiduciary duty by clear contractual clauses in trust deeds for efficiency 
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and flexibility
14
 in present UK statutes, they insist on stringently enforcing the trustee‘s 
fiduciary duty for protecting public interests as a part of public policy.
15
 In fact, the judicial 
attitude towards this issue reflects that the function of fiduciary duty in trusteeship induces 
the trustee to perform well by imposing the ‗after-the-fact liability‘ for the failures of the 
trustee.
16
  
 
In addition, the fiduciary duty in trust law provides a protective mechanism without the 
beneficiary‘s or trustor‘s active monitoring. Firstly, if the beneficiary spends inordinate 
amounts of time in self-monitoring the trustee, the efficiency of the trust may be reduced. 
Secondly, the exclusion of the beneficiary‘s active participating can avoid unprofessional and 
irrational intervention, which can also cut down the transaction costs in trust fund 
management.
17
 Thirdly, if the transaction security is lodged by instructions in trust deeds or 
disempowerment, the trustee‘s managerial power would be overly restricted. By contrast, the 
fiduciary duty rules can entitle managers to a wide range of power deal flexibly with practical 
issues in different circumstances.  
 
3.2.2.2 Bankruptcy Remote as Firewall against Trustees’ Creditors  
 
Another advantage of trusts is that the partitioning of different assets in a trust fund can better 
protect the beneficiary‘s interests from challenges of trustees‘ personal creditors. First of all, 
once the trust asset is transferred to a trustee, the ownership of the trust asset is separated 
from the trustee‘s personal property, which means that the beneficiary‘s interests in a trust 
fund can be protected from the fiduciary‘s creditors‘ claim when the trustee goes insolvent.18 
In the case of insolvency, the beneficiary is still entitled to obtain the interest of the trust asset. 
Second, the principles of bankruptcy remote of trust law also require the trustee to keep the 
independence between various trust funds that are managed by the same trustee. Specifically, 
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each trust fund should have its own independent account and should never be commingled 
with other trust funds. As a consequence, even if one of the trust funds becomes insolvent, 
the creditors have no right to claim compensation from other trust funds.  
 
Similarly, the independence of trust assets is also applicable to the settlor. Once a certain 
amount of property is entrusted to a trustee, the settlor will have no right to dispose or utilize 
the trust property on his or her own. Any creditor of the settlor is not allowed to make any 
claim against the trust property. Generally, the trust property is not regarded as the settlor‘s 
heritage: when the natural person settlor dies, the beneficiary can still gain the interests from 
the trust fund. In the case where the settlor is a corporation, the beneficiary interests in the 
trust property can also be protected from the settlor‘s bankruptcy.  
 
3.2.2.3 Beneficiaries’ Enforcement against Trustees 
 
One of the basic rules in trust law is that the beneficiary is entitled to enforce the trustee duly 
to manage the trust asset for the beneficiary‘s interests. By contrast, before the enactment of 
the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, the third party in a contract under UK laws 
was unable to enforce the contracts.
19
 Therefore, the English trust historically was and 
currently is providing more effective enforcement protection of the third party beneficiary 
than the law of contract.
20
 In this term, the law of trust entitles a series of legal powers to the 
beneficiary to enforce the trustee to fulfil duties properly, namely the tracing right against a 
third party purchaser and claim right or judicial remedy against the trustee.  
 
On the one hand, in the event where the trustee unduly transfers trust property to a third party, 
the transferee must be bona fide and have supplied a true value as the consideration, 
otherwise the beneficiary can directly compel the transferee to return the trust asset to the 
trust fund. This means that even a third party beneficiary is not a contractual party to the trust 
deed or enjoy a title under property law, he or she can keep the proprietary right in the trust 
property. The Chancellor‘s willingness to recognize the beneficiary‘s enforceability against 
an outsider is factually protecting ‗the beneficiary‘s (and the settlor‘s) reliance upon the 
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trustee‘s promise‘;21 in other words, the enforceability by tracing creates protection for the 
beneficiary without resorting to the settlor or the trustee. Moreover, the direct tracing right for 
beneficiaries forces the third party purchaser to ensure that the trustee‘s disposition of the 
trust asset is legal and does not amount to breach of trust, otherwise the third-party purchaser 
will be at the risk of tracing,
22
 which can be regarded as another low-cost monitoring 
mechanism for protecting the beneficiary‘s interests.  
 
On the other hand, if the trustee breaches his or her duties and infringes on the beneficiary‘s 
interest, the beneficiary has the right to require the trustee to make good the losses caused by 
any breach of trust and return any profit gained from the trustee‘s misfeasance.23 In addition, 
the beneficiary can also request the court to remove the unsatisfactory trustee to avoid further 
damage to the beneficiary‘s interests.24 Specifically, because the trustee obtains powerful 
control of the trust assets and is conferred to discretionarily determine the utility and 
management of the trust fund, the trustee‘s discretion in managing trust assets may cause 
some potential damages to or reduce the profit for the beneficiary. In these circumstances, the 
court has the power to restrict the trustee‘s discretion or even appoint a new trustee to protect 
the beneficiary‘s interests.25 Compared with the third-party beneficiary contract, beneficiaries 
in trusts can enjoy more direct and effective protection from the judicial system.  
 
3.3  The Judicial Protection for Beneficiaries in Commercial Trusts of England 
 
3.3.1  Duty of Care 
 
3.3.1.1 Unprofessional Trustees: Ordinary Prudent Man Standard 
 
The duty of care in English case law is not a subject that solely belongs to the law of trusts. 
Instead, duty of care also exits in tort law, partnership law and company law.
26
 As for English 
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trust law, the clarification of the duty of care did not derive until the famous case Speight v 
Gaunt (1883),
27
 where Jessel MR set out a practical standard for judging whether a trustee 
has duly fulfilled the duty of care, namely the ‗ordinary prudence‘ standard. In this case, 
Gaunt, the defendant, who had no professional investment experience was appointed as a 
trustee of a family settlement. The beneficiaries instructed the trustee to invest in local 
government debentures by buying securities at regional stock exchanges. To carry out this 
instruction, the trustee appointed a stockbroker to manage the trust business. However, the 
trustee did not know that the stockbroker was nearly insolvent. Finally, the stockbroker 
presented a forged bought note as evidence that he had successfully invested the trust funds 
into the securities, but actually the stockbroker had embezzled the trust funds to pay off his 
personal debts and then vanished. The beneficiaries filed a lawsuit against Gaunt for the 
breach of fiduciary duty to preserve trust funds, because the trustee did not prudently verify 
the truth of the bought note. 
 
In brief, the core debate between the Court of Appeal and Chancery was whether the trustee 
should be unconditionally and absolutely liable for the loss of trust funds through delegation. 
According to general equitable rules, any defaults by a trustee‘s agent or delegation will 
result in liability to the trustee. This is a compulsory rule that may not compromise with any 
market practice.
28
 However, in this case the Court of Appeal did not accept this argument and 
held that ‗if you once arrive at the conclusion that Gaunt was informed by the bought-note 
that the purchase had been made in that way, there was no obligation on him to make any 
further inquiry‘.29 The main two reasons for this decision were that first the defendant was 
not an expert in stock investment and second the strict duty of verification would be too high 
for him. Actually, in this case the plaintiff had previously known that the trustee was not a 
professional in investment. Accordingly, he was not entitled to expect performance by the 
trustee at as high a level as a professional. Consequently, the Court of Appeal held that ‗[a] 
trustee investing trust funds is justified in employing a broker to procure securities authorized 
by the trust and in paying the purchase-money to the broker, if he follows the usual and 
regular course of business adopted by ordinary prudent men in making such investments‘, if 
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the legal liability of trustees is stricter than this standard, it would be impossible to employ 
any trustee to do anything.  
 
Furthermore, commercial transactions were likely to be much more complicated than ever 
before, which means that the delegation of the employment of agents by a trustee is 
increasingly common and even inevitable. Moreover, practically any legal rules must give 
regard to business practice. In this case, if the court stuck to the rule that the trustee must 
verify every detail in transactions by a broker employed by him, the overly strict verification 
or supervision duty of trustee may destroy the basic trusteeship in commercial co-operations. 
In addition, the function of delegation is an amelioration of economic efficiency. If the law 
requires trustees to verify or supervise all the conducts by the employed agents, economic 
efficiency will be reduced seriously.  
 
3.3.1.2  Professional Managers: Modern Expert Standard 
 
With the development of professionalism and division of labor in modern business, the 
‗ordinary prudent man‘ standard that was commonly applied to unremunerated or unskilled 
trustees has not been suitable for those fiduciaries with particular skills or qualifications. 
Differently, a stricter standard was proposed for remunerated and professional trustees, such 
as solicitors, stockbrokers and real estate managers. In the past, trustees‘ duty of care mainly 
referred to an obligation to preserve the value of trust assets and prevent speculative conduct 
that might cause loss to the beneficiaries. In modern markets, the above ‗prudent trustee‘ 
standard has been developed and extended, which means that ‗trustees were obligated to 
maximize financial returns to trust funds as well as preserve the capital‘.30  
 
The leading case regarding duty of care in modern financial investment trusts, Bartlett & 
others v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (1980)
31
 shows a standard for judging the duty of care 
of professional trust corporations. The plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of a trust holding 99.8% 
shares of a company, Barclays Bank Trust Co., Ltd as the trustee committed to exercise the 
voting and managerial powers attached to the shareholding on behalf of the plaintiff. 
Therefore, the trustee would have the controlling interest in the company, but there was no 
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representative of the trust corporation on the board of directors. To raise finance, in 1961 the 
board announced the policy that the company would invest in the real estate market, although 
the trust corporation had been advised by a merchant banker that the proposed investment 
was likely inappropriate. However, the trustee neither made more inquiries nor required the 
board to provide further information on this investment. One of the projects seriously failed 
and caused losses to the beneficiary.  
 
Pursuant to the ‗ordinary prudent man‘ standard, in general circumstances, the law does not 
require a trustee to verify the information provided by a ‗trustworthy‘ party in trust 
transactions. However, here the court held that a trust corporation was different from an 
ordinary trustee, as it usually had specialised skills and relatively high-level professional 
experience in particular businesses. Hence, a trust corporation‘s duty of care should be higher 
and stricter than an ordinary trustee. In this case, Barclays Bank Trust Co., Ltd as a 
professional trust manager ‗should not have relied only on information given at annual 
general meetings of the property company‘,32 but ought to have made further consultation of 
the investment in person for the purpose of prudently safeguarding the interests of the trust. 
Therefore, the bank had breached the trust and should be liable for the loss suffered by the 
beneficiary.  
 
Another question is if a trustee holds the majority of a company‘s shares, what the trustee 
should do in corporate governance to prevent being regarded as violating the duty of care. In 
Re Lucking’s Will Trusts (1968)33 a trust fund held 70% of a private company‘s shares and 
one of the two trustees was employed as one of the directors of the company. However, the 
business of the company was managed by an executive director but not the trustee director. 
The executive director wrongfully took £15,000 from the company‘s bank for personal ends 
and then went bankrupt, and the money was lost consequently. The trustees were eventually 
deemed in breach of trust for their failed supervision of the other directors‘ misconduct in 
corporate management. Cross J held that in consideration of the trustees that they had held 
the majority shareholding of the company; in other words, the trust fund was the major 
interested party in the corporate governance, and the trustee director as the single 
representative of the beneficiaries should have been involved in managing the company to 
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actively secure the beneficiaries‘ interests in the company.34 Although the trustee director 
may not be an executive on the board, nevertheless, ‗he may find someone who will act as his 
nominee on the board and report to him from time‘ or ‗ought to ensure so far as they can that 
they have such information as to the progress of the company's affairs as directors would 
have‘.35 The duty of care rule requires the trustees who hold the controlling interest in a 
company act responsibly as possibly as he or she can for prevent any misappropriation or 
unauthorized disposition of the trust assets.
36
  
 
From the above review of a series of leading cases in English trust law, the ‗process-oriented‘ 
standard of duty of care can be labelled as one of the core features of English trusts. This 
point means that because the practical standards of fiduciary duty in English trusts were 
mainly developed from the judicial practices through a long history and in most situations the 
judges tended to consider the trustees‘ performance of the process of fund management 
instead of the rigid standard of the duties nor the result of trust management, thus the 
boundary of trustee‘s liability and the standard of performance can be adjusted flexibly in 
different circumstances and ages.  
 
3.3.2  Duty of Loyalty 
 
3.3.2.1  The Rules of Profit: Conflicts of Interest  
 
In early cases that were concerned with the renewal of a lease by a trustee, if the trustee 
renewed a lease in his or her own name, then he or she might be deemed in breach of duty of 
loyalty and the profit of the new lease would be judged as the profits from a constructive trust 
that must be returned to beneficiaries.
37
 This rule was gradually developed as a strict rule that 
a trustee should not make personal secret profit by means of his or her advantageous position 
in a trust, unless the beneficiaries had expressly authorized such action. The leading case that 
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clarified the rule of profit is Aberdeen Railway Co. v Blaikie (1854),
38
 in which the judge 
declared that both the director of a company and the trustee in a trust are the position of a 
fiduciary who should never make profits by contracting with the company or trust fund.
39
 
Although it is a case about the director‘s duty of loyalty in company law, its fundamental 
statement of duty of loyalty in commercial law is also significantly influential on trustees, 
especially in commercial trusts. Later, following the approach in the case Aberdeen Railway, 
Lord Wright opined in the case of Regal (Hasting) Ltd v Gulliver (1942) that ‗if a person in a 
fiduciary relationship makes a secret profit out of the relationship, the court will not 
investigate whether the other person is damnified or has lost a profit which he otherwise 
would have received. The fact is in itself a fundamental breach of the fiduciary 
relationship‘.40 The same attitude towards this issue was also maintained by Lord Hodson‘s in 
his opinion in the case of Boardman and Another Appellants v Phipps Respondent (1967) that 
‗[t]he proposition of law involved in this case is that no person standing in a fiduciary 
position, when a demand is made upon him by the person to whom he stands in the fiduciary 
relationship to account for profits acquired by him by reason of his fiduciary position and by 
reason of the opportunity and the knowledge, or either, resulting from it, is entitled to defeat 
the claim upon any ground save that he made profits with the knowledge and assent of the 
other person‘.41 Although the case law has established a bundle of strict rules to prevent 
trustees from making personal profits from the trust, the fiduciary may also be absolved from 
such obligations in the circumstances where the trust agreement permits a particular form of 
profit or the authorization has been sought for the profit.
42
  
 
3.3.2.2   Self-dealing and Fair-dealing: No Third-party Involved 
 
Having considered the rules of conflicts regarding a trustee‘s managerial discretion, the 
discussion now shifts to the conflicts of interest in transactions between the trustee and the 
trust fund or beneficiaries. One aspect of this is the self-dealing rule which aims to regulate 
the proposed purchase of trust assets by a fiduciary and the other is the fair-dealing principle 
which confines the fiduciary‘s purchase of a beneficiary‘s interests in a trust fund.  
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The self-dealing rule originally derived from the English case Keech v Sandford (1726),
43
 in 
which a trustee was strictly prevented from renewing a lease regarding trust estate in his own 
name. The Lord Chancellor‘s basic reason for this verdict was that if the court allowed a 
trustee to make a deal involving the trust asset with the beneficiary, the trustee was on both 
sides of the deal, and he or she might hardly act to secure the best price for the beneficiary 
and himself at same time. This is the reason why self-dealing is commonly banned. The 
further question is that if a trustee who proposes to carry out a transaction with the trust fund 
in a fair price, whether such a deal is acceptable. In a series of traditional trust law cases the 
court tended to interdict any self-dealing regardless of whether or not the dealing price was 
fair. Again, in Aberdeen Railway it was held in the House of Lords that the prohibition of 
self-dealing between a director/trustee with the company/trust fund was a universal and strict 
rule regardless of the fairness or unfairness of the price of the deal. In the case of Re 
Thompson’s Settlement (1986)44 the proceeds of sale and rent of a series of certain estates 
were conveyed to a trust for the interest of the grandchildren of the settlor. The trustees then 
conveyed the lease of the trust property to the company and partnership in which the trustees 
were the directors and then the majority shareholders. The court held that although the 
company and partnership had agreed to pay the rent at a fair market price, the self-dealing 
rule still strictly prohibited the trustee from putting himself in the position where his duty and 
interest conflicted. Therefore, the transfer of the lease of the trust property was invalid. In fact, 
where a trustee makes a deal with the trust fund it means that the trustee will have an 
advantageous opportunity of knowing the true market value of the trust property. However, 
the beneficiary as the counterparty hardly gains such information pertaining to the deal; in 
other words, the trustee may have benefited at the expense of the beneficiary. 
 
The basic reason for prohibiting self-dealings is the unavoidable conflicts of interest between 
a trustee‘s private interest and fiduciary duty when he or she is on both sides of any 
transaction concerning the trust property. By contrast, if a trustee just proposes to make a deal 
with the beneficiary of the trust, the law fair-dealing rule will apply which commonly limits, 
but not absolutely excludes such transactions. In the widely cited case of Tito v Wadell (No.2) 
(1977)
45
, Megarry V-C held that ‗if a trustee purchases the beneficial interest of any of his or 
her beneficiaries, the transaction was not voidable ex debito justitiae, but could be set aside 
                                                          
43
 Keech v Sandford [1726] Sel Cast King 61. 
44
 Re Thompson’s Settlement [1986] 2 All E.R. 720.  
45
 Tito v Wadell (No. 2) [1977] 3 All E.R.129. 
96 
 
unless the trustee could show that he or she had taken advantage of his or her position and 
had made full disclosure to the beneficiary, and that the transaction was fair and honest‘; in 
other words, if the procedure of the transaction proposed by the trustee was truly disclosed to 
the beneficiaries of a trust fund and the price of the deal was demonstrated as not unduly 
lower than a market price, then the transaction proposed by the trustee should be lawful. If 
the disclosure of the transaction was not given to the beneficiaries, then the transaction would 
be set aside by the court.  
 
Overall, in English trust law, the biggest distinction between the nature of the fair-dealing and 
self-dealing rules is that (i) the cases falling within the fair-dealing rule are mostly where the 
beneficiary is directly involved in the transaction with the trustee, and the beneficiary is fully 
informed and expressly consents to this, whereas (ii) the cases falling within the scope of 
self-dealing are mostly where the beneficiary is not normally the counterparty of the 
transaction and the trustee does not faithfully disclose the information of the transaction, so 
the beneficiary may not make a fair judgment nor give consent to the deal.
46
 
 
3.4  The Protection Mechanisms of Trusts in Mixed and Civil Law Jurisdictions 
 
Historically, scholars in civil law countries insisted that any practice of property law must 
follow the unitary theory of property rights
47
 and numerus clausus, which meant that in civil 
law countries (i) any property or estate could only have one sole owner and (ii) the content of 
ownership should only be stipulated by statutes but not discretionarily determined or 
contracted by the parties;
48
 in other words, the civil law entitled the ‗owner‘ of one property 
in Roman law countries to exercise his or her property rights exclusively in lawfully 
possessing, using, disposing and profiting from the property without any restriction by any 
other persons. As a consequence, the division of ownership between beneficiary and trustee 
in English trusts became a challenge to continental law systems. In trust law, once a settlor 
transfers the asset to a trustee, the trustee will obtain the legal title over the trust assets. 
However, the trustee can only manage trust assets in accordance with a trust deed, rather than 
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dispose of the asset on behalf of himself or herself. In English trust law, if a trustee unduly 
disposes of trustee assets, the beneficiary has the right to trace the property from the third 
party. Moreover, in a general sense, beneficiaries are not allowed to intervene in fund 
management. This particularity is also considered as unacceptable that if the beneficiary has 
ownership of trustee assets, he or she should not only have a tracing right, but also the right to 
control the management of the property, whereas English trust law avoids beneficiaries away 
from the trust management in most circumstances.  
 
It is well known that the systemization of fiduciary rules in the Anglo-American legal system 
was developed from not only judicial practices, but also the dichotomy of equity and 
common law. By contrast, the above-mentioned legal structure in English trusts never existed 
in civil law jurisdictions. To a large extent, the dual ownership in English trust law is the 
main incompatibility with the legal institutions in continental law family. In consideration of 
the high level of flexibility of the trust structure in financial investments, more and more civil 
law countries attempt to import business trusts into their domestic private law. To remove the 
incompatibility between the two legal traditions, different countries invented different 
approaches based on their own legal traditions to construct equivalent functions for protecting 
beneficial parties.  
 
3.4.1 The Protection Mechanism of the Trusts in Mixed Jurisdictions 
 
3.4.1.1  Scotland: Segregation of the Trustee’s Patrimonies  
 
As one of the typical legal regimes in common law countries, Scottish trust law displays how 
the advantages of trusts can be reserved in a civil law system. Historically, the origins of 
Scottish trusts can be traced to the seventeenth century by common law rather than by 
legislation.
49
 As discussed above, the dilemma of importing trust law into civilian legal 
jurisdictions is that there is no counterpart in the civil law tradition as the division of 
ownership between common law and equity. As a result, when the trustee unduly disposes of 
the trustee asset and causes a loss to the beneficiary, the beneficiary is unable to exercise the 
equitable tracing right to recoup from the third party. Accordingly, in Scots trust law, the 
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ownership of trust property is always in the hands of the trustee and dual ownership is never 
accepted.
50
 The beneficiary‘s right is a kind of right in personam, but not a right in rem;51 in 
other words, the function of the fiduciary duty regime in English case law is replaced in Scots 
law with a kind of remedial power against trustees without an equity system.  
 
In terms of the bankruptcy remoteness of trust assets, Scottish trust law also forms a ring-
fenced fund that can separate the trust assets from the trustee‘s private creditor‘s claim. 
Although there is no dual ownership structure in Scottish trusts, the separation of the trustee‘s 
patrimonies can provide an explanation for this phenomenon. The trustee of a Scottish trust 
fund has two separate patrimonies, the one is his or her private patrimony, which is available 
to his or her private claimant, the other is the trust patrimony that should only be liable for 
trust liabilities.
52
 Therefore, in the circumstance where a trustee‘s creditor claims against the 
trustee, the trustee can only use his or her private property to repay the debt, but the trust 
assets will not be claimed. Additionally, if the trustee mixes the two kinds of patrimonies and 
the liabilities incurred by the trust patrimony, the beneficiary is entitled to require the trustee 
to transfer the corresponding amount from his or her private patrimony to the trust patrimony.  
 
Because the trustee of a Scottish trust is the exclusive owner of the trust assets, the trustee 
may exercise the discretionary power to transact the trust fund with third parties. The 
beneficiaries will be at the risk of the trustee‘s breach of trust. The separation of the trustee‘s 
patrimony can also provide enforceability by the beneficiary to protect the trust interests from 
the trustee‘s misconduct. Based on the principle of contract, transactions between a trustee 
and third parties are lawful, because the trustee is the only owner of the trust assets and ‗a 
contract cannot be set aside on the ground of breach of duties‘.53 If the trustee breaches the 
duties to transact the trust property with a third party, however, no matter whether or not the 
trustee discloses the trusteeship to the counterparty, the counterparty can only claim for the 
liabilities against the trustee‘s private patrimony but not the trust patrimony.54  
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In fact, the nature of the remedial mechanism in Scottish trust law is an allocation of 
liabilities between the trustee‘s personal and trust patrimonies. On the one hand, the dual 
patrimony structure in Scottish trusts effectively achieves economic functions of English 
trusts by establishing a ‗transferring platform‘ between the liabilities of trustee‘s private 
property and the trust property for striking a balance between the protection of third parties 
and beneficiaries‘ interests. On the other hand, the protective mechanism in the Scottish legal 
system also reserves the unified ownership principle in the civil law tradition which reduced 
the costs in legal transplantation. For example, the beneficiary cannot directly manage the 
trust assets, because he or she has no proprietary right to the trust fund. In this way, the 
independent management of Scottish trusts is maintained by excluding the intervention of the 
beneficiary.
55
 
 
3.4.1.2 Quebec: Real Right Nihilism  
 
Another mixed jurisdiction in common law countries is Quebec in Canada where trust law 
was also adopted from the common law system but applied on the basis of continental law. 
Quebec has been a colonial province of France since the mid-seventeenth century as a result 
of the Seven Year War between Great Britain and France (1756–1763). Quebec was ceded to 
the British Empire. The transplanted French civil law in Quebec was reserved through the 
promulgation of the Quebec Act of 1774,
56
 which was importantly regarded as the 
fundamental statute of Canadian politics. The Constitution of 1867 further established a 
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federal system in Canada, the French civil law system in Quebec has been permanently 
admitted by the Canadian constitution.
57
  
 
According to the Civil Code of Québec 1994,
58
 a trust is defined as: ‗A trust results from an 
act whereby a person, the settlor, transfers property from his patrimony to another patrimony 
constituted by him which he appropriates to a particular purpose and which a trustee 
undertakes, by his acceptance, to hold and administer‘,59 which means that the trust property 
belongs to neither a trustor nor a trustee. Moreover, under Quebec Civil Code, the legal 
nature of a trust is regarded as ‗a patrimony by appropriation, autonomous and distinct from 
that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none of them has any real right‘60 and 
based on the French civil law tradition, a trust fund is established by (i) a contract/will 
between a settlor and a trustee and (ii) the acceptance of the trustee(s).
61
 In sum, it can be 
concluded that the uniqueness of a Quebec trust is that the ‗dual ownership‘ has been avoided 
and the key issue of a trust is the trustee‘s managerial obligations, which are commonly based 
on contractual agreements between the trustor and trustee.
62
  
 
The remedies for beneficiaries under Quebec trust law are quite similar to Scottish trusts. 
Because the Quebec Civil Code repudiates any party‘s ownership of trust property, the 
remedy for a beneficiary cannot be a tracing right that is only valid based on an existing 
property right. Furthermore, since the law deems the relationship between a settlor and a 
trustee as contractual, the settlor is not allowed to trace the trustee property as well. Pursuant 
to s 1290 of the Quebec Civil Code, however, any of the settlor, beneficiary or even an 
interested third party of a trust is entitled to take action against the trustee and compel him or 
her to fulfil the obligation under the trust contract. As a consequence, any undue disposition 
of the trustee assets by a fiduciary must be recovered or corrected by the fiduciary; in other 
words, the Quebec civil law system has reorganized the legal relationship in trusts focusing 
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on the trust property only, and both the settlor and beneficiary can exercise the claim right 
against the trustee to secure trust interests.  
 
3.4.1.3 South Africa: A Contract Regulated by the Court 
 
South Africa was governed by the Netherlands from the mid-seventeenth century until the 
early nineteenth century when the British Empire took over power from the Dutch.
63
 Before 
the arrival of the British, the legal system in South Africa was mainly organized according to 
the principles of the Dutch law. The legal transplant of trusts in South Africa appeared as 
early as the 1800s. However, the legal features of today‘s South African trusts have been 
developed side by side with Dutch regimes
64
 and differ from the typical English trusts. At 
present, the basic principles of South African trusts are outlined in the Trust Property Control 
Act 57 of 1988.
65
 
 
The definition of a South African trust is different from an English trust in that the trust is a 
kind of legal ‗arrangement‘ that is mainly determined by trust instruments.66 The ownership 
of trust assets can be transferred to either a trustee or a beneficiary.
67
 In the first circumstance 
the trustee is required to manage the trust property in the interest of a beneficiary, whereas in 
the latter circumstance, although the ownership of trust asset is directly possessed by the 
beneficiary, the trust assets can only be controlled by a trustee who must manage the trust 
asset in accordance with the trust instruction.
68
 Moreover, a trust under South African law is 
revocable, unless the trust arrangement is accepted by the beneficiary.
69
 Therefore, it can be 
seen that the legal nature of a trust in South Africa is based on the law of contract.  
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With respect to the segregation of trust assets, however, South African law does not prioritize 
the interests of beneficiaries. In a case where the trust property has been (i) unlawfully 
assigned to a bona fide third party by the trustee or (ii) claimed by the trustee‘s private 
creditors, if the ownership of trust assets is in the hand of the beneficiary (a bewind trust), the 
beneficiary can get the assets back because he or she is the owner of the trust assets, whereas 
if the beneficiary is not the owner of the trust fund, the beneficiary can only file an action 
against the trustee for remedy.
70
 
 
As regards the protection mechanism for beneficiaries‘ interests, the South African law 
entitles a wide range of powers to the court. Firstly, any trust instrument must be registered 
with a Master appointed by the Supreme Court of South Africa
71
who has the duty and power 
to monitor the management of the trust and intervene in certain particular situations. In 
addition, before a trusteeship commences, the appointment of a trustee must be approved by 
the Master
72
 and the property of the trust assets must be registered with the Master.
73
 In this 
way, the trust asset can be segregated from the trustee‘s private assets.74 Secondly, according 
to the same legislation, in the application to the Master or any interested persons in the trust 
fund, the court is entitled not only to adjust trust provisions of fund management, but also to 
remove a delinquent trustee
75
 if the trust instrument is regarded as inappropriate for reaching 
the trust purpose or the trustee has breached his or her duty to beneficiaries. In sum, it can be 
seen that under the South African legal system, the protective function of fiduciary duty can 
also be substituted by a strong judicial power without an equity system. 
 
3.4.2 The Protection Mechanism of the Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 
 
3.4.2.1  France: The Protection of Trust Purposes  
 
In continental Europe, the Roman the situation is different: the legal tradition has set up a 
barrier to import of trust law in civilian countries. Although Quebec civil law was 
transplanted from France, however, the import of trusts into the French Civil Code was much 
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later than Quebec. Before 2007, French lawyers still insisted that the division of ownership in 
English trusts were incompatible with the civil law inheritance. In consequence, any trust-like 
regimes in France were addressed by analogy, namely the ‗fiduciary relationship‘ in 
testament or contract of mandate, a testamentary executor or an agent under contract would 
be regarded as trustees; in other words, under traditional French civil law, there was neither a 
separate rule of ‗fiduciary duty‘ nor a uniform legal system dealing with the trust-like 
issues.
76
 By 2007, a French legal term fiducie as a kind of independent institution was 
introduced into the French Civil Code, this was regarded as the first independent legal 
institution that established fiduciary rules in French legal system.
77
 According to s 2011 of 
the French Civil Code, in a fiducie the settlor‘s asset is transferred to a fiduciary who must 
separately hold the entrusted assets for the benefit of a third person.
78
 In addition, a fiducie 
must be established by contracts or statute
79
 and there is no expression of the division of 
ownership between a trustee and beneficiary.
80
  
 
Accordingly, in French law the remedial approaches for beneficiaries are also formed on the 
basis of obligation law. For instance, French law requires that any natural person trustor must 
assign at least one protector who will be responsible for securing beneficiaries‘ interests by 
supervising the trustee‘s conducts. As a result, the relationship between a protector and a 
settlor is contractual, the range of protector‘s supervisory power will depend on the trustor‘s 
authorization in the contract.
81
 In the situation of breach of duties, French fiducie law allows 
the trustor to enforce the fiduciary to perform his or her duties on behalf of the beneficiary. 
Importantly, the French law also entitles the protector to judicial power, which means that the 
protector may exercise the power against the trustee for guaranteeing that the trustor‘s will 
can be properly satisfied.
82
 In terms of the separation of trust property, if the trustee unduly 
disposes of the trust assets and incurs liabilities for the trust fund, the third party generally 
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has the right to claim against both the trustee‘s private and trust properties, unless the third 
party was aware of the trustee‘s limited power to dispose of or sell the trust assets.83  
 
The above shows that in French law the rules of fiduciary duty and beneficiaries‘ right to 
claim have been integrated into the traditional obligation law. Therefore, it is clear that 
between the interests of the third contractual party and beneficiary, the French law tends to 
prioritize the former one and the beneficiary is not allowed to directly trace the trust assets 
from the third party. Compared with the legal reform in the Quebecan civil law, on the one 
hand, based on a similar tradition, the ‗trust laws‘ in both jurisdictions do not entitle the 
beneficiary with any ‗property right‘ or ownership. Therefore, the beneficiary may not 
directly exercise a remedial power to trace the property; in other words, the beneficiary right 
in France and Quebec is still a kind of right in personam, which can only be realized by 
compelling the trustee to fulfil his or her duty. On the other hand, however, under French 
trust law the trustee is the owner of the trust asset, but the Quebecan law denies any concept 
of an owner of trust assets.  
 
3.4.2.2  Germany: Entitles Settlors with Strong Contractual Power 
 
German private law is well known for its systematization. However, the ‗trust‘ or ‗trust-like‘ 
regime in Germany was not organized in separation. On the contrary, the German trusts, that 
is, the so-called Treuhand, was a special legal concept that was summarized from a series of 
judicial activities of the German courts and academic studies of traditional German laws 
since the nineteenth century.
84
 The definition of Treuhand is a fiduciary relationship in which 
the settlor entrusts certain rights to a trustee (Treuhänder) and enables the trustee to exercise 
pre-agreed rights in the beneficiary‘s (Treugeber) interests. 
 
In terms of the bankruptcy remoteness of the Treuhand, although the ownership of trust 
assets is assigned to the trustee (Treuhänder), the trust assets under a Treuhand are generally 
not protected by a ring-fenced fund. In the case where the trustee goes bankrupt, the creditor 
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of the trustee can obtain the access to the entrusted assets
85
. Where a trustee (Treuhänder) 
unduly disposes of trust assets or assigns trust assets to a third purchaser, the beneficiary is 
entitled to be compensated by suing the trustee. However, the transaction between the trustee 
and the third party is still valid;
86
 in other words, if the trustee abuses his or her power to sell 
or dispose of the trust assets, the beneficiary‘s remedial power is only in personam instead of 
exclusive right in rem.  
 
In respect of the beneficiary‘s (Treugeber) right, similar to the fiducie in France, German 
trust law also entitles the settlor to active powers in the management of Treuhand and the 
duties or rights of a trustee are also more flexible on the basis of contractual autonomy. If the 
beneficiary has been added as a contractor into a trust deed in advance, the beneficiary will 
have a power against the trustee and compel the trustee to fulfill the duties agreed in a 
contract. However, if the beneficiary is not a contractual party in the Treuhand contract, the 
beneficiary will not be entitled to any direct remedial power and can only obtain a remedy or 
compensation by resorting to the settlor. In addition, the Chapter of Delegation law (Auftrag) 
of the German Civil Code is different from English trusts in that any adjustment of German 
trust fund management should be approved by the settlor,
87
 which means that the settlor can 
obtain a contractual right to influence the trustee‘s management. 
 
In sum, it can be seen that the remedial regime for beneficiaries‘ trust interest under German 
civil law is organized according to the principles of contract. As a result, where trustees 
breach their fiduciary duty, only a contractual party can exercise a right of claim to obtain a 
remedy and protect the beneficiary‘s interests. In the meantime, the trustors‘ contractual 
power of intervention may have substantially removed the principle of independent 
management in trust law. The incompatible civil law system in German law also fails to 
adopt the concept of ‗fund patrimony‘ to keep the trust assets away from the claims of the 
trustee‘s private creditors. Therefore, the regime of Treuhand under German law can hardly 
provide a protection mechanism and efficient governance structure for the beneficiaries‘ 
interests that are equivalent to English trusts. 
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3.5  Legal and Economic Comparison of Protection Mechanisms for Trusts 
 
The comparative analysis above shows that in the solution to the agency problem in trusts or 
trusteeship, the legal rules of fiduciary duty differ from one jurisdiction to the next. What is 
useful for legal practice is to discover the function of the fiduciary duty rules for business 
trust investments. In terms of English business trusts, the basic principle is that (i) for 
trustors/beneficiaries, prior to the establishment of a trust fund, trustors/beneficiaries will be 
required to carry out necessary investigation of the trustee‘s professional skills and 
commercial reputation in specific business and (ii) if a settlor rationally entrusts a fiduciary to 
carry out an investment on behalf of a beneficiary, the trustees are obliged to manage the trust 
property diligently and prudently in the best interest of beneficiaries, and in the circumstance 
of a breach of trust, the law will compel the trustee to be liable for the loss to the beneficiary. 
 
From an economic point of view, the English case law has unconsciously admitted the 
‗principle of the rational man‘ in a free market. The consequence is that any investor of 
business trusts should be aware of, and liable for, the risk in the market. Correspondingly, if a 
‗rational trustor‘ is defined as an investor who has prudently considered the potential risk 
before making an entrustment and rationally believes that the trustee can competently manage 
the funds, then it may be true that the nature of the fiduciary duty rules is a legal mechanism 
that aims to save transaction cost of (i) irrational investment (the standard of fiduciary duty 
depends on what principal‘s expectation of a trustee‘s performance is) and (ii) contracting 
(fiduciary duty rules as default rules) and (iii) supervising the agent‘s performance (fiduciary 
duty rules act as deterrents to the fiduciary). 
 
In contrast, owing to the lack of an independent system of equity, the trust laws in civil law 
jurisdictions are primarily established on the basis of obligation law or contract law. As a 
result, most civil law countries tend to (i) establish a dichotomy between trust patrimony and 
trustee‘s private patrimony (Scotland/Quebec); (ii) entitle settlers to direct intervention power  
(Germany) or (iii) compulsorily employ an external protector (France/South Africa) for the 
purpose of securing the interest of beneficiaries. In brief, the transaction costs of the civil 
trusts in various jurisdictions can be measured by two factors, namely (i) who is entitled to 
intervene in the trustee‘s management or claim a remedy; and (ii) at which juncture(s) would 
the intervention be allowed:  
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Table 3.1: The transaction costs of the remedial mechanisms of trusts in  
different jurisdictions 
 
Jurisdictions Actors of intervention Time-points of intervention 
England Beneficiaries Breach of trust 
Scotland Beneficiaries Breach of trust 
Quebec Trustors/Beneficiaries Breach of trust 
South Africa Interested Persons/Protectors Breach of trust/Management 
France Trustors/Protectors Breach of trust/Management 
Germany Trustors/Beneficiaries Breach of trust/Management 
 
Table 3.1 indicates that in order to secure the interests of beneficiaries, most civil law or 
mixed jurisdictions‘ laws tend not only to restrict trustees‘ discretionary power in the process 
of trust management, but also entitle both beneficiaries/trustors or external protectors to 
direct intervention powers. Consequently, on the one hand, fiduciaries in civil law countries 
have to compromise with trustors/beneficiaries‘ requirements in trust deeds to reduce 
unnecessary compliance risk. On the other hand, because the laws legislate that the duties and 
rights of trustees are basically determined by trust contract, trustors or beneficiaries will be 
motivated to argue for more direct intervention powers in the process of trust management.  
 
To put it differently, it is clear that fiduciary duty rules in English trusts not only provide a 
series of expected and practical legal remedies for beneficiaries, but also impose substantial 
regulation on fiduciaries to reduce moral hazard. In fact, the economic effects of English 
trusts can be summarised as follows: (i) the exclusion of the trustor‘s/beneficiary‘s 
intervention in trust management reduces the cost of negotiation for both trustors/trustees and 
avoids the irrational decision making by unprofessional principals; (ii) the strict deterrence of 
fiduciary duty rules make it unnecessary to introduce external monitors to supervise trustees‘ 
conduct; and (iii) the ‗process-oriented‘ standard of fiduciary duty rules effectively maintain 
the flexibility and efficiency of fund management, which can be regarded as the most 
advantages of English trust.  
 
It can be concluded from the above comparative analysis that although the dual ownership in 
English law does not exist in other jurisdictions, there are still some cost-efficient approaches 
to introduce the protection mechanism of English trust law into Roman law traditions. The 
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related experience in Scottish trusts offers a costless model for keeping the independent 
management by professionals and effectively regulating the agent‘s behaviour. In a civil law 
or mixed jurisdiction, the legal nature of the so-called equitable right should be regarded as a 
kind of in personam right, which is mainly a remedial power for the beneficiary. At the same, 
the ownership of trust assets must be completely conveyed to the trustee who is expected to 
remove the beneficiary‘s control of the trust assets. Meanwhile, unless the third party or 
trustee‘s private creditors are bona fide, the trust assets can be protected from the claims of 
the above persons and the beneficiary has the right to claim against the trustee in court.  
 
At the same time, the judicial practices of trusts in England has provided a practical standard 
of manager‘s legal liability in different circumstances and some cases also show that for 
rational investors, the rational expectation of a trustee‘s performance and reasonable market 
risk is required; in other words, the fiduciary duty rules should reflect not only the legal 
requirement and regulation of a trustee, but also the basic awareness of commercial risk of an 
investor who is intending to engage in trust investment, both of which should always be the 
fundamental principles of any business legal systems. 
 
3.6  The Private Equity Investment Trusts in China  
 
3.6.1  An Overview of China’s PE Investment Trusts Market: 1990s–2015 
 
As one of the early achievements of the policy of opening up, the first trust investment 
company, namely China International Trusts Investment Corporation (CITIC) was 
established by China‘s State Council in 1979. Thereafter, hundreds of trust investment 
corporations were incorporated all around China. By late the 1990s, as many as 239 trust 
investment corporations (including the trust investment departments of commercial banks) 
were established in China.
88
 After six waves of reorganization during the 1990s to 2007, most 
of those small-scale and unqualified trust investment institutions had been ordered to dissolve 
and currently the number of the licensed trust investment corporations has declined to 68,
89
 
all of which are currently regulated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission.
90
 In a 
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practical respect, the first PEIT was issued by CITIC in 2007.
91
 Afterwards, the quantity and 
capitalization of PEITs in the Chinese capital market were expanded at a high rate. By the 
first quarter of 2011, the proportion of PEITs in China‘s trusts industry had risen from 1.3% 
(March 2007) to 16.01% (March 2011).
92
  
 
Generally speaking, during the 1980s to 1990s, the main business of most trust investment 
corporations in China included cross-border investment, real estate investment, international 
trade, finance leasing and trust loans, whereas collective investment did not emerge until 
1991.
93
 The first generation of collective investment funds was established in a trust structure 
in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. By the end of 1997, there were 79 collective investment 
funds in China with capitalization of RMB6.83 billion.
94
 However, there was almost no real 
private equity investment trust in China until a series of laws and regulations were legislated 
in 2007. In 2001 and 2006, the Law of Trusts of China was enacted and the Partnership Law 
was revised respectively, which provided a legal system for investors to engage in private 
equity and venture capital in unincorporated forms. In terms of PEITs, the two specific 
regulatory documents established the basic legal structure for carrying out private equity and 
venture capital investments in China. The one is the Rules on Trust Schemes of Collective 
Funds by Trust Companies
95
 (released in 2007 and revised in 2009)
96
 and the other is the 
Guidelines for Trust Companies to Operate the Trust Private Equity Investment Business 
(2008),
97
 both of which will be discussed in details in the next section.  
 
3.6.2  The Legal Structure of China’s Private Equity Investment Trusts  
 
According to the Trust Law (2001), the Rules (2009 Revision) and the Guidelines (2008), the 
PEITs in China are commonly structured as follows: the licensed trust corporation issues the 
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private equity or venture capital collective investment schemes to qualified investors.
98
 The 
trust corporation, as the trustee, should be responsible for prudently investing the funds in the 
equity of unlisted companies. In terms of the distribution of profit, the corporation has the 
right to charge management fee in the amount of 1% to 2% of gross trust assets. Only if the 
profit rate surpasses the hurdle rate, can the trust corporation enjoy 20% of the profit of the 
trust fund and the 80% profit will be allocated to the beneficiaries. The basic legal structure 
of PEITs under China‘s investment trust law can be illustrated simply by a classic PEITs 
project Hu Nan Trust Corporation–Venture Capital Collective Investment Trust Scheme (Ⅰ) 
(2007)
99
 as follows:  
 
Figure 3.1: The legal structure of PEITs under China’s investment trusts law 
 
The Hu Nan Trust Corporation is the trustee who has the power to control and manage the 
trust capital independently for the interests of beneficiaries and the beneficiaries are not 
allowed to get involved in the daily business of the project. At the same time, because PE and 
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VC investment is categorized as high-risk investment, the trust corporation employed Fortune 
Capital, a Shenzhen-based venture capital firm to provide professional consultation for trust 
investments, but any project screening proposed by the venture capital firm has to be 
approved by the trust corporation. In addition, the venture capital firm does not possess the 
funds directly, but deposits them into an independent account in the custodian bank, namely 
the Hunan Branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which means that neither 
the trust corporation nor the venture capital firm is able to arbitrarily dispose of the funds, 
unless all the investment proposals have been approved by the custodian bank pursuant to the 
trust agreement.
100
 Furthermore, the trustee sets up the beneficiaries‘ meetings to decide 
collectively on (i) proposals for reinvestment; (ii) termination and extension of the project; 
and (iii) the raising of fees for trustees. With the exception of the above matters, any conduct 
should be exclusively controlled and determined by the managerial team of the trust fund. 
According to the agreement, the management fees of the Hu Nan project was counted as (i) 
the fee for the trust corporation made up of 1% of the trust funds; (ii) the fee for the 
investment adviser (venture capital firm) took up of 2.5% and (iii) the custodian fee 
represented 0.6% of the trust funds. Finally, after deducting the aforementioned fees and tax, 
if the expected profit was realized, the venture capital firm was entitled to obtain 15% of the 
net profit of the project, while 85% of the profit will be distributed to each investor.
101
 
 
3.7  The Legal Problems of China’s Private Equity Investment Trusts  
 
3.7.1  Beneficiaries’ Intervention in the Beneficiaries’ General Meeting 
 
3.7.1.1  Beneficiaries’ Voting Rights in the Decision-making Process 
 
Although the Trust Law of China (2001) stipulates that the trustee must honestly and 
prudently deal with trust affairs in the best interests of beneficiaries,
102
 the most serious 
problem is the lack of a practical standard of fiduciary duties for normalizing the trustee‘s 
conduct in China‘s PEITs. This shortcoming results in the investors being unable to foresee 
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whether the loss of investment in PEITs can be repaid by the trustee and the trustees are also 
confused about what the boundary is between the losses caused by market risk or breach of 
trust. As a result, most PEIT investors require substantial power to intervene in the 
management of the funds for the purpose of securing interests in fund management.  
 
One of the most famous PEITs in China is the Bo Hai Industrial Investment Fund
103
 which 
was initiated in 2006. The investors of the Bo Hai Fund entrusted funds to the trustees, 
namely BOC International Holdings Limited and Tian Jin Tai Da Investment Holding 
Company Limited. The two corporations were responsible for managing the fund on behalf of 
all the investors. However, because the trustees did not shoulder unlimited liability for the 
loss of the fund and the risk in PE is at a high level in financial investment market, all the 
investors emphatically required direct decision-making power in the management of the fund. 
Finally, this demand was approved by an administrative order of the local government. The 
trustee of the funds and other investors agreed to establish the Bo Hai Industrial Investment 
Fund Management Company Limited jointly, which was supposed to be the actual trustee of 
the Bo Hai Fund. The problem is that the actual managers of the investment was the two 
investment management corporations holding 70% of the shares of the management company, 
while the beneficiaries obtained 30% shares of the company. Such shareholding structure has 
actually changed the PEIT to a corporate-type PE fund, in which the beneficiaries‘ voting 
right can weaken the efficiency of fund management.  
 
3.7.1.2  The Inefficient Decision-making Procedures of Beneficiaries’ Meetings 
 
After the promulgation of the Rules (2009 Revision) in 2007, most PEITs established 
beneficiaries‘ meeting in practice. Section 42 of the Rules (2009 Revision) stipulates that if 
there is no rule of ‗1) Terminating entrustment contract ahead of schedule or extending 
entrustment term; 2) Altering entrusted property utilization approaches; 3) Changing the 
trustee; 4) Raising remuneration for the trustee; 5) Other items that need to be decided by the 
beneficiaries‘ meeting as prescribed in trust scheme documents‘ in trust agreements, a 
beneficiaries‘ meeting shall be convened to decide the aforementioned issues. Section 46 also 
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provides that ‗any decision on the issues for deliberation shall be agreed by at least two thirds 
of the votes before it becomes effective, except for the decisions on changing trustees, 
altering entrusted property utilization approaches and terminating entrustment contracts in 
advance, which shall be agreed by all the beneficiaries present at the meeting‘. These 
provisions actually entitle beneficiaries to extremely strict veto power to intervene in the 
management of PE funds. Practically, all the participants of PEITs have to negotiate all the 
provisions and details in fund operation, otherwise the trustees and all beneficiaries have to 
canvass or negotiate with one another to propose any alteration regarding fund utilization.  
 
In recent years, several legal disputes regarding the inefficient voting procedure of 
beneficiaries‘ meeting have emerged in China. In the case of Zheng Da Jin Niu Investment 
Trust Scheme (2012), owing to the continual huge losses suffered by the trust fund, some 
beneficiaries required that the trust be terminated ahead of schedule by convening a meeting 
of the beneficiaries, but were refused by the trustee, namely CCB Trust Company Limited. 
Pursuant to the trust deed and the Rules (2009 Revision), if the trust corporation refuses to 
convene the beneficiaries‘ meeting, ‗those beneficiaries who hold more than 10 per cent of 
the total trust units shall have the right to convene a meeting‘.104 However, the gross capital 
of the Scheme was as huge as RMB 400 million and most investors only held RMB 3 to 5 
million, which meant that the beneficiaries‘ meeting could only be convened by at least ten 
investors‘ joint calling. Eventually, after protracted negotiation between the beneficiaries, up 
to the voting at the beneficiaries‘ meeting on January 2013, the gross losses of the investment 
was increased from 28% (April 2012) to 50% (January 2013). What‘s more, although the 
trust corporation provided a series of alternative investment plans, because the termination of 
trusts in advance or changing the utilization approaches of trust assets should be approved by 
all the beneficiaries, the final solution to this case was an 18-month extension of the scheme 
with specific redemption dates.
105
 In a technical sense, it is obvious that the above decision-
making procedure of the beneficiaries‘ meeting was unsatisfactory, the management of the 
fund was not improved and the long-term process of the meeting seriously increased 
transaction costs.  
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3.7.2  The Ineffective Monitoring of Custodian Banks  
 
3.7.2.1  The Relationship between Custodian Banks and Trust Corporations in China 
 
In English trusts the settlor generally is unable to control or supervise the trustee directly, the 
agency problems in trusts is more serious than partnerships and corporations. For settling this 
matter, most countries‘ investment trust law requires a qualified third party to safeguard the 
funds and supervise the trustee‘s management. Similarly, the existing Securities Investment 
Fund Law (2012 Revision)
106
 and the Rules (2009 Revision) also require the investment fund 
manager or trust corporation to employ a commercial bank to be the custodian of the fund. 
Theoretically, for the effectiveness of the supervision, the basic requirement of a custodian 
bank is that the custodian should not be an affiliated enterprise of the funds management 
corporation. For example, s 28 of SIFL (2012 Revision) prohibits a fund custodian and a fund 
manager from making capital contribution to or holding each other‘s shares. Additionally, s 
18 of SIFL (2012 Revision) also prevents the directors and fund managers from being in a 
position of a custodian of the fund or hold shareholding interests in custody. However, the 
Rules (2009 Revision) only require that ‗in the duration of a trust scheme, the trust company 
shall choose a sound commercial bank as its custodian‘,107 but does not restrict the affiliation 
between the trust corporation and commercial bank.  
 
In comparison with other types of collective investment trusts, the management of PEITs is 
more complicated, hence the managers of PEITs are required to have special skills and 
experiences in PE or other related fields. However, since the early 1980s, most of China‘s 
trusts corporations were only allowed to invest in some particular low-risk markets, such as 
debt financing, finance lease or even international trading, and until 2007 the development of 
China‘s PEITs was officially admitted by the Chinese authorities; in other words, the trust 
corporations in China have not effectively established their own networks and commercial 
reputation in the private equity and venture capital market. Hence, at present quite a few 
PEITs are sold, raised and kept by commercial banks, and then managed by professional PE 
and VC firms. In this way, the trust corporations can economically use commercial banks‘ 
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network of clients
108
 and establish their reputation by co-operating with PE firms. 
Accordingly, those trust corporations that are held by commercial banks
109
 have been more 
competitive in China‘s PEIT market. This is the main reason why the laws and regulations in 
China do not forbid the connected relationship between the trust corporations and custodian 
banks.  
 
3.7.2.2  The Legal Status of the Custodian Bank of Private Equity Investment Trusts  
 
According to the Rules (2009 Revision), the statutory duties of custodian banks of a PEIT 
mainly include 
1) Safely keeping the entrusted property in custody; (2) Opening different accounts 
for different trust schemes to ensure the independence of entrusted property; 
(3) Confirming and carrying out the trust company‘s order of managing and utilizing 
entrusted property; checking up the transaction records, funds and accounts of the 
entrusted property; (4) Recording entrusted funds transfers and keep letters of 
illustration for fund use delivered by the trust company; (5) Periodically working out 
custody reports to the trust company. (Section 21) 
 
and  
 
In case that the trust company violates laws and regulations, or the entrustment 
contract, or the custody agreement, the custodian shall immediately notice in written 
the trust company to set right; where material violation or an event that seriously 
threaten the safety of entrusted property occurs, the custodian shall report to the 
CBRC promptly. (Section 22) 
 
                                                          
108
 See Jianchun Zhang, Jingyi Yu, ‗The Relationship between China‘s Monetary Trusts and Commercial Banks‘ 
2005(4) China Urban Economy 24 [张建春、于敬一，‗我国资金信托计划与商业银行的关系‘，中国城市经济，
2005 年第 4 期，第 24 至 27 页]. 
109
 Up to 2013, China Industrial International Trust Company Limited held by China Industrial Bank, CCB 
Trust Company Limited held by China Construction Bank and Bank of Communication International Trust held 
by Bank of Communication accumulatively managed RMB1,170 billion in China‘s trusts industry, represented 
11% of the whole trust asset of China trusts industry. The stable and wide client base is the most important 
advantage of the above trust corporations. Zhuoqing Yang, and Huiru Zhong, ‘Huge Strength Disparity of 
Trust Corporations, Bank-based Trust on the Top’ (7 July 2014) [杨卓卿、钟惠茹，‘信托公司直销实力悬殊大
银行系信托优势明显’, 证券时报，2014 年 7 月 17 日] 
<http://finance.china.com/fin/xt/201407/17/9486013987.html> accessed 22 August 2014. 
116 
 
In other words, the function of the custodian bank of PEITs is to be responsible for the 
security of the trust funds and to supervise the trustee‘s performance, but not to dispose of 
directly of the trust property.  
 
However, according to the definition of a trust under the Law of Trusts (2001), a trustee‘s 
role in a trust is managing or disposing of the property rights.
110
 A further question is whether 
the custodian bank is a joint trustee under Chinese law; in other words, although the 
custodian bank‘s functions of PEITs are unlikely to be regarded as ‗disposing of trust 
property‘, but whether it should be regarded as ‗managing trust property‘? Although the 
current statutes of trust law and relevant regulations do not provide an express answer to this 
problem, the current Law of the People‘s Republic of China on Commercial Banks (2003 
Revision)
111
 excludes the possibility of trust investment businesses operated by commercial 
banks in China.
112
 Therefore, it can be seen that the relationship between a trust corporation 
and a custodian bank of PEITs in China is not ‗joint trusteeship‘, but a sort of general 
contractual relationship; that is to say, the employment of a custodian bank independently 
depends on the trust corporation‘s selection, and the rights and obligations of custodian banks 
in supervising the trustee‘s performance in PEITs has no direct legal relationship with settlors. 
 
3.7.2.3 The Ineffective Supervision by Custodian Banks 
 
As mentioned above, the prime function of the custodian is to keep the fund safe by virtue of 
supervising the trust corporation‘s utilization of the funds. Nevertheless, the current 
governance model of PEITs can hardly achieve this goal. The interested relationship of some 
trust corporations and commercial banks may benefit the managers or shareholders of the 
custodian banks from the trustee‘s opportunistic behaviors, which substantively weakens the 
effectiveness of custodians‘ supervision. And the trust corporations tend to select those 
commercial banks that are likely to compromise with trustees, as the employment and 
selection of custodian banks are absolutely determined by the trustees of PEITs; that is to say, 
the market of custodian banks in China‘s trust industry is distorted and lacks competition.  
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The custodian fee is the only income for the custodian banks in PEIT businesses, once the 
fixed custodian fees are earned, the custodians may have no further motivation to diligently 
supervise the performance of the trustees. In addition, owing to the unclear liability 
mechanism in Chinese laws, the custodian banks may also have very little pressure to 
supervise the trustees. Overall, the main problem regarding the custodian banks of PEITs in 
China is the lack of economic motivation and independent legal status, which results in 
custodian banks hardly being able to supervise the trust corporations in fulfilling their duties 
optimally in fund management.  
 
3.7.3  The Economic and Social Factors linked to China’s PE Investment Trusts  
 
Compared with experienced PE and VC firms, the Chinese trust corporations‘ unprofessional 
management in private equity businesses finds it difficult to establish their own reputation in 
private equity and venture capital markets. As an alternative strategy, quite a large number of 
trust corporations choose to make ‗zero-loss promises‘ to investors, by which the trust 
corporations successfully attract more investors, especially those individual investors who are 
unwilling to undertake high risk.
113
 The Rules (2009 Revision) clarify the fact that trust 
corporations are not allowed to make any form of ‗zero-loss promises‘ to investors,114 with 
the result that the distorted PEITs market indulged and fostered numerous irrational investors. 
The rationalization in China‘s private equity and venture capital market was seriously eroded.  
 
In fact, the law and regulations consistently position trust investment including PEITs, as 
high-risk financial investment activities. By the second quarter of 2014, besides those 
institutional investors, high net value
115
 individuals had become the second-largest client base 
of trusts.
116
 The problem is that even though those rich individuals have enough money to 
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invest in PEITs, due to their vocational and educational backgrounds, quite a large number of 
them may not have the necessary knowledge or experience
117
 to rationally understand and 
predict the risks in the complex financial investment and corporate governance in private 
equity and venture capital businesses. Consequently, when some CISs defaulted, more and 
more individual investors irrationally or even violently required trust corporations to pay the 
full amount of principal and interests.
118
 Therefore, the authorities also tend to require or 
encourage the trustees to provide zero-loss promises to investors
119
 for the purpose of 
securing the social stability of China, which is always deemed by the CCP as the primary 
political assignment.  
 
In addition, the shareholding structure of the 68 trust corporations in China is also a notable 
factor. According to the list of trust corporations released by the China Trustee 
Association,
120
 50 trust corporations are controlled by state-owned enterprises
121
 and 5 are 
controlled by the bureaux of finance of local governments;
122
 in other words, at present stage 
around 80% of China‘s trust corporations are controlled by national capital. Therefore, if the 
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trust funds default, those state-controlled trust corporations are able to repay the full amount 
of capital and interests to beneficiaries, as strong SOEs or governmental shareholders can 
provide adequate cash to do so. Against this background, it is obvious that the personal 
interests of the trust fund managers and the directors of trust corporations have a close 
relationship with the SOEs or local governments‘ nominating powers. Considering the above-
mentioned relationship between the clients of China‘s trust investment and government, it is 
not unreasonable to argue that both the lack of private incentive in shareholding structure and 
the political pressure from the current Chinese political climate motivate the management 
layer of trust corporations to avoid any loss to investors, no matter whether or not the loss is 
caused by regular market risk.  
 
In relation to the form of remedy for the losses of PEITs, because any zero promises have 
been identified as invalid by China‘s authorities, if the trust corporations fail to repay their 
promised profit to investors, trust corporations have to settle the disputes in private, rather 
than letting the investors file lawsuits. For example, trust corporations may sell the failing or 
bankrupted PEITs to asset management companies or negotiate with local governments to 
seek bailouts, or even use their own capital to repay investors‘ losses. 123  Moreover, in 
traditional Chinese culture, any litigation may have a negative impact on individuals, families 
and social community. Thus, trust corporations have to do their best to avoid lawsuits for the 
purpose of maintaining and protecting their vulnerable commercial reputation in China‘s 
private equity and venture capital market. Although the Trust Law (2001) and the regulations 
issued by the CBRC allow the participants in investment trusts to solve disputes by means of 
litigation, until now there have been very little litigation regarding disputes between the 
parties of trust investments.
124
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Consequently, the ‗zero-loss promises‘ in China‘s trust industry have seriously led to two 
main problems, the one is that the SOEs and governmental shareholders are actually using the 
money of taxpayers, who are mostly ordinary citizens, to inappropriately pay for the rich who 
only represent an extremely small part of the whole population of China.
125
 The other legal 
problem is that until now the Chinese courts have not issued a practical standard or official 
judicial interpretation, and the widely accepted private settlements for disputes between 
trustees and beneficiaries also make it hard to convey or expose the real problems in China‘s 
PEIT market. Therefore, the authorities are not motivated to reform or improve the legislation 
for their own political concerns.  
 
3.7.4  The Barriers to IPOs of the Investee Companies in Chinese Stock Markets  
 
At present, in practice, PEIT-involved companies are generally prohibited by the CSRC from 
listing on the domestic stock markets in China for the reason that the shareholding structure 
of such listing candidates cannot satisfy the disclosure requirements. According to China‘s 
Securities Law (2013 Revision), the requirement is that any company that has been listed or 
is planning on being listed must disclose (i) the name list of the top 10 shareholders of the 
company and their respective shareholdings, and (ii) the persons in practical control of the 
company
126
 for preventing the connected transactions problems. Because the trust 
corporations have the duty of confidentiality towards beneficiaries, the list and shareholding 
of beneficiaries in PEITs will not be disclosed to regulators and public investors. Therefore, 
the CSRC is likely to reject the application for the reason that if the shareholder of a listed 
company is in the name of a PEIT, public investors cannot identify who the actual controllers 
of the listed company are.
127
 The issue in respect of the governance structure of PEITs is that 
actually the real shareholder of the listed company is the trust corporation, because the trust 
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under Chinese law does not have an organizational qualification as a shareholder in a limited 
liability company. The trustees of PEITs are the shareholder of such companies. However, in 
consideration of the governance structure of China‘s trust funds discussed above, the 
beneficiaries can, in fact, actively participate in the management of PEITs; in other words, if 
the unit-holding proportion of each beneficiary in a given PEIT is not fully disclosed, public 
investors will have difficulties in identifying the actual ownership structure of such listed 
companies and predicting the operation of such companies. Furthermore, the CSRC is also 
concerned that the PEIT may break the compulsory restriction on the number of promoters of 
listed companies.
128
 As a result, to exit successfully from investee firms, trust corporations 
have to reorganize PEITs into other organizational structures, such as a corporation or ‗trust–
limited partnership‘ structure, both of which will increase the transaction costs in fund 
management.  
 
3.7.4.1  IPO by Transferring Capital into a Company 
 
In this way, the one approach is for the trust corporation to temporarily transfer the trustee 
funds into its own account. Therefore, the ownership of the trustee assets will be clarified and 
be approved by the CSRC. Once listed, the trust corporation returns the principal and profit 
of the PEITs to the beneficiaries. As the independence between the trustee‘s and principal‘s 
accounts is a basic rule in trust law, this transaction model is seriously violating this statutory 
requirement. Another widely used alternative strategy is that the trust corporation may 
establish a limited liability company or joint stock company and then transfer the funds of 
PEITs into the shell company‘s independent account for the purpose of making the new 
company a sole shareholder of the portfolio company. The problem is that, according to the 
current Company Law (2013 Revision), the numbers of promoters of an limited liability 
company or joint stock limited company should not exceed 50 and 200 respectively,
129
 
whereas the Rules (2009 Revision) does not limit the number of qualified investors in any 
PEITs. Therefore, this alternative way may not only unduly limit the scale of PEITs but also 
raise the transaction cost in the process of establishing the trust fund and exiting from the 
investee companies.  
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3.7.4.2  IPO by Altering the PE Investment Trusts into a Trust-Partnership Fund 
 
Although currently PEITs cannot exit investee companies by IPO, by contrast, since 2009, 
the limited partnership has been allowed to invest in listed firms as an independent 
institutional investor.
130
 As an alternative approach, in order to avoid transaction costs in the 
process of establishing a company, PEIT investors developed a new structure that combines 
the legal features of trust and limited partnership. In the first stage, the trust corporation 
establishes the PEIT as usual and then the trust corporation employs a professional private 
equity and venture capital firm to be the general partner of a limited partnership who will 
actually manage and determine the utilization of trust funds. At the second stage, the PEIT 
(limited partner) and the private equity firm (general partner) will respectively subscribe 
around 90% and 10% of the funds. In the process of the fund operation, the beneficiaries will 
be charged fixed fees by both the trust corporations and private equity and venture capital 
firm, and the general partner will earn carried interest. 
 
Figure 3.2 indicates that the shareholding structure of the trust–limited partnership private 
equity fund is much more complicated than general PEITs. Because the trust corporation 
should pay an amount of fees to private equity firms (investment adviser), this transaction 
model will decrease the actual profit of beneficiaries. The problems are whether this type of 
private equity fund should be regarded as a trust or a limited partnership and who should be 
liable for the mismanagement of the fund? According to s 30 of the Law of Trusts (2001) and 
s 26 of the Measures for the Administration of Trust Companies (2007),
131
 the trustee is 
allowed to re-entrust the business of the trust fund to other persons, but the trustee must be 
liable for all the legal consequences of the re-entrustment. However, s 21 of the Guideline 
(2008) stipulates that the investment adviser should only provide consultancy for the trust 
corporation and the investment decision should be independently and solely made by the trust 
corporation; in other words, any investment decision directly made by external private equity 
and venture capital firms in PEITs is invalid and illegal. In fact, the trust–limited partnership 
fund has considerably changed the function of investment trusts. Here the trust corporation 
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only plays a role as an intermediary or conduit between the investment adviser and 
beneficiaries, its profit only comes from the fixed management fee paid by trustors, which 
means that after the establishment of the fund, the trust corporation will have no motivation 
to supervise the private equity firm‘s management. Consequently, although this type of PEIT 
may temporarily make it possible to exit by IPO, the transaction costs in such a complicated 
organizational structure is evidently higher than the simple structure of private equity 
investment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8 A Proposal for the Legal Reform of China’s Private Equity Investment Trusts  
 
From the above discussion it is obvious that the current regulatory approaches and 
governance structures cannot effectively and efficiently secure the safety of trust funds nor 
enhance the trust corporation‘s management of PEITs. With reference to western countries‘ 
experience and lessons, this research tries to provide a proposal for further legal reform of 
China‘s PEITs, which mainly focuses on the following domains: (i) breaking the zero-loss 
promise and specifying the standard of qualified investors of PEITs; (ii) removing 
beneficiaries‘ active participation in management and clarifying the boundary of trustees‘ 
fiduciary duties; (iii) enhancing the custodian banks‘ supervision role in PEITs. Eventually, if 
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Figure 3.2: The legal structure of the PEITs with ‘trust with limited partnership’ form 
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the above problems can be solved, the barrier to IPO of PEITs-involved companies in 
Chinese stock markets may be solved.  
 
3.8.1  Break the ‘Zero-loss Promises’: Privatization and Rationalization  
 
As a result of the ongoing mixed ownership reform of Chinese SOEs, improvement in the 
governance structure of Chinese trust corporations can also be expected. Non-state and 
international investors will have a strong interest in improving governance within the Chinese 
trust industry, as it is the sole kind of financial sector without restrictions on investment. The 
privatization of trust corporations will accelerate the development of marketization and 
rationalization of the private equity investment trust industry and then, as a result, a more 
reasonable market entry standard will be highly demanded as well. Therefore, the first part of 
this reform proposal can be specified in two domains: (i) diversify the ownership structure of 
China‘s trust corporation, by which the motivation of ‗zero-loss promises‘ will be inherently 
reduced in the PEIT market; and (ii) establish a more substantive approach (rather than the 
exercise of administrative discretion) for selecting qualified investors, by which the Chinese 
PEIT market will be rationalized.  Both elements of the reform proposal are aligned with the 
current trajectory of reform in China and should therefore be feasible in the medium-term. 
 
3.8.1.1 Mixed Ownership Reform of the Trust Corporations in China 
 
Since the Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms
132
 was 
issued by the Central Committee of the CCP in November 2013, a new wave of marketization 
reform of China‘s SOEs has been launched, in which the legitimacy and political foundation 
for mixed ownership reform of the SOEs was established. It has been proven in this research 
that the state-controlled ownership structure of China‘s trust corporations is one of the factors 
that causes the distorted governance structure of PEITs and the barrier to the IPOs of PEIT-
involved companies in China‘s domestic stock markets. Therefore, this research tends to 
conclude that the mixed ownership reform of trust corporations is an essential way to break 
the zero-loss promise myth and rebuild the rationality of the PEIT market. 
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Specifically, strategic institutional investors should be positively encouraged to invest in or 
even control state-owned trust corporations, by which the diversified shareholders will have 
inherent motivation to refuse the zero-loss promise. In such a way, the non-state shareholders 
can also impose pressure on the managers of the trust corporations, by which the lack of 
owners of SOEs will be solved and the quality of corporate governance of the trust 
corporations will be improved. At present, the first pilot privatization of trust corporation was 
finalized by early 2015, the SDIC Trust Corporation Company Limited, one of the state-
owned trust corporations, was invested by two non-state financial firms, and, as a result, the 
shareholding of non-state shareholders represented 35% of the ownership of the SDIC.
133
 
Therefore, it can be expected that the further mixed ownership reform of the trust industry in 
China will be promoted and encouraged in the near future for the purpose of improving the 
efficiency of corporate governance and breaking the zero-loss promise.  
 
3.8.1.2 Test Qualified Investors in Substantive Approaches 
 
As summarized at the beginning of this chapter, the nature of a trust is the trustor‘s true belief 
that a particular trustee‘s skills, experience and good will in particular businesses can 
independently guarantee the best interest of the beneficiary. From an economic perspective, 
one could say that the prime advantages of business trusts are the efficiency by excluding 
non-professionals‘ intervention and the fund safety by strict fiduciary duty rules. However, it 
should not be ignored that the legitimacy of all the above legal features of business trusts 
must be based on the trustor‘s necessary investigation of trustees‘ qualification before he or 
she decides to establish the trusteeship with the fiduciary; in other words, the chief 
requirement of a so-called qualified investor should focus on the necessary understanding of 
the risk in connection with a particular type of trust investments, and the prudent 
investigation of the trustee‘s reputation and experience in such areas.  
 
In China‘s regulatory regime of PEITs, the qualified investors rule only sets the minimum 
investment amount or personal income threshold on PEIT investors and generally requires the 
trustee to fully disclose the relevant risk in business trust investments.
134
 However, the 
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substantive testing approaches of investors‘ ability to identify risk have not yet developed. 
The problem is that although most investors of PEITs are those high net wealth individuals 
and institutional investors, to enhance the rationalization of the market and reduce 
unnecessary losses to PEIT participants, the law should provide a series of substantial testing 
standards to recognize the qualification of PEIT investors and enhance the rationalization of 
the private equity and venture capital market.  
 
In the UK‘s financial regulatory system of collective investment schemes CISs (including 
private equity funds), a series of specific testing standards are expressly provided. According 
to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Promotion of Collective Investment 
Schemes) Exemptions Order 2001,
135
 qualified investors of an unregulated CIS can be tested 
by both the ‗quantitative requirement‘ and ‗qualitative requirement‘, which are aimed at 
judging a person‘s risk tolerance and ability to identify risk. In terms of the knowledge 
requirement, s 14 of the CIS Order (2001) only allows an investor who is (i) an authorized 
person; (ii) a person being exempted under s 38(1) of the FSMA (2000) in relation to one or 
more relevant scheme activities; (iii) a person carrying out daily activities involving 
unregulated schemes; (iv) a government, local authority or international organization; and (v) 
a director, officer or employee of the above kinds of ‗persons‘, where the position may enable 
him or her to participate in unregulated schemes. Besides, s 23 of the CIS Order (2001) also 
allows an investor who has a certification signed by an authorized person for the purpose of 
showing that he or she obtained enough professional knowledge of risk identification of a 
particular private investment to be qualified as a ‗certified sophisticated investors‘.136  
 
As discussed above, because China‘s trust corporations are not as sophisticated as 
professional private equity firms, the only way to cost-efficiently expand the business is to 
establish a co-operative relationship with commercial banks. As a consequence, unlike those 
limited partnership private equity funds both in China and international markets, the main 
clients of China‘s PEITs are not institutional investors, but wealthy individuals, many of 
whom may not have enough knowledge and experience in financial investment. This point 
can partly answer the questions why the beneficiaries of China‘s PEITs tend to intervene 
directly or even participate in the management of the funds. 
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With reference to the above statutes in common law jurisdictions, in order to reduce 
beneficiaries‘ irrational intervention, a practical testing approach should be established that 
can effectively select those qualified investors who are not only wealthy but also 
knowledgeable in risk judgment. For example, the authorities may provide a detailed basing-
point system for trust corporations to screen PEITs investors. Firstly, the trust corporations 
may regard the senior professional practitioners
137
 in certain investment-related careers as 
qualified investors, who can rationally judge the risk in private equity investment by their 
professional experience. Secondly, for non-professional investors, the regulator can require 
trust corporations not only to check the net wealth of individual investors, but also 
compulsorily interview, for example, or conduct background investigations into potential 
investors, all of which should be filed with the CBRC. The CBRC should then have the 
power to repeal the qualification of the investors who fail to self-prove the ability of risk 
judgment of PEIT investment. To enforce the trust corporation to fulfill the obligation of the 
above investigation, the CBRC should be empowered to punish trust corporations that 
willfully or negligently approved unqualified investors in PEIT investment. As regards 
institutional investors‘ ability to judge risk, the regulator should also expressly issue a 
specific testing direction that should focus on the members of the management layer‘s 
educational background and professional experience and, in terms of enterprises, trust 
corporations should assess the business performance within the past five years to judge 
whether the institutional investor is able to effectively consider the risk of PEIT investment.  
 
In summary, although a potential investor‘s qualification generally can only be estimated on a 
case-by-case basis, the regulator of China‘s trust industry should establish a feasible testing 
guideline for trust corporations and specify strict legal liability and punishment of the trust 
corporations who fail to duly examine an investor‘s qualification. Only in this way, may the 
PEITs regulatory regime effectively eliminate irrational investors and push other investors to 
carefully consider the venture regarding PEIT investment. Furthermore, with the 
rationalization of clients of PEITs, qualified investors can understand the rationale for, and 
market risk of, PEITs, which can also push the trust corporations to promote their services 
competitively. Eventually, only when the trustees‘ professional management and services 
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have been substantially improved, may the beneficiaries give up the irrational intervention 
and make the transactions more efficient.  
 
3.8.2  Trustee’s Independent Management and Establish Judicial Fiduciary Rules 
 
3.8.2.1   The Efficiency of Using Fiduciary Rules for Reducing Agency Costs 
 
At the outset of this section, an economic analysis of creating and applying fiduciary duty 
rules in comparison with detailed provisions in statutes will be helpful. To be more precise, 
the fiduciary duties is defined as a kind of ‗standard‘, in which the content of law is given 
after individuals‘ acts, whereas detailed statutory provisions contain much more fixed and 
express detailed requirements of behaviors which is categorized as ‗rule‘.138  Briefly, the 
frequency with which a law governs behaviors determines the choice of rules or standards. If 
a given conduct is frequent and recurring, enacting detailed provisions in legislations in one 
time will be more economical than using standards, as the prediction of how the adjudicator 
may practically interpret the vague words in standards will be costly for individuals
139
. In 
contrast, if a conduct is infrequent, a standard will be preferable for regulating or normalizing 
behaviors, as specifying all the contingencies of infrequent behaviors will be expensive and 
most of such prediction may be wasteful.
140
 The economic analysis of fiduciary duties, both 
functionally and historically, has shown that the role of fiduciary duties is reducing moral 
hazard and providing remedies for principals when the agent has taken opportunistic 
behaviors. Hence, using a set of standards such as fiduciary rules which are continually 
developed in adjudication would be a wisdom choice, as addressing the agency problems in 
business trusts can hardly be specified ex ante in legislations.  
 
Moreover, as noted in the first chapter of this work, the feasibility and transplantability of 
fiduciary law mainly depends on the quality of judiciary in a given importing country and the 
basic fact of China is that the political and social attitudes towards judicial intervention in 
business activities are conservative. At the same time, however, it also should be borne in 
mind that the economic efficiency and functional advantages of a certain type of business 
organization are inherently connected with particular sorts of business activities. Therefore, 
in consideration of the existing large scale market of business trusts in China, this work 
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suggests that the economic efficiency of PEITs can be realized only if investors‘ 
unreasonable intervention is avoided, the trust corporations are able to and obliged to 
conform the fiduciary duties in practice. Of course, undoubtedly this may take time.  
 
3.8.2.2  Remove Beneficiaries’ Meeting’s Inefficient Intervention 
 
In terms of beneficiaries‘ right of intervention, when beneficiaries are dissatisfied with the 
performance of the trust corporations, according to both the Law of Trust (2001)
141
 and s 42 
of the Rule (2009 Revision), the beneficiaries are able to intervene directly in the 
management by exercising their voting right. As analyzed above, however, quite a large 
number of investors may hardly rationally and efficiently give practical advices on improving 
the decision-making related to trust funds. In this regard, the depositary and regulator may 
jointly make an effort to defuse investors‘ dissatisfaction efficiently. Pursuant to the FSMA 
(2000) in the UK, any proposals to alter the provisions of the trust deed or change its manager 
must be approved by the Financial Conduct Authority
142
 and the trustee must submit a written 
notice stating the reasons for such a change to the regulator;
143
 in other words, the intention to 
make any alteration to the fund must be verified by the professional institutions rather than 
unprofessional investors.
144
 Accordingly, the rules regarding the power of beneficiaries‘ 
meeting of China‘s PEIT regulatory regime might be improved as follows: 
 
Firstly, as the custodian banks are entitled to consistently monitor the manager‘s behavior, 
the most pragmatic and cost-efficient way to deal with beneficiaries‘ objections to the 
performance of trust corporations is requiring the beneficiaries who are unsatisfied with the 
trustee‘s management to claim from the depositaries (mostly the custodian banks in China). 
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The custodian may determine whether the trust corporation‘s conduct should be adjusted on 
the grounds of its independent investigation of the issue. If the custodian bank agrees to 
adjust the management of the trust fund, in accordance with s 22 of the Rules (2009 
Revision), the custodian must require the trust corporation to set right with a written notice 
and, in the meantime, if the trust corporation refuses to make any correction, the custodian 
bank must report it to the CBRC promptly. Where the beneficiaries still feel dissatisfied with 
the regulator‘s decision, they have the right to transfer their shares in the fund to other 
qualified investors.
145
  
 
Secondly, in the case where the trust corporation breaches its fiduciary duty or unduly 
disposes of trust assets and causes loss to beneficiaries, the current regulatory system in 
China also overly entitles the beneficiaries‘ meeting to determine power to dismiss146 or 
change
147
 the trustee directly. However, neither the regulations legislated by the CBRC nor 
the Trust Law (2001) imposes a duty of approval on the regulator. Theoretically, the vast 
majority of investors must be risk-averse, hence any managerial behavior that can cause loss 
to investors is likely to be doubted or even intervened. The problem is that although it is 
possible that the trust corporations may have contravened the duties and failed to manage the 
fund in the best interest of the beneficiaries, it is also quite simple that the loss caused by 
market risk should be taken by investors themselves. In order to improve the efficiency of the 
decision-making process, it is recommended that the power of the beneficiaries‘ meetings to 
replace a trustee should be revised as ‗submitting a proposal to the custodian‘148 and the latter 
has the duty to investigate the beneficiaries‘ complaint carefully. If the custodian also agrees 
to change the trust corporation, it must provide a detailed report to the CBRC and the final 
decision should only be made by the regulator.  
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3.8.2.3  Establishing Judicial Rules to Clarify Trustee’s Duties 
 
As analyzed at the beginning of this chapter, the economic efficiency of trust law is on the 
ground of the separation between ownership and control of trust property and the fiduciary 
duty is a remedial mechanism for the principal to strengthen him-herself against the agent‘s 
discretionary power, which is mainly carried out and standardized by the courts. In Chinese 
trust law system, the court‘s statutory judicial power of intervention is quite limited. Up to 
now there are only two provisions that generally prescribe the court‘s role in trust businesses. 
Specifically, s 22 and 23 of the Law of Trusts (2001) respectively provides that ‗if the trustee 
disposes of the trust property against the purposes of the trust or causes losses to the trust 
property due to violation of the management duties or improper handling of the trust affairs, 
the trustor has the right to apply to the people‘s court for withdrawing the disposition‘ and 
‗[i]f the trustee disposes of the trust property against the purposes of the trust or is at serious 
fault when managing, utilizing or disposing of the trust property, the trustor has the right to 
remove the trustee according to the provisions of the trust documents or apply to the people‘s 
court to remove the trustee‘. The function of both the provisions has made it possible for 
investors in PEITs to be relieved by the court where their interests are being or have been 
infringed by the trustee‘s behavior. However, owing to the undue intervention by 
beneficiaries‘ meeting, a similar remedial function of the court‘s power to withdraw has not 
been sufficiently exercised.  
 
In fact, once the law and regulations have removed the beneficiaries‘ intervention power, the 
disputes between trust corporations and investors must be settled by a neutral third party. For 
the purpose of reducing litigation cost, the basic procedure of dispute settlement should be as 
follows: any disputes should be preliminarily settled by the CBRC and then if the parties are 
not satisfied with the decision, they should be entitled to file a lawsuit that should mainly 
involve the claim of compensation against the trust corporation that breaches its fiduciary 
duty and causes loss to investors, or the replacement of a trustee. Correspondingly, the court 
may exercise its judicial power to withdraw any misconduct of the trust corporation and 
compel the trust corporation to revert the trust property or compensate the beneficiaries. The 
court should also have an exclusive right to replace a trust corporation to protect beneficiaries‘ 
interests. Under the present commercial law of China, a system of practical standards of 
fiduciary duty rules can only be established by removing beneficiaries‘ direct intervention 
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and encouraging the court to actively exercise the power of withdrawal or replacing a trustee 
for the purpose of addressing the disputes and protecting the beneficiaries‘ interests, as 
fiduciary duty is a kind of practical standard which must be developed on a case-by-case 
basis.  
 
In comparison with the case law of both common law and civil law trusts, the above proposal 
for China‘s further reform regarding the establishment of fiduciary duty regime may, to some 
extent, successfully reflect the basic function of trust law. Similar to the Scottish legal system, 
it is also unrealistic to establish a divided ownership structure between the trustee and 
beneficiary in Chinese trust law. Alternatively, the exercising of judicial power to withdraw 
can also provide effective remedy for beneficiaries without irrational intervention. This point 
of view is reminiscent of the nature of a trust in Scotland. As the case of Armour v Glasgow 
Royal Infirmary (1909) shows in the circumstance where the trustee breaches a duty, the 
beneficiary cannot directly exercise a tracing right, otherwise the existence of an ownership 
for a beneficiary makes it possible to permit the beneficiary intervene in the management of 
the trust. Hence, the beneficiary has to exercise his or her claim right by resorting to the court. 
Correspondingly, the actual function of fiduciary duty rules of a civil law trust is that the 
beneficiary is entitled to enforce a trustee who has breached his or her fiduciary duty to 
cancel an unlawful transaction and claim a remedy against the trustee by resorting to a court 
order; in other words, the institution of the power of withdrawal can provide a sufficient 
remedy by correcting any misconduct on the part of the trustee without entitling the 
beneficiary to a proprietary right. In relation to the judicial practices regarding fiduciary duty 
rules in England, if the Chinese trust law regime can be improved to empower the courts with 
substantive remedial power, the institutional functions and advantages in English trusts may 
be transplanted and developed in China, because litigation can gradually develop a standard 
to the public that will be a practical guideline for both the trust corporations and investors.  
 
In sum, if the regulator and court can play a leading role in dispute settlement regarding the 
PEITs in practice, trust corporations can clearly identify the ambit of legal duties from the 
verdicts by the court, and investors will also recognise in which circumstances the law and 
court may exempt trust corporations from the liability and investors must suffer the loss at 
their own risk. Only in this way can investors be educated to consider the potential risk and 
their actual risk tolerance more carefully and rationally before deciding to engage in private 
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equity and venture capital investment, and trust corporations will also have a strong incentive 
and pressure to enhance their professional skills in private equity fund management diligently, 
and not only negatively play a role as the ‗conduit of capital‘. 
 
3.8.3  The Legal Reform of Custodian Banks of PE Investment Trusts in China 
 
3.8.3.1  Custodian Bank as the Co-trustee of PE Investment Trusts  
 
One of the problems regarding the custodian bank of China‘s PEITs is that because the trust 
law system in China defines the relationship between custodian banks and trust corporations 
as a sort of contractual relationship and the nomination of custodian banks of CISs is 
exclusively determined by the trustee, there is no direct legal relationship between the 
custodian bank beneficiaries. In this situation, once the custodian fails to fulfil its duty of 
safeguarding, the beneficiaries are unable to claim against the custodian. 
 
In this regard, the experience of the UK‘s CISs regulatory system may have some useful 
implications.
149
 The FSMA (2000) provides that the application of a CIS registered in the UK 
must be made to the authority by the manager and trustee who should be independent of each 
other.
150
 Pursuant to the Glossary of Financial Conduct Authority Handbook (2014),
151
 the 
‗depositary‘152 is the trustee of an authorized unit trust153 scheme and the main duties of a 
depositary are (i) safekeeping of the trust property and (ii) overseeing of the fund manager‘s 
performance.
154
 Therefore, depositary trustees are required to fulfil their duties under the 
UK‘s trust law.155 What is more, if the trustee violates the duties under the FSMA (2000), the 
FCA has the power to revoke an authorization made by the manager and trustee of an AUT
156
 
and if the FCA considers that the trustee has contravened or is likely to contravene the 
                                                          
149
 Under Part XVII of the FSMA (2000) ‗Collective Investment Schemes (CISs)‘, there are three main types of 
CISs, namely (i) AUT schemes, (ii) open-ended investment companies and (iii) recognized overseas schemes. 
By functional comparison, the AUT is the legal structure ta tis the most similar to China‘s PEITs. 
150
 FSMA (2000), s 242(1)–(2) and 243(4). 
151
 This document is available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/COLL/6/2. 
152
 The term ‗depositary‘ under the FSMA (2000) is the same as both the ‗custodian‘ in the Trustee Act (2000) 
in the UK and ‗custodian bank‘ in Chinese law; both of which are mainly in charge of the safekeeping of trust 
assets.  
153
 Hereinafter referred to as an ‗AUT‘. 
154
 See details in the section on ‗Collective Investment Schemes Sourcebook‘ of the Financial Conduct 
Authority Handbook <http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/COLL/6/6> accessed 16 June 2014. 
155
 Furthermore, s 253 of the FSMA (2000) does not allow the parties to waive the trustee‘s duty of care, hence 
the trustee (depositary) of AUTs should comply with the requirement of the duty of care under the Trustee 
Act (2000).  
156
 Section 254. 
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requirement imposed by the FSMA (2002),
157
 the FCA has the power to require the trustee to 
wind up the scheme up.
158
 In this scenario, the court has the power to issue an order to 
remove the trustee.
159
  
 
In terms of the regulatory framework under the FSMA (2000), the further issue is: what is the 
relationship between the investor and the manager of a unit trust? Although the law of FSMA 
(2000) does not clarify the legal status of the manager of AUTs, at least the contractual 
relationship between investors and manager makes it possible to allow investors to claim 
against the manager for breach of duties under the contract. The difference between the 
manager of AUTs as trustee or contractual party is that if the manager is statutorily defined as 
the trustee of CISs, the manager must fulfil the duty in accordance with a higher standard. 
Moreover, some equitable remedial approaches (e.g., the tracing right) provided by equity 
and general trust law will apply, which means that if the fund manager is regarded as the 
trustee of investors, the legal protection of beneficiaries‘ interest will be sounder than a 
contractual relationship.
160
  
 
Inspired by the above regulatory approaches, to protect the interests of beneficiaries and the 
supervising custodian‘s conduct in China‘s PEITs, the regulators of the CBRC should 
expressly define the legal status of a custodian bank of PEITs as a trustee, but not only a 
contractual party with the trust corporation. From a macro perspective, currently the business 
model of the Chinese financial market is separated; in other words, different financial sectors 
such as commercial banks, insurance companies and trust corporations are operated and 
regulated separately
161
 and, generally speaking, other unprofessional financial institutions 
such as securities brokers and commercial banks are not permitted to engage in China‘s 
PEITs business. Thus, although the governance structure of CISs under the FSMA (2000) is 
providing a mixed regulatory model for beneficiaries, which means that beneficiaries are able 
to respectively exercise the remedial powers against both the trustee based on fiduciary 
relationship and the manager based on contract, in China, however, it may be costly to 
exchange the legal statuses of the trust corporations and custodian banks (actually the 
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 Section 257 (1) (b). 
158
 Section 257 (2 )(b). 
159
 Section 258 (1) (a). 
160
 Iain G MacNeil, An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2012) 182–
183.  
161
 For more background information see Hui Guo (n 88) 93–98. 
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depositary). Therefore, under the current Chinese regulatory system, the trust corporation 
should still be the fund manager and trustee of PEITs.  
 
Secondly, there is the possibility to allow custodian banks to be the joint trustee of PEITs, 
because s 43 of current the Law of Commercial Banks (2003 Revision) does not absolutely 
prohibit the Chinese commercial banks from engaging in trust investment.
162
 It is 
recommended that the CBRC clarifies the legal status of the custodian bank under the Rules 
(2009 Revision) as the joint trustee of PEITs. In this way, the CBRC and the court can also 
impose the duties of care and of loyalty on the custodian banks
163
 in accordance with basic 
trust law principles.  
 
Thirdly, according to s 32 of the Law of Trusts (2001), if the trustee breaches the duties of the 
law or in the trust deed, the custodian bank may be jointly liable for the losses to the 
beneficiaries. This formal liability will motivate the custodian bank to carefully supervise 
every dealing instruction proposed by the trust corporation. 
 
3.8.3.2  The Appointment Procedure and Incentive Mechanism of Custodian Banks 
 
Accordingly, if the legal status of the custodian bank is a joint trustee, the appointment of the 
custodian should therefore also be determined by investors, instead of the trust corporation. 
However, considering the lack of professional knowledge of custodian banks, the investors 
may not be able to determine the selection of a custodian for PEITs properly. Alternatively, 
the authorities can entitle the final power to appoint to the CBRC who will make the 
commission on behalf of the beneficiaries of PEITs. Firstly, to establish a competitive 
custodian banking market, the trust corporation should draft a list of candidate commercial 
banks by way of an open tendering system and then submit the list of candidates to the CBRC 
for approval. The CBRC as the chief regulator of PEITs should carefully check each 
                                                          
162
 Section 43 of the Banking Law (2003 Revision) [中华人民共和国商业银行法（2003) 年修订）] provides that 
‗No commercial banks may, within the territory of the People‘s Republic of China, engage in trust investment or 
securities business, or invest in immovable property which is not for private use, in non-banking financial 
institutions or in enterprises, except where otherwise provided for in the regulations of the State.‘ 
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 In this regard, s 25 of the Law of Trusts (2001) prescribes that ‗[t]he trustee shall fulfil his duties and perform 
the obligation of being honest, trustworthy and cautious, and managing effectively‘and s 4 of the Rules (2009 
Revision) also requires that the trust corporations ‗shall be faithful to its duties and fulfill the obligation of being 
honest, credible, prudent and diligent, so as to best serve the beneficiaries‘, both of which are the current legal 
basis of the trustee‘s fiduciary duty regime under China‘s trusts system.  
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candidate bank‘s documents, compare the records of each bank‘s historical performance and 
finally appoint one of the candidates as the custodian bank for a given PEIT. The advantage 
of this appointment procedure is that the employment of a custodian bank will no longer be 
exclusively determined by the fund manager, but a neutral regulator who can only make a 
judgment based on the professional performance and reputation of each candidate bank.  
 
As some institutional economists properly argued: ‗If owners of cooperating inputs agree 
with the monitor that he is to receive any residual product above prescribed amounts 
(hopefully, the marginal value products of the other inputs), the monitor will have an added 
incentive not to shirk as a monitor.‘164 If the statutes allow the custodian bank to earn a 
proportion of the performance fee from the profit of the funds, the custodian bank will have a 
motivation to secure the transaction, at least the custody will have incentive to prevent the 
trust corporation from engaging in overly high risk projects.
165
 In more detail, it is 
recommended that the CBRC revise the Rules (2009 Revision) that after the appointment by 
the CBRC, the custodian bank should be in a position of a trustee and then the custodian fee 
and performance fee should be determined through negotiation between beneficiaries, the 
trust corporation and the custodian bank. However, in the meantime, the regulation may 
statutorily require that the ‗performance fee‘ for custodians should not surpass the amount of 
the fixed custodian fee. Furthermore, with reference to the relevant provision of the Trust 
Law (2001),
166
 the CBRC may consider adding similar provisions in the Rules (2009 
Revision) that if the custodian bank fails to safeguard the security of trust property or does 
not properly supervise the instructions proposed by the trust corporation, the custodian will 
not be allowed to earn any custodian fee before the loss has been compensated. Finally, 
because the custodian is recognized as the trustee of PEITs, that is, where the custodian 
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 Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‗Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations‘ (1972) 
62 American Economic Review 777, 782. 
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 According to a self-regulated document for commercial banks‘ custodian business, namely the Guideline for 
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or made compensations.‘ 
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contravenes the duties, the beneficiaries‘ general meeting should have the power to replace 
the delinquent bank subject to the CBRC‘s approval.  
 
3.8.3.3  Custodian Banks’ Power of Intervention against Trust Corporations 
 
According to the Rules (2009 Revision), in the scenario where the custodian finds the trust 
corporation in breach of duties in the trustee deed or under the law, the bank only has the 
right to notify the trustee or report it to the CBRC in good time.
167
 However, the custodian 
bank does not have any substantive power of intervention to correct the trust corporation‘s 
misconducts, which has reduced the effectiveness of the custodian‘s supervision. By contrast, 
pursuant to part COLL 6.6.14(4) of the CIS Sourcebook of FCA,
168
 the depositaries of CISs 
are entitled to notice or warn the trust corporation of the breach of duties.
169
 If the request or 
instruction given by a managing trustee eventually results in the breach of trust, the 
depositaries should refuse to act under the managing trustee‘s direction. Therefore, part 
COLL 6.6.10 of the FCA Sourcebook expressly requires that any investment or disposition of 
the scheme property proposed by the fund manager must obtain the consent of the depositary 
and if the depositary does not believe that the manager‘s investment proposal is acceptable, 
the depositary has the power to request the fund manager to cancel or change the proposal.
170
 
 
As for the custodians of PEITs in China, the regulation should additionally entitle the trustee 
to the power of refusing to obey any unjustified instruction from the trust corporation. If the 
trust corporation refuses to rectify its misconduct upon the custodian‘s notification, the 
custodian bank must inform the CBRC of the above issues immediately to prevent and 
minimize potential loss to beneficiaries. Furthermore, if the custodian bank fails to fulfil the 
above duties and then causes loss to beneficiaries, the trust law will require the custodian to 
be jointly liable for the loss caused by the trust corporation‘s default. In such a way, the 
custodian banks may play a more positive role in protecting beneficiaries of PEITs. 
 
                                                          
167
 The Rules (2009 Revision), s 22. 
168
 Hereinafter referred to as the ‗FCA Sourcebook‘. 
169
 For details, see the section on ‗Collective Investment Schemes Sourcebook‘ of the Financial Conduct 
Authority Handbook <http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/COLL/6/6> accessed 21 June 2014. 
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Chapter 4: The Protection for PE Shareholders in Corporate Governance 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
With the rapid development of the private sector in China‘s economy in the period 1990s to 
2010s, private equity institutions have been playing an increasingly influential role in the 
corporate governance of Chinese companies. Although the reform of Chinese company law is 
constantly evolving, due to the particular political-economic background of the public-owned 
sector of the Chinese economy, protection for private equity investors in portfolio companies 
is still inadequate. As a consequence, a series of corporate governance failures in PE-held 
firms in China have occurred during recent two decades, which reflect that the legal nature of 
the problems in the corporate governance of Chinese PE-held companies is the lack of legal 
mechanisms counterbalancing the interests of heterogeneous shareholders in corporate 
governance. By contrast, UK company statutes and judicial practices form a typical 
shareholder-centred company law system that provides much more contractual flexibility and 
protection for PE shareholders to safeguard their interests via active participation in corporate 
governance. From the perspective of legal transplantation, the legislative and judicial 
experience of UK company law may be referred to improve the protection of private equity 
and venture capital shareholders in the context of Chinese company law.  
 
The first section of this chapter generally reviews the functions of PE and VC in corporate 
governance, and analyses the specific connection between the company law in common law 
jurisdictions and the development of the PE and VC industry. The second section analyses 
the three main dimensions of the protective mechanisms for PE shareholders under the 
company law in the UK. It is argued that the liberalization and contractualization of corporate 
entities, decision-making processes and capital structure under the UK‘s company law system 
have soundly entitled the shareholders (especially the minorities) a series of rights to 
effectively control the corporation and supervise the director‘s performance. The section that 
follows focuses on the practical issues in the leading cases regarding the corporate 
governance of PE-held companies in China. The main problems include the uncertainty about 
the controlling shareholder‘s power to amend the articles of association, contest for corporate 
control and variable interest entity (VIE) regime under the existing company law and capital 
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regulations of China. Finally, compared with the related experiences and lessons from other 
transition economies, this chapter suggests that the substantial dilution of single controlling 
shareholders‘ control in the public-owned companies and an independent regulatory body of 
the securities market should be a precondition of introducing a shareholder-centred company 
law system. Based on the above comparison and analysis, this chapter recommends that the 
restrictions on the controllers‘ power in amending articles of association should be clarified 
further, where the judicial intervention will be quite indispensable. Owing to the immaturity 
of the Chinese entrepreneurs, however, encouraging the use of supplementary agreements 
between private equity investors and founder-controllers may not be proper nor efficient in 
the current situation. As a feasible and expected alternative, the preferred shares and dual-
voting system should be highly recommended for enhancing the private equity shareholders‘ 
rights in the corporate governance of portfolio companies in China. 
 
4.2  The Functions and Agency Costs of Private Equity in Corporate Governance 
 
4.2.1  Private Equity and Corporate Control 
 
Berle and Means stated that in modern corporations the owners‘ control over the corporation 
has been separated from their ownership.
1
 In a corporation with a highly dispersed ownership 
structure ‗the controlling group even if they own a large block of stock, can serve their own 
pockets better by profiting at the expense of the company than by making profit for it‘.2 Since 
then aligning the interests of the board of directors and the shareholders has been the core 
issue of corporate governance and the institutional economy. In Berle and Means‘ approach, 
it would be difficult for the shareholders who only hold a small portion of stocks to guard 
their interests in the shares of a corporation which is actually controlled by its managers. 
After more than half-a-century‘s development, although the dispersed ownership structure in 
public companies still dominates the business world in Anglo-American jurisdictions, the rise 
of institutional investor activism in the past three decades has been reshaping the landscape of 
corporate governance and even the developing path of company law.  
 
                                                          
1
 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction 
Publishers 1968). 
2
 Ibid., 144. 
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Generally speaking, shareholder activism can be described as ‗the way in which shareholders 
can assert their power as owners of the company to influence its behaviour‘. 3  Firstly, 
shareholder activism means that the shareholders‘ actions are usually able to make some 
changes in the company.
4
 Secondly, activism is a kind of governance model against the 
manager-centric model, which is mainly aimed at reducing the agency cost between the 
management and owners by enhancing the shareholder‘s control.5 Thirdly, from a regulatory 
perspective, the errors and illegal business judgement made by the corporate management 
may not be restricted efficiently if the fiduciary duty system or negligence system is not 
established. In such a circumstance, the shareholders can actively participate in decision-
making to correct the inappropriate behaviour of the management.
6
 Moreover, from a social 
perspective, shareholder activism can also play a positive role in protecting public interest by 
avoiding the inefficient governance of public corporations.
7
  
 
Shareholder activism is commonly categorised in two forms: (i) defensive shareholder 
activism and (ii) offensive shareholder activism. The former usually refers to the institutional 
shareholders such as pension funds and insurance companies who ‗hold significant blocks of 
company stock and advocate for change only when company fortunes decline‘.8 By contrast, 
‗offensive activism is characterised by the motivation of profit-seeking and, more often than 
not, is followed by the prompt exit from the company when the returns have been generated, 
or if the campaign has not resulted in the expected returns‘.9 Private equity as one of the most 
typical activists in corporate governance is able to influence the management of companies 
significantly. It is not uncommon that the manager may have strong motivation to prioritise 
his or her personal interest by misappropriating the resources of the corporation. One of the 
effective resolutions to this is to give the management an incentive which can align the 
interests of the agent and owner.
10
 As a kind of institutional controller in corporate 
governance, PE funds usually perform as the vehicle for leveraged buyouts (LBOs) which 
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 European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), ‗Shareholder Activism‘ <http://www.ecgi.org/activism/> 
accessed 21 September 2015. 
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result in the management layer of the investee company involved in the transaction with a 
significant shareholding of the company. In this manner, the agency cost between the 
management and owners will be reduced
11
 and the practice of corporate governance can be 
strengthened.
12
 Compared with the stock options for chief executive officers (CEOs) of 
public corporations, the CEO or senior managers‘ stock in PE-held firms can only be cashed 
when the PE fund successfully exits from the company or liquidates, which can push the 
management to work more sustainably on the long-term interests of the company.
13
 The high-
level debt financing in PE-backed buyouts also acts as an effective disciplinary device on the 
behaviours of management.
14
 Moreover, private equity funds as the owner with concentrated 
and significant ownership in the corporation commonly have a strong voice in the boardroom, 
by which the private equity shareholders are able to intervene in a timely manner in the 
significant decision-making process and monitor the performance of the management.
15
  
 
In summary, from the above overview of shareholder activism and institutional investors in 
corporate governance, it is clear that in a general sense, the positive influence of institutional 
shareholders in corporate governance is based on the controlling status of the firm. In terms 
of private equity investors, the protection of private equity shareholders‘ interest is mainly 
realised by acquiring significant shareholdings in the capital structure of the corporation. In 
the circumstance where the private equity fund does not hold enough stocks in the ownership 
structure of the corporation, the agency cost between the entrepreneur and the private equity 
shareholders is likely higher.  
 
4.2.2  Venture Capital Funds as Minority Shareholders in Corporate Governance 
 
In a general sense, a special type of private equity, namely the venture capital takes a 
minority sum of shares of the investee firm.
16
 Thus, owing to the lack of equity control power 
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in corporate governance, the operation or the VC-held company and the legal protection 
mechanism for venture capital funds is mainly established on a contractual basis,
17
 by which 
the agency problems between the management and the VC investors can be attenuated. The 
VC fund invests in the high-growth but those small start-up companies which usually lack 
mature experts of business operation. Moreover, the centralised ownership structure of start-
ups may also bring disadvantages in monitoring the managers of the firm.
18
  
 
From the perspective of value creation for corporations, the contractual mechanism in VC-
involved companies contributes to improvement of corporate governance in the following 
respects: on the one hand, the contractual provisions between the entrepreneur and venture 
capitalist can restrict the manager‘s discretionary power and enhance the monitoring of the 
management layer. For instance, venture capitalists can hold the power to replace the 
founder-CEOs when their performance is unsatisfactory and 
19
 exercise a veto right to 
prevent inappropriate decision-making.
20
 The venture capital investors commonly use a series 
of covenants to limit the entrepreneur‘s power in assets or purchase of sales, for example, 
mergers and acquisitions and the issuance of shares.
21
 At the same time, the professional 
representatives of venture capital firms can provide more accurate advice for decision-
making and improve the quality of corporate governance of investee companies.
22
 On the 
other hand, venture capital contracts adopt multi-level capital financing instruments to 
prioritize cash flow to VC investors in different circumstances. In most cases, venture capital 
shareholders hold the preferred stocks in portfolio companies
23
 which can have precedence 
over ordinary stocks in the event of bankruptcy and dividend payment.
24
 In addition, 
convertible securities such as convertible preferred stock or convertible bond also provide the 
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VC fund with the right to safeguard the economic interests in investment, by which the 
flexible capital forms can help the VC shareholders reduce the agency costs through the 
process of corporate governance of portfolio companies.
25
  
 
From the overview of the main provisions in the contracts between the VC funds and investee 
companies, it can be concluded that the legal protection of the VC minority shareholders is 
based on a special corporate law system providing both the constraints on the majority 
shareholder or CEO‘s governance power and preference in capital allocation for minority 
shareholders, by which the outside shareholders‘ risk in the whole process of investment can 
be hedged or reduced. In fact, to some extent, the practical effect of venture capital contracts 
can be compared with the loan agreement in banking finance.
26
 For example, the preferred 
right in liquidation provided by preferred shares can be compared to the senior or secured 
short-term debt lent by banks, both of which preferentially safeguards the economic interests 
of suppliers in the event of liquidation.
27
 In addition, similar covenants restricting the 
entrepreneur‘s decision-making power are also used in bank financing. For instance, the 
entrepreneur may be required to pre-negotiate the consent of the bank creditor before making 
particular kinds of business decisions and further borrowing against the collateral assets may 
be limited by the loan agreement as well.
28
  
 
4.2.3  The Foundation for the Corporate Governance in PE-held Companies 
 
Although it has been stated that judicial intervention is playing a core role in protecting 
investors in business organizations, from the above analysis it is clear that in both the buy-out 
funds as controllers and venture capital funds as minority shareholders in investee companies, 
the legal protection for private equity and venture capital investors is mainly based on the 
shareholder primacy principle, rather than external mechanisms such as judicial intervention. 
As for the private equity fund as majority shareholder in the corporation, the control power 
can directly undergird investor protection, whereas the interests of the venture capital fund 
are mainly safeguarded by both the restrictive rules on founder-CEO and multi-level capital 
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structure in corporate law which can provide a balanced benefit pattern within the corporation. 
Overall, in consideration of decreasing transaction costs in corporate governance, especially 
for those transitional economies without strong and sophisticated judicial tradition, a well-
balanced internal governance structure under company law and contractual autonomy should 
be a more feasible approach to protecting private equity and venture capital shareholders in 
corporate governance.  
 
4.3  The Organizational Protection for Shareholders in UK Corporate Governance 
 
4.3.1  Dispersed Ownership and the Rise of Institutional Investors in the UK 
 
During the second half the twentieth century, the ownership structure of corporations in the 
UK experienced a transformation from a concentrated pattern to a dispersed pattern which 
was driven by a series of legal and economic factors. As regards the legal regime, it has been 
argued that the corporate laws and financial regulation system in common law countries, 
especially the US and UK, can provide more powerful protection for minority shareholders, 
in which the controlling shareholder‘s threat to the outside investors will be restricted by the 
courts or regulators.
29
 Furthermore, in the light of non-governmental factors, the new listing 
rules enacted by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) throughout 1960s to 1980s
30
 and the 
high-quality services of professional intermediaries organizing the public offerings in the 
City of London also provided a protective and friendly institutional environment for outside 
investors.
31
 Against this background, the dispersed ownership structure in the UK‘s 
corporations was not established until the 1970s.
32
  
 
As mentioned above, the high-level divorce of ownership and control will increase the agent 
costs in corporate governance,  and due to the inefficient decision-making process, the high-
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level dispersion of ownership gives no single shareholder enough incentive to engage in 
‗collective action‘ to monitor the management.33 As a response to this, there was a high 
demand for professional institutions to actively engage in corporate governance on behalf of 
the individual investors in British companies.
34
 At the same time, the tax-advantaged policies 
for institutions considerably directed the money flowing from individuals to institutions, 
especially insurance companies and pension funds.
35
 Against this background, institutional 
investors have emerged since the second half of the 1970s and developed fast during the 
following decades.
36
 Moreover, during the 1950s to 1960s, a large number of state-owned 
enterprises controlled the social capital and resources in the UK and the economy was 
significantly directed by governmental intervention. As a policy dealing with the economic 
decline, the mass-scale privatization of public sectors in the UK‘s economy was directed by 
the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher‘s government during the late 1970s and 1980s, 
the ownership of state-owned companies was effectively transferred to the hands of private 
institutional investors.
37
 In such economic milieu, the institutional investor as a kind of active 
player in corporate governance brought new challenges to shareholder protection in the UK. 
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Table 4.1: The beneficial ownership of public corporations in  
the United Kingdom (1963–1997) 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: The beneficial ownership of public corporations in 
the United Kingdom (1998, 2010, 2012, 2014) 
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4.3.2  The Inconvenience of Judicial Intervention in Corporate Governance  
 
In addition to the market demands, before the official company law reform launched in 1998, 
the legal protection for shareholders was mainly rooted in the system of fiduciary duties of 
equity, and the statutory regulation in company law usually played a supplemental role.
38
 
However, the costly and complex procedures of judicial intervention in corporate governance 
have become unfavourable, and more and more impractical to the economic development of 
the UK.
39
 According to a series of official consultation documents and consultation papers 
prepared for the new legislation in company law, it was widely agreed that the judicial 
intervention in corporate governance should be simplified and, correspondingly, the 
shareholders‘ active control should be encouraged: the strict restriction of derivative actions 
should be significantly simplified;
40
 the directors‘ duties should be clarified in the written law 
which can effectively reduce uncertainty in judging the directors‘ fulfilment of their duties;41 
shareholders general meeting should operate not only as an organ of decision-making, but 
also an effective mechanism for communication between the board and owners. Especially in 
the era of institutional investors, the demands of institutional investors‘ active participation in 
corporate management should not be ignored. The shareholders should be encouraged to vote 
by electronic means or proxy approach.
42
 At the same time, the majority shareholders‘ power 
to amend corporate charters should be limited by special resolutions and entrenched 
provisions.
43
 It was also suggested that the compulsory judicial approval of the alteration of 
capital such as capital repurchase was overly strict as well, and that, alternatively, the special 
resolution on the change of capital could fulfil the same function more efficiently.
44
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4.3.3  The Self-protection Mechanisms for Shareholders under UK Law 
 
In response to the above new challenges in the capital market of the UK, the Companies 
Act 2006 is making a series of progress in improving the internal protection for shareholders, 
especially minorities. Moreover, to empower shareholders in corporate governance has been 
adopted as main values of UK company law.
45
 In such a way, the powers of particular 
individual directors or executives in corporate governance are restricted,
46
 and shareholders‘ 
communication with, and participation in, the board are also strongly encouraged by the 
law.
47
 In addition, institutional investors‘ active role in corporate governance has also been 
officially recognized as a due principle in UK corporate governance.
48
 In the practical respect, 
however, without the basic support of self-protection by the company law, it would be 
impossible to make the above standardised principles of UK corporate governance work well. 
In the section that follows shareholders‘ self-protective mechanisms under the Companies 
Act 2006, all of which are highly important for private equity investors to attenuate agency 
problems in the corporate governance of investee companies, will be illustrated.  
 
4.3.3.1  The Shareholder’s Power in Relation to Corporate Contracts  
 
a.  Restrictions on the Amendment of Articles of Association 
 
Articles of association represent a contract between the company and shareholders,
49
 in 
which the basic infrastructure of both the governance and ownership of the firm are fixed, 
and the rights and duties of each party involved in corporate governance are also clarified.
50
 
Because the Companies Act 2006 does not provide a clear framework for the power 
distribution between shareholders and board of directors,
51
 the role of articles of association 
of a company should be especially significant in establishing basic rules of corporate 
governance of UK companies. Although the articles of association are regarded as a contract, 
the traditional freedom of contract principles in amending the articles are substantially 
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restricted by the statutes and courts which, to a large degree, has diluted the contractual 
features of the articles of association. Firstly, the articles of association are not absolutely a 
private agreement between the parties. On the contrary, the law may require the company to 
disclose the articles to the public by registering with the Companies House.
52
 Secondly, the 
legal force of the articles of association will automatically bind the shareholders who become 
the parties within the company later, which means that the relativity of contract is also broken 
through in regard to the articles of association. Thirdly, according to the principles of contract, 
a contract should not be altered unless all the parties to the contract consent to do so. In 
contrast, the articles can be altered by special resolution, instead of the full consent of all the 
shareholders.
53
  
 
The Companies Act 2006 provides that the alteration of the articles of association is subject 
to the special resolution agreed to by a majority of not less than 75% of the votes.
54
 Therefore, 
there is an obvious risk that the power of altering the constitution of the company might be 
handled by majority shareholders. Especially in PE-held companies, in the case of the private 
equity investor as the minority shareholder in the investee company, the private equity 
shareholders‘ right may be oppressed by the founder-CEO who is able to determine the 
alteration of the constitution. As a response to this problem, the constraint against the 
controlling shareholders in amending the articles of association is really important.  
 
One of the most noteworthy progresses made in protecting minority shareholders‘ interests in 
corporate contracts is the permission to using entrenched provisions in drafting articles of 
association. Pursuant to the Companies Act 2006, an ‗entrenched provision‘ refers to some 
specified provision in the constitution of the company that can only be amended or repealed 
if a higher threshold is matched or stricter conditions are met, where the amendment of such 
provisions is more restrictive than the one applicable to the special resolution.
55
 The 
entrenchment in articles of association may enhance the protection of minorities. For example, 
the entrenched provisions can only be made at the moment when the articles of association 
are formed or agreed to by all the members of the company to amend the company‘s 
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articles.
56
 In practical terms, the entrenched provisions can also provide that the amendment 
of particular issues in the articles is invalid unless the particular member(s) approve it.
57
 In 
such a case, the minority shareholders can better exercise their voting right to counterbalance 
the majority‘s oppression and protect their interests in the company.  
 
b.  The Shareholder’s Agreement as a Constraint on Majority Shareholders  
 
The constitution of a company is a contract between both the members and company, which 
must be filed with the Companies House and be publicly disclosed.
58
 By contrast, in the 
circumstances where some or all shareholders want to contract privately with respect to 
particular issues, the shareholders‘ agreement may be created. Moreover, although the 
minority shareholder‘s right can be strengthened by applying entrenched provisions in 
creating the articles of association, those shareholders who hold very small sums of shares 
may be oppressed by other shareholders. In such a situation, the specified minority 
shareholder‘s rights can be safeguarded by entering into a shareholders‘ agreement which 
cannot be altered or repealed unless all the contractual parties of the agreement agreed to do 
so.
59
  
 
The legal issue that needs to be considered is the limit of the contractual freedom in creating 
the shareholders‘ agreement. The basic principle in the practice of this area is generated from 
the leading case Russell v Northern Bank Development Corp Ltd 
60
 decided by the House of 
Lord. The four executive managers and the defendant who are the majority shareholder 
jointly owned a company, and all the shareholders and the company entered into an 
agreement after the incorporation of the company. One provision of this agreement stipulated 
that the company was not permitted to create or issue new shares without the written consent 
of each party to the agreement. Nonetheless, the company summoned a general meeting at 
which a resolution of creating new shares was proposed. Russell, one of the shareholders of 
the company, filed a lawsuit attempting to prevent other shareholders from voting in favour 
of the resolution.
61
 The Court of First Instance and Appeal Court dismissed the application, 
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but finally the House of Lord supported the claimant holding that the shareholders‘ 
agreement was not allowed to fetter the statutory power of the company, whereas the 
shareholders as contractual parties of the agreement could freely exercise their voting rights 
and in this context the agreement was enforceable.
62
  
 
The nature of the Russell principle is that the court actually permits the shareholders to 
enhance their protection indirectly by means of altering or restricting the functions of 
companies.
63
 The problem in relation to the Russell principle is that if the law does not set a 
boundary to the shareholders‘ power in altering the company‘s statutory power, the legal 
force of articles of association or even the corporate law would be substantially eroded. Thus, 
after the Russell case there was a call to change the statutes so as to remove this principle in 
judicial practices
64
 or at least the general law should set out the circumstances in which the 
shareholders are permitted to sanction the covenants fettering companies‘ statutory powers.65 
 
4.3.3.2  The Shareholder’s Power in relation to Corporate Governance 
 
a.  The Shareholder’s Power in Decision-making 
 
It is quite surprising that there is no statute specifying the distribution of power between 
directors and shareholders in UK companies among more than one thousand articles of the 
Companies Act 2006; in other words, there would be a very wide range of contractual 
freedom for the members of the company to allocate the decision-making power and 
therefore the articles of association plays a pivotal role in specifying the basic structure of 
corporate governance under UK company law. Theoretically, shareholders are able to 
substantially exert influence on decision-making and to decide the power of the board by 
setting and amending the articles of association. In practice, however, the Model Articles 
issued by the Secretary of State at least give a few clues to find the boundary between the 
managers and owners. At first, s 3 of the Model Articles for both private and public 
companies provides that ‗[s]ubject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the 
management of the company‘s business, for which purpose they may exercise all the powers 
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of the company‘, according to which the directors are entitled to fully exercise their 
managerial power within the limits of the corporate constitution. At the same time, the Model 
Articles also permit the shareholders to direct the board to do or refrain from carrying out 
specific actions by passing special resolutions, only if such actions have not been taken by the 
board of directors.
66
 It can be summarised that the current company statutes of the UK 
strongly empower the shareholders to fundamentally shape the governance structure of each 
company.  
 
Specifically, as the response to the reform proposals overviewed above, the Companies 
Act 2006 encourages shareholders, especially minorities, to effectively participate in the firm 
management. For instance, for private companies, a resolution can be passed in a written 
form and a calling of the general meeting of shareholders is not required by the law.
67
 
Moreover, in order to enhance the protection of minorities, the law also provides that the 
members who represent 5% of total voting rights or a lower percentage as specified by the 
articles are able to require the company to circulate written resolutions.
68
 As regards public 
companies, resolutions must be passed at shareholders‘ general meetings. Previously, the 
shareholding threshold for the members to requisition directors to convene a general meeting 
was 10%, whereas for consistency with the European Union Companies (Shareholders‘ 
Rights) Regulations promulgated in 2009, this required percentage was decreased to 5%,
69
 
which means that it would be far easier for minority shareholders to participate in decision-
making in general meetings. Additionally, in the circumstances where the companies listed 
on the Main Market of the LSE tend to carry out transactions amounting to 25% of the value 
of the firm, they must also be approved by the shareholders‘ general meeting before such 
deals are approved.
70
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b.  Shareholders’ Power of Supervising Directors  
 
Although shareholders have a wide range of power in decision-making in UK companies, in 
respect of the appointment of directors, the Companies Act 2006 says almost nothing with the 
exception of the stipulation that for public companies two or more directors should not be 
elected by a single resolution of the general meeting of shareholders.
71
 That is to say, the law 
allows large leeway for members to arrange the method of electing directors. According to 
the Model Articles for both private and public companies, the directors may be appointed by 
an ordinary resolution passed at a general meeting or directors
72
 and the Corporate 
Governance Code further requires that directors of UK companies be re-elected at intervals of 
no more than three years.
73
 Even though the two model documents have been widely adopted 
by UK companies,
74
 it is still possible for UK companies to arrange their governance pattern 
opting out of the official recommendations.
75
 In a general sense, the minority shareholders 
are at risk of majority shareholders‘ oppression in nominating directors, despite the 
concentration of minority shareholders‘ voice in such issue being highlighted by the regulator 
in recent years.
76
  
 
In order to counterbalance the weak power of shareholders in supervising directors, the 
statute clearly entitles the general meeting to strong power to remove directors from their 
offices. According to section 168 (1) of the Companies Act 2006, ‗[a] company may by 
ordinary resolution at a meeting remove a director before the expiration of his period of 
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office, notwithstanding anything in any agreement between it and him‘, which means that 
shareholders have the absolute power to remove directors regardless of any contractual 
arrangement between the company and director(s). Moreover, the law actually imposes 
heavier pressure on the directors by at least two institutional devices: the one is that the 
shareholders can remove a director at any time within the tenure of the directors, which 
means that in practice this section makes the tenure of the employment contract between the 
company and directors meaningless. To keep their seats in the boardroom, the directors must 
constantly satisfy the owners of the firm. Another is that the shareholders‘ strong power of 
removal can indirectly enhance the shareholders‘ power of decision-making, because the 
directors have to seriously consider the shareholders‘ opinions when they make decisions, 
otherwise they may be removed by dissatisfied shareholders at the general meeting.  
 
4.3.3.3  The Shareholder’s Power in relation to Class Shares  
 
a.  The Contractual Nature of a Share  
 
Although there is no accurate definition of a share in academia, the basic legal features of a 
share in a company are relatively common and clear. A share can be regarded as a kind of 
financial instrument, by which the holder can claim his or her residual interests in the 
company.
77
 At the same time, when the shareholders agreed to contribute a sum of money to 
the company,
78
 it is treated that the shareholders have voluntarily accepted the risks and 
liabilities to the extent of their limited contribution to the pooled capital of the company.
79
 
From the perspective of the shareholders themselves, the share can be considered as an 
official legal certificate, and an identification of their voluntary expectation of return and 
acceptance of liability. Moreover, in practice a series of legal rights attached to shares such as 
voting rights and dividend allocation also establish the mutual covenants between all the 
shareholders,
80
 by which the rights and obligations attached to a given class of share can be 
clearly detected by both incumbent and potential owners of the company. In the context of 
British company law, shareholders can freely determine the specific properties of shares, such 
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as the nominal value
81
 and transferability
82
 by creating specific terms in the articles of 
association. In a general sense, with the exception of some mandatory restrictions such as 
capital maintenance, ‗the contract contained in the articles of association is one of the original 
incidents of the share‘.83  
 
b.  Class Share as the Protective Mechanism in Corporate Governance 
 
In terms of the role of shares in corporate governance, especially in the situation where a 
series of different shareholders exist in a company, the shares with different rights attached 
will play a significant role in determining the governance structure in the company. 
According to s 629 of the Companies Act 2006, the law permits the shareholders to perform 
differently in decision-making and the allocation of interests by arranging different rights in 
shares. The two most common typologies of shares are ordinary share and preference share.
84
 
In most cases, the holders of ordinary shares can fully exercise their voting rights in general 
meeting, but in the case of insolvency, the holders of ordinary shares are paid only if creditors 
and preference shareholders have been liquidated. By contrast, the holders of preference 
shares will usually be prioritized in dividend payment and insolvency liquidation, but their 
voting right in a general meeting is limited.
85
 
 
In relation to PE-held companies, the class shares are particularly important for improving the 
efficiency in corporate governance. With the increase of outsider ownership in the 
shareholding structure, the founder shareholder can use class shares to keep his or her control 
over the firm.
86
 At the same time, outsider institutional investors, especially venture 
capitalists who commonly hold tiny portion of shares, can also, to a large extent, decrease 
their risk by applying preference shares. Furthermore, the contractual freedom in arranging 
class shares will be favourable to the diversification of the capital market and expansion of 
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financing channels for enterprises. For instance, during the growth process of start-ups, the 
risks and potential returns in different stages may vary remarkably; the existence of class 
shares can attract investors with different risk-preferences to constantly provide capital for 
the companies.  
 
As discussed above, the legal nature of shares in UK company law is basically contractual. 
Nevertheless, the problem arises whether the law should set a boundary on arranging class 
rights in corporate contracts. One of the leading cases on this issue, Bushel v Faith,
87
 decided 
by the House of Lords, provides some implications. In this case, the defendant, Faith, was the 
director and shareholder of the company at the same time who held shares with three votes 
per share and could outvote other shareholders in general meetings. As a result, the other 
shareholders, including the claimant, could not remove the defendant from the boardroom, 
although s 184 of the Companies Act 1948
88
 granted the power of removal. The plaintiff 
requested the court to invalidate such class rights of the defendant. The House of Lords 
dismissed the appeal, reasoning that although shareholders‘ removal power was mandatory, 
the court was unwilling to arbitrarily fetter a shareholder‘s statutory voting rights only if such 
a shareholder was also a director.
89
 This opinion can also be understood that the class rights 
as a contractual right specified in the corporate charter should be primarily respected, the 
occasional overlap of director and shareholder is not a necessity that deprives shareholders of 
their statutory rights. In a long term, the Bushel case has been one leading case in the area of 
shareholders‘ removal power against directors. It is noteworthy that in case of large public-
held corporations, the rules in Bushel case, however, may not be correct, as the over-powerful 
voting rights which are held only in hands of very small group of shareholders may be a 
threat to public investors. Consequently, concerning about the risks of distorting corporate 
governance mechanism and unfair market for corporate control, such super-voting rights are 
not quite preferable in large companies in the UK
90
 and the use of super-voting in the 
companies which are listed at the LSE is not encouraged.
91
 Nonetheless, it is acknowledged 
that the dual class share can play a positive role in the quasi-partnership start-ups.  
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4.3.4  The Contractual Nature of Self-protections of Shareholders in the UK 
 
On the basis of the above anatomy of the self-protective mechanisms in the UK, it can be 
concluded that British corporate governance is built on shareholders‘ governance authority.92 
Moreover, the rapid increase of the institutional investors in the UK during the recent decades 
also shows that the legal and regulatory reforms have positively responded to institutional 
investors‘ demands for powerful intervention in corporate management. Therefore, UK 
corporate governance can be trademarked as contractualism in the following three domains:  
 
First, fundamentally, the company law is formally reluctant to limit the allocation of powers 
between the parties in companies. The managerial authority of the board is derived from the 
shareholders‘ contractual arrangement, namely the articles of association, instead of any 
external authorities, including the state.
93
 The shareholders can also freely determine their 
powers and relationships between one another in the management of firms by contracting 
specific terms in corporate contracts and shareholder agreements. The class share system also 
provides the flexibility in arranging their rights attached to shares for both incumbent 
shareholders and potential outside investors in capital markets. Although the Companies Act 
2006 recognizes the independent power of directors in management, the shareholders‘ 
consistent and unconditional power to remove directors has been a sword of Damocles over 
the heads of directors. The management has to seriously consider the shareholders‘ attitude 
before making decisions. Additionally, to further enhance the protection of public investors, 
the Listing Rules of the LSE encourages shareholders to participate actively in the 
governance by allowing them the power to approve significant transactions of listed 
companies. In such a way, it can be said that the company law and regulations in the UK have 
actually put the companies under the control of shareholders.  
  
Second, the strong power of shareholders in corporate governance can better protect the 
shareholders. However, the contracting between shareholders must be time-consuming, or in 
large public companies the agreements between all shareholders are even impractical. Hence, 
the Corporate Governance Codes and Model Articles provide a pack of standard contracts for 
the members of UK companies. The application of such standard contracts by default has 
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effectively saved costs in contracting. The shareholders, in turn, can not only amend the 
Model Articles by special resolutions, but also opt out of the Corporate Governance Codes 
with acceptable explanations. The contractual nature of UK corporate governance is strongly 
confirmed again.  
 
Finally, the conservatism in the judicial practices of the UK also plays a role in keeping the 
shareholder primacy contractual. The freedom that shareholders enjoy in contracting on the 
shareholders‘ agreement and class shares will be prioritized by the court, although 
occasionally such freedoms may influence the statutory rights of the companies or directors 
in practice. Indeed, comprehensively considering the relationship between the statutes, model 
documentations and case law in UK company law, it can be seen that the British judges are 
quite reluctant to materially judge the reasonability in corporate contracts, the related cases 
actually warns about a series of risk in contracting, according to which the practitioners may 
avoid risks by adapting specific contractual arrangements.  
 
4.4  The Institutional Background of Non-state Companies in China  
 
4.4.1  The Non-judicial Protection of Minority Shareholders in Chinese Companies  
 
When one talks about the regime of corporate governance of Chinese companies, the first 
point one should bear in mind is that the basic and original functions of Chinese corporate 
law is to establish a legal framework for restructuring the SOEs of China.
94
 The official rules 
for corporate governance were not promulgated until the Law of Companies was enacted in 
1993. To date, the company law was revised in 2005 and 2013 respectively; both of the 
amendments made efforts to improve the protection of minority shareholders in Chinese 
companies. However, the basic logic of corporate governance in Chinese law is still based on 
the centralised ownership model, instead of a dispersed ownership structure.
95
 In terms of 
non-state companies, it is also quite common that the entrepreneur shareholder is at the same 
time in the position of the president of the board of directors, CEO and controlling 
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shareholder of the company. Thus, the statutory protection of minority shareholders in 
Chinese companies is also a noteworthy issue.  
 
Though the ownership structure of Chinese non-state companies are more diversified than the 
SOEs, quite a large number of the founding shareholders still hold more than one third of the 
shareholdings in listed non-state companies.
96
 The controlling shareholders can easily control 
the election of board members, by which the outsider shareholders or minority shareholders 
may be excluded from the decision-making of the firm. According to the corporate 
governance practices in recent years, owing to the lack of effective constraint, the founding 
shareholders also have strong motivation to make private profit by making affiliated 
transactions and committing financial fraud with public and minority shareholders.
97
  
 
4.4.2  The Listing Rules for Chinese Non-state Companies  
 
The domestic public stock market of China was established in 1990. Although the stock 
market provides an effective source of finance for Chinese enterprises, the public stock 
market is still dominated by SOEs but not those non-state companies who are in need of 
funds.
98
 Against this macro-economic background, the regulatory system and approach of 
listed companies on the Chinese stock market are also established on a state-controlled 
instead of market-controlled basis. Because the initial function of the Chinese stock market 
was a reform approach for restructuring the SOEs and transforming the planned economy 
into a market economy, the approval and regulation of the Chinese stock market, to a large 
extent, was determined by the authorities. Before 1996, the quota of listed companies in a 
certain year was pre-planned by the central and local authorities; in other words, only those 
enterprises that were recommended by the government to the CSRC might be listed, 
otherwise the entrepreneurs had no freedom to apply independently to list on the stock 
market.
99
 Since the promulgation of the Law of Securities of the PRC in 1998, the CSRC 
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enjoyed the exclusive power to substantively examine listing applications and regulate listed 
companies.
100
 In order to simplify the approval procedure, the annual quotas of listing in 
different provisions currently are uniformly pre-allocated by the CSRC.
101
 However, because 
the Chinese stock market is still dominated by SOEs, the listing requirements of Chinese 
private companies are overly strict and costly.  
 
According to the Measures for the Administration of Initial Public Offering and Listing of 
Stocks (2006)
102
 issued by the CSRC, the qualified issuer ‗must have been profitable in the 
most recent three years with annual net profits of more than RMB 30 million‘ and ‗must have 
made the net cash flow more than RMB 50 million accumulated within the most recent three 
years or has made the revenue no less than RMB 300 million accumulated within most recent 
three years‘ and the issuer also ‗must have a total share capital of no less than 
RMB 30 million before the IPO‘.103 By the end of 2012, the small and medium enterprises104 
have accounted for more than 98% of the total number of enterprises in China.
105
 However, 
for most Chinese SOEs the above high-level financial requirements have been a main barrier 
in their way of listing on the stock market. Moreover, the high-level disclosure institution, 
continuous stability of management and equivocal timetable of approval
106
 also reduce the 
private companies‘ enthusiasm to expand finance on the Chinese public stock markets.  
 
In sum, such a series of strict and high-level listing rules can hardly provide effective 
financial sources for the majority of Chinese private companies. By contrast, the relatively 
efficient approval procedures and low-level listing requirement in overseas stock markets 
have been quite attractive to Chinese private enterprises.
107
 Although overseas listing can 
provide a wider range of finance for Chinese private companies in relatively more efficient 
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listing procedures, in the long run, the particular capital control policies that are mainly 
against foreign PE-held corporations may lead to serious instability in corporate governance 
in Chinese overseas listed companies.  
 
4.5  The Problems of Corporate Governance in PE-held Companies in China 
 
4.5.1  The Conflict between Entrepreneurs and Private Equity Shareholders  
 
The separation of the ownership and control is one of the most significant features of modern 
corporations. The director in corporations usually plays a role as the agent of shareholders, 
which can increase the agency costs in corporate governance. In order to control agency costs, 
the contractarians argue that the alignment of the residual claimant and residual control 
between the owners and managers of the firm is essentially significant.
108
 By contrast, the 
ownership structure of private family corporations is highly concentrated, the founder of the 
firm is also the controlling shareholder and president of the board of directors; in other words, 
the separation of ownership and control in private family corporations is not sufficient, but 
the informal contractual arrangements such as the blood relationship among family members 
or the founder‘s personality and authority usually play a more important role in the 
management of family firms. As a consequence, the traditional principle of corporate 
governance may not work well to attenuate the agency problem. 
 
In addition, the contractual theory of corporation argues that the nature of the corporation is a 
‗nexus of contracts‘ between the parties of the company,109 which suggests that the parties of 
the company should have the freedom to form and amend articles of association. The related 
problem is whether the power of the parties is unlimited in determining the specific rules in 
corporate governance? According to the Law of Companies of China,
110
 the general meeting 
of shareholders has the power to determine the specific rules of articles of association. 
Therefore, if the major shareholder holds enough shares in the capital structure of the 
company, the rules of corporate governance can be determined by the controlling or major 
shareholders. In this regard, however, the demarcation of shareholders‘ power may be 
changed, which will threaten the interests of minority shareholders. Gome Company Limited 
                                                          
108
 Henry N. Butler, ‗The Contractual Theory of the Corporation‘ (1989) 11 (4) George Mason University Law 
Review 99, 105. 
109
 Ibid. 
110
 The Law of Companies (2013 Revision), s 37. 
162 
 
as one of the most influential corporate governance cases in China shows how the unclear 
role of the board of directors and general meeting of shareholders can increase transaction 
costs in corporate governance. Since Gome Company Ltd was listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange in 2004, the shareholding of Guangyu Huang, the founder of the company, was 
significantly diluted. For enhancing the control power, Huang amended the articles of 
association by exercising his shareholder rights. The board of directors has exclusive power 
of nominating directors and approving incentive mechanism for the management team.
111
  
 
In 2009, owing to the lack of finance, Gome Company Limited introduced Bain Capital, a 
US-based private equity firm, as the strategic institutional investor to support the business 
expansion. According to the agreement between Bain Capital and Gome Company Ltd, Bain 
Capital held a convertible bond valued at RMB 1.8 billion. If the convertible bonds are 
converted into common shares, Bain Capital would hold 9.8% of shares in the company. 
Moreover, Bain Capital also claimed to nominate three non-executive directors on the 
board,
112
 which was not consistent with the percentage of shares that Bain Capital held in the 
shareholding structure of the company. At the anniversary shareholders general meeting of 
2010, as the major shareholder Huang vetoed Bain Capital‘s nomination of three directors. 
However, the board of directors argued that the resolution of the shareholders general 
meeting should be invalid, because it failed to reflect the interests of other shareholders in the 
company.
113
 Consequently, the board vetoed the resolution of the general meeting and 
nominated three non-executive directors representing Bain Capital to the board.  
 
4.5.2  The Cultural Conflict between PE Shareholders and Entrepreneurs  
 
4.5.2.1  Confucianism Ethics and the Commercial Practice in Modern China 
 
In Chinese traditional society Confucianism,
114
 which was derived and has developed in 
Chinese history for more than two thousand years, has played an important role in shaping 
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the morality and ideology in both the state law system and social governance. In ancient 
China, social life was organized on the basis of agricultural society, where the development 
of the economy was self-organized by families, instead of the class of merchants. In 
traditional Chinese families, income and labour were mainly subject to the male adults‘ 
abilities to farm. The family rules also emphasized the other family members‘ obedience to 
the family leader.
115
 Moreover, subject to the technology and transportation, most Chinese 
people in rural areas do not migrate out of their hometown throughout their lifetime, and the 
people in the village or the nearby areas are acquainted with one another. As a consequence, 
the social norms in such a familiar society rest more upon customs that are practised and 
accepted by people in the community, rather than the law created by the authority.
116
 
Accordingly, Confucian ethics were the philosophic reflection of the agricultural economy in 
ancient China, which can be shown by a series of values in Confucianism. Firstly, the most 
significant virtue in Confucianism is filial piety that absolutely requires offspring to respect 
and obey their parents. Secondly, the brotherhood requires the younger brother to respect his 
elder brothers; thirdly, Li (礼), as the core concept in Confucian philosophy, emphatically 
emphasises the hierarchy between different groups of people, such as subjects and ruler, old 
and young, husband and wife and so forth;
117
 in other words, from the Confucian perspective, 
the idealistic social order is established on the basis of strict hierarchical system, rather than 
the equality of individuals.  
 
Moreover, in the Confucian belief system, objects of worship are ordinary figures and 
characters in the real world, including Confucius, other Confucian scholars such as Mencius, 
the Chinese emperors, and ancestors of the clan and family.
118
 In religious thought, the nature 
of Confucian ethics is a series of moral values,
119
 rather than transcendental beliefs (e.g., the 
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‗natural law‘ thought in Western philosophy). In a practical sense, the nature of the 
Confucian governance mechanism is obedience to the senior and prestigious members in a 
community or organization. A certain behaviour or idea is commonly justified on the basis of 
the status and authority of a specific good or virtuous individual in a community, rather than 
some kind of transcendental value or religious thought.  
 
Influenced by the Confucian culture and tradition, the merchants who behaved in accordance 
with Confucius‘s moral teaching were labelled Ru Shang (Confucian merchants or virtuous 
merchants) and widely praised in ancient Chinese society. Firstly, a notable and respectable 
businessman should never desert benevolence when he doing business or dealing with 
others.
120
 Secondly, the good businessman should frequently examine himself and voluntarily 
correct any error or inappropriate or immoral behaviours.
121
 Moreover, Confucius requires 
that any profit should only be obtained in the right way and any profit made from 
unscrupulous behaviour or against morality should be criticized.
122
 Compared with the legal 
culture in Western countries, the values and ethics in the Chinese commercial world are very 
different. In Confucian ethics, individual virtue and good personality are regarded as the core 
of norm system, that is to say, both the harmony among people and social order are based on 
people‘s independent self-discipline, instead of an objective rule system of social or 
occupational norms, such as legislations and regulations.  
 
4.5.2.2  The Conflict of Interests between the Heterogeneous Directors: A Case Study 
 
In terms of the corporate governance in China, the personality and self-cultivation of the key 
entrepreneurs usually play a significant role in shaping the corporate culture and establishing 
trust between the management and shareholders of the company. A fair number of successful 
Chinese entrepreneurs believe that their outstanding morality or personal charm is the 
irreplaceable strength in achieving successful business. As mentioned above, the good virtue 
of an entrepreneur will be conducive to establishing a good reputation in the market. The 
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traditional commercial culture in China also emphasizes the core status of entrepreneur‘s 
personality and reputation in promoting the performance of the enterprise. In the modern 
commercial world, however, the deep-rooted governance mechanism based on ‗rule of man‘ 
and Confucian enterprise culture may motivate entrepreneurs to over-confidently impose 
their personal opinion on the resolutions of the board of directors or general meeting of 
shareholders. Particularly, when a private company goes public, the shareholding of the 
entrepreneur will be significantly diluted, which can stimulate the entrepreneur shareholders 
to act against corporate governance principles for enhancing their control over the company. 
Because in most cases the entrepreneurs are the controlling shareholders, in the 
circumstances where the institutional investors such as private equity and venture capital 
funds are introduced as the minority shareholders in the company, the arbitrary conduct of the 
entrepreneur may be against the interests of the private equity and other shareholders. This 
point can be well illustrated by analysing the case of NVC Lighting Limited (NVC), a PE-
held Chinese listed company.  
 
NVC was incorporated in 1998. After more than ten years‘ development, the company has 
been ranked among the leading companies in China‘s lighting industry. Before introducing 
institutional investors, Changjiang Wu, the founder of NVC, held 70% shares of the company 
and actually controlled the company. During 2006 to 2008, Goldman Sachs and SAIF Partner 
Fund (a Hong Kong-based venture capital fund) invested in NVC as financial investors. By 
2008, SAIF Partner Fund and Goldman Sachs respectively held 30.73% and 9.39% of the 
shares of the company and Wu‘s shareholding was diluted to 29.33%.123 In 2010 NVC was 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and public shareholders continually diluted Wu‘s 
shares. Moreover, for the purpose of enhancing the company‘s competitiveness in the 
household lighting market, NVC introduced Schneider Electric Company Limited,
124
 a 
global-leading energy management service provider in July 2011. Schneider held 9.04% of 
the shares in NVC.
125
 Consequently, Wu‘s shareholding was diluted further to 17.15%.126 By 
contrast, the SAIF Partner Fund, Goldman Sachs and Schneider, who can be regarded as the 
concerted party, in total held around 33% of the shares and the rest were held by public 
shareholders. Although Wu did his best to increase his shareholding in the ownership 
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structure of NVC,
127
 the representatives of NVC on the board of directors of the company 
only held two seats. By contrast, the concerted party possessed four seats (i.e., two for the 
SAIF Partner Funds, one for Goldman Sachs and one for Schneider).
128
 Since the private 
equity fund and other institutional shareholders had invested in NVC, it is obvious that the 
controlling power had been dramatically diluted in the process of both private financing and 
public listing. Wu, the board director of the company was actually at the risk of being 
removed by the PE investors and other shareholders. 
 
In response to such a disadvantageous status in the corporate governance of the company, Wu 
had a strong motivation to act against the board of directors to enhance his influence in the 
company. In the autumn of 2011, he proposed that the headquarters of the company be 
moved from Huizhou to Chongqing (his hometown). Although the board of directors 
disagreed about doing so, as a compromise, they agreed to setting up a subsidiary, NVC 
(Chongqing) Industrial Company, in Chongqing which would only function as a sale 
premises rather than the headquarters of NVC. In order to control the company directly, 
however, Wu arbitrarily authorised the subsidiary with other main functions, including 
marketing, purchasing and logistics departments without the board of director‘s approval.129 
Moreover, Wu arbitrarily signed an agreement with the Chongqing government, by which the 
use of land for building the Chongqing NVC Plaza was authorised to another company 
personally held by Wu. Because his misconduct went seriously against the basic corporate 
governance principle, in May 2012 the board of directors demanded that Wu resign as the 
CEO and president of the board.
130
  
 
From the perspective of Western corporate governance theory, the CEO of the corporation 
should respect the resolutions of the board of directors; in other words, the CEO has no right 
                                                          
127
 According to related reports in the public media, Changjiang Wu bought long the public shares of NVC in 
2011, and became the first majority shareholder with over 19% of shares in the company. Ibid., 49–50; ‗A 
Storming Attack against Director Changjiang Wu: the Emergent 48 Hours for NVC Lighting‘ (Finance China, 
May 2012) [‗ 董事长吴长江风暴：雷士照明紧急的  ―48 小时 ‖‘. 财经中国 . 2012 年 6 月 25 日 ] 
<http://finance.china.com.cn/industry/20120625/824076.shtml> accessed 28 July 2015.  
128
 Su (n 111) 50; Chenguang Ma, ‗The War of Control Power of NVC Lighting and the Development of 
Chinese Private Companies‘ (Co-Effort Law Firm LLP, 2012) [马晨光，‘从“雷士照明控制权之争”思民营企
业发展之路’. 协力律师事务所，2012]  
< http://www.co-effort.com/zh_CN/infomation_show.asp?id=455 > accessed 28 July 2015.  
129
 ‗NVC Lighting: The Chongqing ―Headquarters‖ as Illegal Headquarters for Regulatory Arbitrage‘ (China 
Economy, August 2014) [‗雷士照明：所谓‘重庆总部’实为绕开上市公司监管的非法总部‘. 中国经济网. 2014 年 8
月] <http://finance.ce.cn/rolling/201408/28/t20140828_3444022.shtml> accessed 28 July 2015； Su (n111) 50.  
130
 Su (n 111) 50. 
167 
 
to arbitrarily make any decision without the permission of the board of directors. Emotionally, 
however, based on the traditional Chinese culture, the employees and staff of a company may 
regard the entrepreneur as the ‗spiritual leader‘ of the enterprise. The personality and ability 
of the entrepreneur are sometimes held in higher regard than the managerial institution in 
corporate governance.
131
 On 13 July 2012, the staff of all the subsidiaries across the country 
started to strike. In the meantime the suppliers and sellers ceased any co-operation with the 
board of directors of NVC, and asserted that they would not co-operate with NVC unless the 
board agreed to inviting Wu back to the management layer of the company, citing as reasons 
that among the members of the management only Wu was the expert in the lighting industry, 
and his personal ability and reputation were an irreplaceable resource for NVC.
132
 The board 
of directors finally agreed to allow Wu back to the company in late August 2012.
133
  
 
The case of NVC shows that although eventually the entrepreneur regained the controlling 
power over the company, the cost of such a long process of negotiation and the fight between 
the institutional investors and entrepreneur would be very high.
134
 The nature of the problem 
in this case is that in the circumstances where the entrepreneur of the company is also the 
director and CEO of the company, once the entrepreneur shareholder‘s ownership is diluted 
by the public shareholders and institutional investors such as private equity and venture 
capital funds, the entrepreneur is able to arbitrarily intervene in the operation of the company 
by exercising his or her managerial power and utilizing his social resources which finally 
considerably increases the transaction costs in corporate governance.  
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4.5.3  Variable Interest Entities and Overseas Listing: The Lack of Fiduciary Duties  
 
4.5.3.1 The Policy Barrier to Overseas Listing of PE-held Companies in China 
 
a. The Industrial Policy Restriction of Overseas Listing of PE-held Companies 
 
As early as 1995, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce of China
135
 enacted the Catalogue for 
the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries,
136
 which aims to restrict foreign investors‘ 
investment activities in mainland China. Basically, the industries for foreign investors to 
invest in China are classified into three categories, namely (i) encouraged industries, (ii) 
restricted industries and (iii) prohibited industries. Although this regulation has been revised 
six times
137
 during 1996 to 2016 and the authority tends to make the Chinese market more 
accessible for foreign investors, even now foreign investors are still prohibited from investing 
in cultural and media areas, including information technologies (IT) industries;
138
 in other 
words, foreign private equity and venture capital investors are not permitted to hold shares in 
domestic IT companies. As a consequence, Chinese IT companies have no choice but to 
apply alternative organizational structures for overseas listing, which mitigates the risk of 
MOFCOM turning down their application.
139
  
 
b.  The Capital Restriction of Overseas Listing of PE-held Companies  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3 of the present research, since the 1990s international private 
equity and venture capital firms have been consistently playing a significant role in the 
Chinese private equity and venture capital market. Ever since the first Chinese non-state-
owned company was successfully listed on the NASDAQ in US in 1999,
140
 more and more 
Chinese entrepreneurs recognized that compared with the strict administrative approval 
requirements of listing on the Chinese stock markets,
141
 overseas listing was a more efficient 
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 Wu Wang, ‗The Legal Analysis of VIE Structure‘ (Global Law Bulletin, August 2013) [王武，VIE 结构相关
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 Qiao Xing Universal Resources, Inc. (NASDAQ：XING) was the first Chinese private company listed on 
foreign stock exchange market.  
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 The primary limitation to private companies listing on domestic stock exchanges is due to the limited 
resource of sponsors for private companies; in other words, as regards the listing on the public stock market, the 
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way to raise funds. Coincidentally, with the great boom of the internet economy in the global 
market in the late 1990s, an increasing number of Chinese entrepreneurs engaged in IT 
industry. Particularly, since the three most influential web portal companies, namely Sina, 
SOHU and Net Ease subsequently listed on the US stock market in 2000, the new emerging 
Chinese IT industry has quickly recognized that introducing international private equity 
investors and then listing on overseas stock markets such as the US or Hong Kong stock 
exchanges is a more efficient way of not only expanding financing, but also establishing their 
international commercial reputation.  
 
In practice, the most popular way to list PE-held companies overseas before 2006 was the so-
called red-chip listing.
142
 In this model of overseas listing, the domestic actual controller and 
international private equity funds jointly register a shell company in offshore financial centres 
such as the British Virgin Islands (BVI) or Cayman Islands. The offshore company then 
registers another shell company in Hong Kong
143
 and the Hong Kong offshore company 
wholly acquires the domestic company. Finally, the BVI or Cayman offshore company will 
be listed on a stock market abroad.
144
 The period 2000 to 2006 was a golden age for the 
Chinese private economy; some of the most famous Chinese private enterprises such as 
Mengniu and Gome were successfully listed on foreign stock exchanges. One of the 
noteworthy factors of this wave of overseas listing is that quite a large number of the most 
successful overseas financing projects were backed by international private equity and 
venture capital funds or investment banks.
145
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Stanley and Actis (US$61 million) and listed on the HKSE in 2004; Baidu, the largest Internet search service 
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Figure 4.1: The red-chip structure 
 
The Chinese regulator, however, considered that the uncontrolled overseas listing of Chinese 
private companies may cause serious capital flight and the Chinese public investors also 
levelled criticism that the CSRC‘s policy failed to attract excellent private companies to the 
domestic stock market.
146
 Against this background, the regulators enacted the very strict 
listing rules, namely the Provisions on the Merger or Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors
147
 in September 2006,
148
 which substantively blocks the path for the 
overseas listing of Chinese private companies. Specifically, according to s 42 of the M&A 
Rules (2006), any domestic corporations or natural person should not register any offshore 
special purpose company (SPC), unless it is approved by MOFCOM. If the application is 
approved by MOFCOM, then any listing transactions of the SPC are required to be approved 
by the CSRC.
149
 Moreover, where the offshore SPC acquires the domestic company‘s shares, 
such listing application must also be approved by MOFCOM, otherwise the acquisition will 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
company in China backed by Draper Fisher Juvetson (US$12 million) and listed on the NASDAQ in 2005; New 
Oriental Education Group, the largest education training company in China backed by Tiger Universal Fund 
(US$30 million) and listed on the NYSE in 2006. Shoushuang Li, et al, (n143)17; Su (n111) 144–149; Li Du, 
‗What Can We Learn from the Overseas Listing of New Oriental?‘(China Youth Daily, 19 May 2006) [堵力，
‘ 新 东 方 纽 约 上 市 给 中 国 教 育 带 来 了 什 么 ？ ’ ， 中 国 青 年 报 ， 2006 年 5 月 19 日 ] 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2006-10/19/content_5221332.htm> accessed 5 June 2015. 
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be invalid.
150
 Although the law formally provides a procedure for an overseas application for 
Chinese domestic companies, in fact, since the promulgation of the M&A Rules (2006), until 
now the CSRC and MOFCOM have not given their approval for a private company to be 
listed successfully overseas.
151
 As a result, the current regulation of the capital control of 
Chinese private companies also motivates both the international private equity and venture 
capital investors and Chinese entrepreneurs to introduce alternative legal structures that can 
prevent the risk of the prohibition by Chinese financial regulators.  
 
4.5.3.2  Variable Interest Entities as an Alternative Legal Structure for Overseas 
Listing of PE-held Companies 
 
The above regulations on foreign investment in China have shown that currently foreign 
investors are strictly restricted by the regulators. In order to successfully complete overseas 
IPO, and circumvent the uncertain and time-consuming administrative procedures, the VIE 
structure is widely used by both foreign PE funds and Chinese private companies. The nature 
of the VIE is an adjustment of the red-chip structure, as indicated in Figure 4.2. The 
difference between the red-chip structure and the VIE is that in the VIE structure the foreign 
private equity and venture capital holds shares through a wholly foreign-owned enterprise
152
 
registered in China, rather than directly controlling the domestic company. Through a series 
of contractual arrangements among the domestic company, the WFOE and domestic 
shareholders, the WFOE is able to control the domestic company as if it holds shares in the 
domestic company.  
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Figure 4.2: The variable interest entity structure 
 
As with the red-chip structure, before establishing a series of contractual arrangements 
between the parties, the PRC shareholders and foreign private equity and venture capital 
funds jointly incorporate shell companies in BVI or Cayman Islands and Hong Kong and then 
also establish a WFOE in mainland China as a main contractual party in a VIE structure.
153
 
The contractual arrangements of the VIE structure include the following provisions, by which 
the foreign private equity and venture capital funds are able to invest indirectly in domestic 
companies: first, the loan agreement between the WFOE and PRC shareholders, in which the 
capital of the WFOE contributed by foreign private equity and venture capital funds and PRC 
shareholders will be extended to the PRC shareholders and then the PRC shareholders 
contribute the loan to the domestic company. Second, the WFOE and domestic company 
enter into the consulting and services agreement, through which the WFOE provides certain 
services such as industrial consulting or technical support for the domestic company. In 
return, the domestic company is obliged to transfer all the profit to the WFOE as the ‗service 
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fee‘. In this way, the foreign private equity and venture capital funds are able to fully obtain 
the profit of the domestic company who is licensed to engage in the industries that are not 
opened to foreign investors. In terms of the corporate governance of the domestic company, 
the voting rights proxy agreement between the WFOE, domestic company and PRC 
shareholders commonly provides that the PRC shareholders fully authorize their voting rights 
to the WFOE, by which the WFOE will be able actually to control the domestic company. 
For the convenience of exiting, the PRC shareholders commonly agree to grant an option to 
the WFOE which permits the WFOE or a third party to purchase the shares of the domestic 
company at a pre-agreed price. Finally, by signing the equity pledge agreement, the PRC 
shareholders‘ equity interests in the domestic company will be pledged to the WFOE as a 
guarantee for the performance of the domestic company‘s obligation.154  
 
4.5.3.3  The Problems of Corporate Governance in VIE Structure: Case Studies 
 
a.  The Nature of the Corporate Governance Problems in VIE Structure 
 
During recent decades, foreign private equity investors have become familiar with the VIE 
structure. Although the VIE structure facilitates private equity and venture capital investors to 
overcome the restriction and prohibition on certain industries, due to the contractual nature of 
the VIE structure, the stability and certainty of the WFOE‘s controlling power is much 
weaker than the direct shareholding relationship. In such circumstances, if the PRC 
shareholder breaks VIE agreements, the offshore companies will lose control of the domestic 
businesses; in other words, from the perspective of corporate governance, the PRC 
controlling shareholders are able to unilaterally control the domestic company and threaten 
the equity interests of the PE investors. Even if the private equity investors can enforce the 
domestic company or PRC shareholders to fulfil the contractual obligations under Chinese 
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contract law, the costs of the dispute resolution process is time-consuming and expensive.
155
 
Moreover, owing to the lack of shareholding relationship between the private equity investor 
and domestic company, the contractual nature of the VIE structure also makes it hard to apply 
fiduciary duty principles to the PRC shareholders who are actually the director of the 
domestic company. By reviewing the following two cases, one can clearly see how the VIE 
structure may significantly increase private equity investors‘ risk in corporate governance 
under the Chinese legal system.  
 
b.  Case Studies of Corporate Governance in Variable Interest Entity Structure 
 
Walden International invested in Sina, one of the leading Chinese Internet corporations, and 
successfully listed on the NASDAQ in 2000. Owing to the policy restriction on the Internet 
industry, the VIE structure was used in the listing process of Sina, by which two of the 
founders of Sina simultaneously wholly held a domestic company for the purpose of holding 
the Internet content provider
156
 licence. The profit of the domestic company was transferred 
to offshore entities that are listed on the overseas stock exchange market. However, owing to 
the inconsistencies in business strategies between Zhidong Wang, the key founder of Sina 
and the board of directors, Wang was removed by a resolution of the board. As a defence, 
Wang attempted to break the contract between the domestic company and the WFOE, which 
might have resulted in the VIE structure collapsing and causing the failure of overseas 
listing.
157
 Although through negotiation within the board of directors, eventually the adverse 
consequences in the Sina case were prevented, the serious legal problems within the VIE 
structure had drawn more attention and concern.  
 
Similarly, the Alipay incident is another high-profile case showing the potential conflicts 
between the founder of the portfolio company and private equity investors in a VIE structure. 
Since 1999, Alibaba Group, the most influential Chinese e-commerce company, has attracted 
investment from a series of international venture capital and institutional investors. Given 
                                                          
155
 Xianwu Zeng, Lihui Bai, ‗Variable Interest Entity Structure in China‘ (King & Wood Mallesons Law Offices, 
February 9 2012) < http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/02/articles/corporate/foreign-investment/variable-
interest-entity-structure-in-china/ > accessed 26 June 2015. 
156
 Hereinafter referred to as ‗ICP‘. The ICP refers to the commercial entities that provide Internet services to 
the public. In China any company is not permitted to enter the Internet services industry unless it is licensed by 
the authority.  
157
 Su (n 111) 142–157. 
175 
 
future overseas listing, the VIE structure was set up between Alibaba Group (Cayman) and 
Alibaba E-commerce (Zhejiang) Corporation. As the domestic company, Alibaba E-
commerce (Zhejiang) Corporation controlled by Jack Ma, the key founder of Alibaba,
158
 is 
licensed to engage in third-party payment service and Alipay, one of the most lucrative 
subsidiaries of Alibaba Group, was controlled by both foreign institutional investors and 
domestic shareholders of Alibaba through the VIE agreements.
159
 In 2005, to establish the 
commercial reputation in the online commerce market, Alibaba agreed to co-operate with 
Yahoo! who holds 40% of shares in Alibaba Group. As a consequence, the founder Jack Ma 
and other individual Chinese shareholders‘ shares were diluted to 31% and Yahoo! became 
the first majority shareholder in Alibaba Group.
160
 In order to keep control of the company, 
the parties to the transaction agreed that Jack Ma and other individual Chinese shareholders 
could hold half of the seats on the board, while Yahoo! and other private equity investors 
could only have the other half. As a defence, however, Yahoo! required that Yahoo! should 
be entitled to appoint one more director from October 2010, which means that the founder 
would lose control both in the capital and governance structures.
161
 Although Alibaba Group 
acquired financing and reputational resources from Yahoo! to develop its own business, the 
tense relationship between the founder and institutional investors has become a serious threat 
to the stability of Alibaba Group‘s corporate governance.162  
 
Coincidently, the People‘s Bank of China 163  issued the Administrative Measures for the 
Payment Services Provided by Non-financial Institutions (June 2010)
164
 which stipulates that 
any applicant applying for a payment services licence should be a company legally formed 
inside China. In the name of complying with the aforementioned regulation, Jack Ma 
unilaterally unwound the VIE agreement and transferred the whole ownership of Alipay to 
the Alibaba E-commerce (Zhejiang) Corporation without the board‘s permission. In this way, 
although Jack Ma had enhanced control over the core business of Alibaba Group,
165
 the 
interests of foreign private equity and other institutional shareholders were seriously damaged.  
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4.5.4  The Nature of Corporate Governance Problems in Chinese PE Investments  
 
The case studies of corporate governance of Chinese listed companies show that due to the 
strict requirement of listing on the Chinese stock market, quite a large number of private 
equity investors get their return by listing the portfolio companies on the overseas stock 
exchanges. Consequently, in the process of private financing and listing, the control power of 
the entrepreneur will be continually diluted by both the private equity and venture capital 
investors and public shareholders. As a means of defence, the entrepreneur as the key person 
(e.g., the CEO or president of the board of directors) in the management layer of the company 
is able to influence the management of the company substantially, the interests of minority 
shareholders might be threatened by the entrepreneur‘s arbitrary behaviour in corporate 
governance.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, the legal problems in the corporate governance of private 
equity-held companies also show that the nexus of contract theory of corporate governance 
may, to some extent, also be doubted. According to the contractual theory of the firm, the 
nature of the firm is a series of autonomous contracts between stakeholders. Therefore, 
company law should be established on a discretionary basis. However, the analysis of the 
above cases in China shows that the basic rules of corporate governance (such as the articles 
of association) should also have their own limits; in other words, the parties of the company 
should not have unlimited powers to change the power of the board of directors, otherwise in 
the circumstances where the interests of private equity investors and entrepreneur 
shareholders are not balanced in the general meeting of shareholders, the over-powerful 
board of directors may be controlled by the private equity and venture capital directors and 
their concerted parties to oppress the entrepreneur‘s legal rights, in which case the transaction 
costs will be increased. Moreover, the lack of fiduciary duties in the VIE structure also shows 
that compared with the joint stock company, owing to the unstable relationship between the 
listed entity and domestic company, which is controlled by the entrepreneur shareholders, the 
contractual nature of the firm should also be doubted.  
 
To sum up, in order to improve the corporate governance in Chinese PE-held companies, it is 
recommended that reform in future should emphasize developing a series of contractual 
mechanisms between the private equity shareholders and entrepreneurs which can not only 
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provide the entrepreneur with effective control power over the company, but also grant 
private equity and venture capital shareholders special rights to guarantee their interests in 
portfolio companies. In terms of company law reform, this chapter argues that although the 
board of directors is regarded as the centre of the corporate governance in Western countries, 
owing to their different cultural and social backgrounds, the limits of the board of directors 
should be reconsidered in Chinese company law.  
 
4.6  A Proposal for Corporate Governance Reform of Chinese PE-held Companies  
 
The case studies above illustrate the imbalance in common issue in private equity- and 
venture capital-held companies in China between the CEO-controllers‘ desire for control and 
private equity and venture capital investors‘ demands of legal protection for their minority 
shareholding interests. The first chapter of this dissertation shows that the business 
organization laws in common law jurisdictions are mainly based on a contractual mechanism 
which grants a large scope of freedom between the parties within the firm. Specifically, the 
shareholder-centred model in UK company law further illustrates that the powerful general 
meeting of shareholders can effectively reduce agency costs in corporate governance, which 
implies that ideally in the jurisdictions with a weak judicial (fiduciary) protection system for 
investors, such as China, the shareholder-centred model corporate governance system is 
likely to be more transplantable and useful for investor protection. In fact, however, owing to 
the ‗initial conditions‘166 in the Chinese economy, the particular background and interest 
pattern in Chinese companies will strongly characterise the Chinese corporate law. The 
analysis below will discuss the contributions and limits of UK model company law in 
improving the protection of private equity shareholders in Chinese companies. The lessons 
from the corporate law reforms in post-Socialist countries in Eastern Europe will also be 
briefly referred.  
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4.6.1  The Basic Principles of Legal Reform of the Corporate Law in China  
 
4.6.1.1  Lessons and Experiences from the Privatizations in post-Socialist Countries  
 
Before discussing the possibility of legal transplantation of UK model company law to 
enhance investor protection in China‘s PE-held firms, one important point that needs to be 
considered is what the precondition is for such transplantation in transforming the economy. 
In similar economic and social situations, post-Socialist states such as Russia and Poland may 
provide some implications and lessons. As the path dependence theory suggests, the starting 
point for the establishment and reform of corporate law in post-Socialist countries is based on 
a highly concentrated stated-owned economy. Therefore, the existing initial ownership and 
governance structures in such an economic and political condition determined that the initial 
corporate law in such jurisdictions must be rooted in the long-term battle between private 
investors and politically interested parties. In Russia, for example, as with the history of 
Chinese economic reform,
167
 the initial function of joint stock company law was totally based 
on corporatization and privatization of SOEs.
168
 In the process of the Russian privatization, 
owing to the serious inflation and lack of monitoring and disclosure mechanism, most 
Russian corporations had been controlled by the insiders and incumbent managers of the 
SOEs.
169
 In consideration of the weak judicial system in Russia, the reformers introduced a 
kind of so-called self-enforcing company law, which was drafted by two American 
scholars.
170
  
 
From the perspective of such self-enforcing companies, the basic model was actually more 
like the UK‘s shareholder-centred governance structure. For instance, the operation was 
mainly in the hands of inside parties such as shareholders, directors and managers, instead of 
outsiders such as intermediaries, which substantially gave the shareholders decision-making 
power in corporate governance; specifically the supermajority voting right on significant 
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transactions and cumulative voting.
171
 Although the Joint Stock Company Law of the Russian 
Federation came into force in 1996, it was, to a large extent, in the self-enforcing or 
shareholder self-protection model, the effectiveness was surprisingly disappointing. The 
value of companies was extravagantly tunnelled by existing inside controllers by pervasive 
self-dealings and the predicted protection of minority shareholders was proven to have 
failed.
172
 Although it cannot be denied that the lack of effective remedy for regulating self-
dealings is crucial in corporate governance, the point should be especially emphasised that 
the nature of the collapse of shareholder-centred corporate law in Russia is attributed to lack 
of separation of ownership and control;
173
 in other words, the more power the shareholders 
had, the more serious the oppression of minorities would be, because the very small portion 
of ownership of outside shareholders could hardly bring pressure to bear or influence 
decision-making. Consequently, the ‗common-law style‘ self-enforcing model of the 
company law proved that the law was only an instrument for the ‗ruling class‘.174 Ironically, 
in the new Russia it may be the inside managers of privatised firms.  
 
In contrast, Poland, as another large post-Socialist country which has been widely recognized 
as a much more successful transforming economy, shows a quite different landscape in 
corporate law reform, although the initial condition in the Polish economy was also the 
privatization of publicly owned enterprises. Generally speaking, since the coup took place in 
1989 the process of capital privatization proceeded mainly in the following steps. First, the 
government transferred the ownership in SOEs to the Polish Ministry of Treasury, which 
resulted in the founding supervisory body being replaced with the ownership supervisory 
body.
175
 In the second stage the Ministry of Treasury freely sold the shares to external 
investors by floating them on the stock exchange, private placement and public tender. 
Finally, the Polish SOEs were mostly owned by private and foreign investors, instead of 
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insiders.
176
 Therefore, in the moderate process of privatization, the external capital market 
was gradually established. Correspondingly, the systematic financial regulation would 
become indispensable. In fact, the first securities law had come into force in Poland as early 
as 1991 and the Polish Securities Commission, playing a role as independent financial 
regulator in the capital market, was also established.
177
 The stringent external regulatory 
system in Poland ensured the healthy performance of financial intermediaries in the capital 
market and enhanced the information disclosure for both the public investors and 
regulators.
178
 In sum, the successful prevention of inside control in privatized companies and 
tough investor protection can play a significant role in securing private property rights against 
political interference, especially in those countries that do not have a strong and sophisticated 
judicial system.  
 
Based on the synchronous reform in financial regulation, the legal transplant of a 
shareholder-centred company law performed much more positively in Poland than in Russia. 
According to the Polish commercial code, Polish company law has vested a wide range of 
powers in shareholders, such as cumulative voting; preference shares; statutory power to elect 
the supervisory board and management board; approval power of significant transactions; and 
two-third majority voting on any proposed amendment of articles of association.
179
 As a 
result of both the stringent external protection and wide freedom of contractual rights for 
shareholders, the performance of Polish firms and the stock market developed much better 
than not only Russia but also other Eastern European post-Socialist jurisdictions.
180
  
 
With reference to the comparison between the transplantation of shareholder-centred 
company laws in the two transforming economies, it can be manifestly concluded that the 
‗initial conditions‘ in both the ownership structures and external capital markets will 
remarkably influence the path dependence in legal transplantation. Primarily, the shareholder-
centred corporate governance model should be based on the ownership structure without a 
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single large shareholder, otherwise the shareholder-centred corporate law may only become 
the controllers‘ instrument to oppress minorities and to exploit the company‘s interests. 
Furthermore, the avoidance of a single majority shareholder makes it possible to attract 
outside investors and, as a result, the securities regulation would be indispensable for the 
authority, otherwise the attraction of external capital providers would be seriously reduced.  
 
From the perspective of contractual theory, the above issues can be analysed as follows: 
although the Coasian contractual firm describes the firm as substitution of a nexus of 
contracts between employers and employees,
181
 but actually the core meaning of contractual 
explanation in corporate governance would be the contractual relationship between the 
managerial personnel within the corporations.
182
 From a corporate law point of view, the 
contractual nature of an enterprise can be regarded as a combination of contracts in areas of 
(i) non-human capital and (ii) human capital.
183
 The practical meaning of ‗human capital‘ is 
that due to the absolute monopoly of human capital of each individual, the value 
maximization of individuals‘ efforts can only be incentivised, but never exploited;184 in other 
words, the precondition for applying contractual company laws is an existing free market for 
managers. By contrast, in a public enterprise or in a broader sense, the pressure and incentive 
from the market for managers never exist in an enterprise without separation of ownership 
and control,
185
 so that any incentive contract or self-enforcing mechanism can hardly perform 
well. 
 
4.6.1.2  The Feasible Direction for Corporate Governance Reform in China 
 
With reference to the path-dependence theory of corporate governance and the above analysis 
of the corporate law reforms in post-Socialist countries, the primary question needs to be 
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answered is what the specific path-dependence is of Chinese corporate law reform and 
whether shareholder-centred corporate law is feasible and useful in solving agency problems 
and enhancing protection of private equity investors in Chinese private equity and venture 
capital industry. Similar to the initial conditions in the economy of Eastern European, in the 
first instance, Chinese company law was also designed for the corporatization and 
commercialization of Chinese SOEs. Thus, any pure academic or imaginary proposal for 
legal transplantation would not be feasible. The following section of this dissertation 
basically argues that in the current Chinese economic and political environment, the 
transplantation of UK-style corporate law is partially possible, and some of the core 
institutions in the UK‘s company law have been gradually introduced into the Chinese 
commercial law system. However, the inherent interest pattern in the Chinese politics and 
economy will still play a negative role in impeding the liberalistic reform in Chinese 
corporate law.  
 
On the one hand, as discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, the rapid development 
of the Chinese private economy, including the private equity and venture capital industry, has 
been calling for a new type of corporate governance norm with more contractual freedom and 
less administrative intervention. From the political perspective, since the Third Plenary 
Session of the 18th Central Committee of Communist Party of China convened in 
November 2013, the highest level of Chinese authority has decided to significantly speed up 
the social reforms in improving the market price mechanism and encouraging the non-public 
sectors in the Chinese economy.
186
 Moreover, with the development of industrial 
restructuring in the Chinese economy, the takeover activities will boom in the foreseeable 
future and then the real private equity funds or buyouts funds will play a more important role 
in the Chinese economy. As a response and in preparation for such a prediction, one should 
have the confidence that the takeover legal system which focuses on the equality in investor 
protection in mergers and acquisitions will be improved by Chinese legislators.
187
 In sum, the 
general economic environment of liberalistic reform of Chinese company law is optimistic. 
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On the other hand, owing to the statutory-dominating status of the party state system, 
however, the unshakable status of the publicly owned economy in China may make it 
impossible to wholly transplant the shareholder-centred system into the Chinese legal system 
in the short term;
188
 in other words, the path of corporate law reform in China will still be 
significantly influenced by the publicly owned firms. The problem here is that with reference 
to the experience of the UK, the ownership structure played a fundamental role in the 
transformation of corporate governance model. Therefore, the dominant position of SOEs 
will have strong motivation and ability to hinder, or at least slow down, the transformation of 
Chinese corporate law from the insider model to dispersed shareholder-centred model.  
 
In terms of the corporate governance of PE-held companies in China, the primary conflict is 
the protection of PE investors as minority shareholders and balancing the pluralistic interest 
pattern in the company. Hence, the shareholder-centred company law that provides a series of 
advantages in minority shareholder protection should still be much more useful for reducing 
agency costs in the corporate governance of Chinese PE-held firms.
189
 
 
4.6.2  The Limits of Shareholders’ Voting Rights in Amending Corporate Contracts 
 
4.6.2.1  The Uncertainty of Contractual Freedom in Corporate Contracts 
 
Since the first amendment of the Company Law of China in 2005 to the most recent 
substantive revision in 2013, it is quite clear that the evolutionary path of Chinese company 
law is liberalistic, which is mainly based on a common law corporate governance system. In 
terms of the corporate governance structure, the shareholders‘ power and rights are also 
continually enhanced by the legislation. For example, according to the Company Law (1993), 
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the directors cannot be dismissed by shareholders without any causes.
190
 The Company Law 
(2005 Revision) removed such restrictions and permitted the general meeting of shareholders 
to freely determine the removal of directors guided by the articles of association of each 
company.
191
 At present, the newly revised Company Law of China (2013 Revision) also 
insists on empowering the shareholders‘ power in corporate governance. 192  It can be 
concluded that the general meeting of shareholders has played the supreme power centre in 
Chinese corporate governance.
193
 According to the contractual theory, the voting principle 
can be freely distributed between the parties in the company. However, the decision-making 
power in creating or altering basic governance rules of companies should be approved by 
shareholders, because the residual claimants have strong motivation to seriously vote in 
consideration of the interests of the firm aligning with their own stake.
194
 Although the 
current company law grants the power of amending the articles of association to the 
shareholders, the scope of contractual freedom in Chinese company law is still quite 
uncertain,
195
 which leads to the problem that the majority voting may oppress the minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholders. This is why the Gome case is important in a 
practical sense.  
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4.6.2.2  The Limitation of the Self-protection Mechanisms for Minority Shareholders  
 
In the Gome case, in order to enhance and keep the control of the company, Guangyu Huang 
as the controller of the company, overwhelmingly determined the amendment of the articles 
of association. As a result, the board of directors exercised their strong powers of appointing 
directors, issuing corporate bonds and incentive mechanisms without the general meeting‘s 
approval.
196
 According to s 38 of Company Law (2005 Revision),
197
 the general meeting of 
shareholders has the power ‗to elect and to replace directors and supervisors that are not 
appointed from representatives of staff and workers‘. The opting-out of such a rule, however, 
means that minority shareholders may lose their voice in appointing and supervising their 
representatives in the boardroom.  
 
Admitting that stricter approval procedures to amend articles such as the entrenchment 
provisions stipulated in the Companies Act 2006 of the UK may prevent value-decreasing 
amendments proposed by controllers. Any approval of value-increasing amendments may 
also be very difficult and even inefficient.
198
 From a more social perspective, it was argued 
that in order to make the corporate law flexible, the contractual nature of the corporation 
should be insisted on, which means that the opting-out of corporate law by amending articles 
of association should be the basic principle in general law.
199
 Considering the balance of the 
flexibility of commercial activities and the weak status of public investors in public 
companies, the law of public companies and financial regulations should not only encourage 
the contractual autonomy of business organizations and the government should create a kind 
of ‗standard rules‘, including listing rules, securities law and model articles of association as 
default corporate contracts that can save contracting costs in corporate governance.
200
 
However, for protecting minority shareholders, the restriction on controlling shareholders in 
amending articles of association and judicial interventions in amending articles of association 
are quite necessary. 
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In order to reduce majority shareholders‘ opportunistic behaviours in altering governance 
structure, the norms in company law should be categorised in different groups, depending on 
various functions of norms, the modifiability of each category of rules would be different. 
Basically, the norms in corporate law can be categorised in the following types: first, the 
structural rules and distributional rules. The former mainly distribute the powers between 
different organs within the company and the latter group of rules stipulate the distribution of 
corporate assets between the owners.
201
 Second, the fiduciary rules in respect of the 
obligations of directors and controlling shareholders which mainly play a role as the gap-
filler and default rules applied by the judicial approach.
202
 Because the structural and 
distributional rules are fully exercised by the parties in the company, which means that the 
parties of the corporate contract are able to reasonably consider and utilize the information 
for maximizing their interests, it is unnecessary to restrict the contractual freedom in 
contracting and altering such terms in the articles of association. On the contrary, owing to 
the separation of ownership and control, and controllers‘ advantageous status, the fiduciary 
rules should be compulsory. The court will play a role as delegated contractor for owners, 
especially for the minorities of the corporation.
203
 In such a categorised structure of corporate 
rules, the corporate law cannot only keep the flexibility and contractual freedom, but also 
prevent the majority‘s oppression on minority shareholders.  
 
4.6.2.3  Set up a Judicial Standard of Contractual Freedom in Chinese Company Law 
 
In the existing Chinese company law, with the rapid rise of institutional shareholders and in 
consideration of the priority of minority shareholder protection, the derivative actions for 
shareholders are encouraged more than before.
204
 As early as the amendment of the Company 
Law in 2005, a shareholder derivative lawsuit system was introduced in China: in the 
circumstance where directors or supervisors violate their duties, any eligible shareholders are 
entitled to institute proceedings on behalf of the company against the directors or supervisors 
for their wrongdoings.
205
 The fiduciary duty system in Chinese commercial law is not yet 
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widely implemented, notwithstanding, the possibility of judicial remedy for minority 
shareholders in amending corporate charters s has been provided by the law.  
 
In practical terms, more and more legal disputes in respect of the articles of association in 
Chinese companies have also arisen from China‘s judicial practices. However, the Chinese 
courts have not reached consensus on judging the validity of amending articles of association. 
For instance, some local courts considered that in the circumstances where specific 
shareholder(s) do not accept an amending proposal of the articles that may significantly 
influence the rights of the shareholder(s), such shareholder(s) should not be legally bonded by 
the amendment.
206
 The reason for the above decision is that the dissenting shareholder(s) are 
not the contractual parties to the amendment of the articles.
207
 Put differently, in some cases 
judges have argued that the contractual autonomy in amending the articles should be 
respected by the court, unless the voting procedure is defective,
208
 as the majority voting 
procedure was statutory in Chinese company laws.
209
 It is obvious that none of the above two 
viewpoints can perfectly solve the problems in practice. On the one hand, if the standard of 
judgment only stands on the basis that the statutory procedure of voting is complied with, the 
abuse of voting rights in amending corporate contracts by controlling shareholders can hardly 
be restricted. On the other hand, if the dissenting shareholders can be exempted from general 
meeting decisions, the majority voting principle will be threatened.
210
  
 
In this regard, a series of practical principles developed in UK common law that would be 
useful for Chinese legal practices. As a fundamental principle, the common law requires that 
an amendment of articles should only be decided in the interests of the company as a whole, 
otherwise any alteration of the articles of association based on specific shareholders‘ personal 
stake would be regarded as invalid. This judging standard was initially set up in the case of 
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Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd (1900),
211
 in which Lindley MR held that voting power 
in amending the articles of association at the general meeting should be subject to the 
principle that the exercise of such votes must be ‗bona fide for the benefit of the company as 
a whole‘.212 However, the further important issue is how to assess the standard of ‗bona fide‘ 
and ‗the benefit of the company as a whole‘; particularly, if a controller is able to determine 
the amendment of the articles of association, by means of which the proceeds of both the 
company and the controller are increased, in what circumstances should such an amendment 
be valid? In the case of Shuttleworth v Cox Bros Ltd (1926),
213
 the Court of Appeal held that 
the bona fide standard should not be determined by the judge, rather it should be tested by (i) 
whether a rational reason is available that any one reasonable person would consider such 
amendment was made in the interests of company as a whole or (ii) whether such an 
amendment is so unreasonable that no any reasonable man would consider that it was decided 
in the interest of the company instead of a given shareholder.
214
 In such an examining 
approach, the validity of amending the articles of a company is much clearer.  
 
In addition, the remedies for unfair prejudice in UK case law may also be referential for 
facilitating the protection of minority shareholders in Chinese companies. The unfair 
prejudice remedy differs from the derivative action, the former one is a legal instrument 
especially for the interests of minorities instead of the corporation. According to s 994 of the 
Companies Act 2006, in the circumstances where the given minority has been or is at the risk 
of being unfairly oppressed by controlling shareholders, such judicial remedies can be 
provided by the court. The core issue in this regard is the criteria of judging the unfairness in 
each petition. In the leading case O’ Neil v Phillips (1999),215 the two fundamental standards 
of judging the unfairness was initially formed. Lord Hoffman held that first, the contract such 
as the articles of association is usually created at the moment when the company is 
incorporated, thus the norms and limits in relation to the company‘s affairs should be 
regulated by the provisions of corporate contracts. As a general principle, the British court is 
reluctant to provide unfair prejudice remedies if the defendant have not breach the articles.  
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Second, if some issues which are obvious against the ‗equitable considerations‘, the court is 
likely to remedy the minority shareholders. In most cases, the so-called ‗equitable 
considerations‘ in relation to unfair prejudice is applicable to those small quasi-partnership 
firms (e.g. the start-ups), rather than those large public corporations, as in such enterprises the 
mutual trust and understanding among all the members are the foundation of association, 
even though some of them will never be recorded in any contract.
216
 In such firms, the 
shareholder who is in a controlling position should be prevented by the court from the 
behaviours aiming at pushing the minorities aside from corporate management or from 
enjoying the profit.
217
 Since the presence of a controlling shareholder is a feature of PE-held 
start-ups in both the UK and China, it is possible to envisage that this remedy could work in 
both systems in the context of quasi-partnership firms. 
 
Although at the outset of this research suggests that the effectiveness of judicial protection for 
investors in China may be limited, in this regard, this research insists that, to some degree the 
judiciary should play a role in judging the justification of altering the articles of associations 
in PE-held companies, as the requirement of ‗for the benefit of the company as a whole‘ is 
actually a practical standard instead of a fixed and express ‗rule‘ stipulated in written laws. 
Similar to the advantages of fiduciary duties in promoting the efficiency, the amendment of 
corporate contract are not so frequent that worth very detailed legislation. In contrast, it will 
be more cost-efficient to judge a given amendment of articles of association by controlling 
shareholders on a case-by-case basis. 
 
In practice, currently the liberalistic reform of Chinese company law remarkably enhanced 
the judicial right of shareholders to restrain controlling shareholders‘ oppression. In 
consideration of costs and solidarity of the parties in companies, however, the judicial 
intervention in shareholders‘ contractual behaviours should be conservative and prudent. In 
private companies, especially family-owned companies, the relationship between not only the 
management, owners and even employees are very closely tied. Any over-encouraged 
judicial intervention between the minority and controlling shareholders will weaken or even 
destroy the trust, friendship and co-operation between the parties in the 
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companies.
218
Therefore, from the perspective of the operational efficiency within the 
enterprise, the judicial intervention or assessment of the alteration of articles should not be 
launched, unless the internal remedies such as active communication with the boards of 
directors and supervisors have been exhausted.  
 
In a practical sense, the reform can be carried out in two aspects in future. The one is that in 
order to save the costs in judicial intervention, in the circumstance where a given shareholder 
institutes a proceeding against a defective amendment of articles, the defendant – commonly 
the controlling shareholder – must effectively prove that such an amendment is proposed in 
the interest of the company rather than the controlling shareholders‘ benefit. If the controlling 
shareholder fails to do so, such an amendment of articles of association can be adjudicated as 
invalid and the responsible controlling shareholder may be ordered to compensate any loss to 
the company and those victim shareholders. The other one aspect is that the Supreme Court 
of China may be capable to release more detailed guidance of judicial practices in relation to 
the cases of fiduciary duties in company law,
219
 by which the judging standard of so-called 
‗for the benefit of the company as a whole‘ can be interpreted on a case-by-case basis. For the 
quality and stability of judicial practices in China, however, such sort of detailed and 
practical standard can only be gradually developed in practice. What‘s more, the pilot reform 
project of ‗case guidance system‘ in Chinese judicial system is also led and encouraged by 
the Supreme Court of China since 2010.
220
 Although it is still at an early and experimental 
stage, in comparison with those sensitive areas such as constitutional review and 
administrative law, the development of judicial practices in civil and commercial law system 
can be expected. Therefore, it is recommended that the Chinese courts at present should be 
encouraged to accept the disputes in relation to the justification of amending provisions in 
corporate contracts, only in this way, the standard for PE shareholders and the entrepreneurs‘ 
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contractual activities can be gradually developed, of course, the maturity of such practical 
standards may take time. 
 
4.6.3  Class Share: Why Not? 
 
4.6.3.1  Class Share as Efficient Contracts for PE Investors and Entrepreneurs 
 
Owing to the deep-rooted tradition of rule of man in Chinese society, when outside investors 
such as private equity and venture capital funds enter into a family firm, the conflicts between 
the capital and control would be easily triggered. As analysed above, the nature of such a 
problem is the extremely heterogeneous demands and expectations of the corporate 
governance of PE-held companies between the founder-controller and private equity 
shareholders. Therefore, in Chinese private equity industry a more flexible capital structure 
that can establish a balance mechanism between the PE and VC investors and founder-
controller has been strongly desired. More specifically, it can be seen from both the failure of 
corporate governance in the case of NVC and the violation of the contractual spirit in the VIE 
structure that a stable and friendly collaboration between the entrepreneurs and PE and VC 
investors can hardly be reached; only the provisions in the articles of associations may be 
resorted to, but also a kind of capital instrument meeting pluralistic demands of different 
shareholders in the company.  
 
Since the early 2000s, in order to align the interests of the PE investors and entrepreneurial 
shareholders, a kind of special shareholders‘ agreement that is aimed at incentivising the 
entrepreneurial shareholder to work assiduously for the interests of the company, the so-
called value adjustment mechanism
221
 provision was made for Chinese venture capital 
players.
222
 In a typical VAM contract, if the entrepreneur can reach a specified goal of 
corporate performance, such as a predicted compound annual growth rate
223
 or return on 
equity
224
 or successfully list the company on public markets by a pre-agreed date, the PE fund 
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should transfer a sum of shares to the entrepreneur without any charge as a reward.
225
 
Otherwise, if the entrepreneur of the investee company fails to reach the pre-agreed goal of 
performance, the entrepreneur shareholder, commonly the controller of the company, must 
transfer a given amount of shares without any charge to the private equity and venture capital 
shareholders.
226
  
 
It is obvious that the legal nature of VAM contract is a supplementary agreement between 
particular shareholders, which aims to optimally arrange the benefits pattern among the 
shareholders with various demands. However, because of the immaturity of the entrepreneurs 
in Chinese private firms, many of the founders of enterprises over-ambitiously enter into 
VAM contracts with experienced venture capitalists without prudent consideration of their 
profitability and sufficient investigation of markets. As a consequence, the failure of VAM 
practices in PE/VC-held companies successively occurred in China.  
 
On the one hand, some cases occurred in the recent decade such as Yolo Electronic Company 
Limited
227
 have clearly reflected that over reliance on the incentive mechanism in VAM 
contracts will put investee companies at the risk of business failure or over-costly 
transactions.
228
 Xiao Chen, the CEO-controller of Yolo, entered into a VAM contract with 
Morgan Stanley and China Diamond Holdings L.P.
229
 in 2005. As a consideration, the two 
private equity funds contributed USD 50 million to the company. According to the VAM 
contract, if the annual net profit of Yolo exceeded RMB 0.75 billion in the 2007 fiscal year, 
the private equity shareholders agreed to transfer 3% of the shares to the founder as a reward 
free of charge. By contrast, however, if the annual net profit of Yolo amounted to less than 
RMB 0.6 billion in 2007, Xiao Chen must transfer a total 6% of the whole shareholding to 
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the private equity shareholders without any charge.
230
 Owing to the unpredictable 
competition pressure, such an over-ambitious goal was actually impossible in such a short 
term. Finally, Xiao Chen the CEO-controller of Yolo had no choice but to sell the company 
to another leading household electronic appliances retailer in 2006, only for the purpose of 
avoiding the adverse consequence of the VAM contract.
231
  
 
On the other hand, although the Supreme People‘s Court‘s judicial adjudication of the 
validity of VAM contracts
232
 preliminarily legalized the validity of VAM provisions in the 
Chinese private equity and venture capital industry,
233
 as one of the most complex and 
innovative practices in the Chinese financial industry, the limits of the contractual freedom of 
VAM agreements in China is still highly uncertain.
234
 Moreover, owing to the speculative 
tendency in VAM contracts, the regulator‘s attitude towards VAM is still conservative. 
Therefore, at present the compliance risk in applying VAM agreements in the Chinese PE 
industry is also high and uncertain.
235
  
 
No matter the CEO-controller‘s abuse of power in corporate governance, such as in the case 
of Changjing Wu in NVC, or the breakup of the spirit of the contract in VIE structure, such as 
in the cases of Sina and Alibaba, or even the failure in practice of VAM, as in the case of  
Yolo, the key issue reflected by all the cases above is that in the Chinese private equity 
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industry, the immaturity of Chinese entrepreneurs and commercial culture currently are 
unable to establish a sustainable foundation for feely applying shareholders‘ agreements.  
 
In sum, compared with the special agreements between private equity shareholders and 
founder-controllers, as a more flexible corporate finance instrument, the class share will be 
more advantageous in the following respects: (i) based on a statutory framework in corporate 
law, the uncertainty in using class shares will be much less than shareholder agreements such 
as VAM provisions; (ii) the details of class shares will be clarified in the articles of 
association, whereas the shareholder agreements generally will not be disclosed to public 
investors or other third parties, including the creditors of the company.
236
 Moreover, again, 
concerning the immaturity of the entrepreneurs of private companies in China, a more 
normative contractual structure rather than pure contractual activities without instruction, 
would be more suitable and securable.     
 
4.6.3.2  The On-going Reform of Class Share System: ‘State Control’ as the Key Word 
 
After around one decade during which the privatization reform of SOEs in China, with the 
promulgation of the Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening 
Reforms by the China Communist Party in November 2013, a new wave of 
commercialization of the Chinese economy has been launched, in which the marketization of 
China‘s SOEs is positioned as the primary goals. In this aspect, the class share system as a 
very specific legal regime is expected to play a significant role in facilitating mixed 
ownership reform of Chinese SOEs. For instance, it is suggested that the state-owned shares 
should be converted into preferred shares without voting rights, by which the monopolistic 
control power of the administrative bodies will be significantly restrained. At the same time, 
the economic rights in preferred shares will also reduce the risk and maximize the value of 
state-owned assets, which should be the core function of SOEs in Chinese economy.
237
 
Furthermore, in a wider sense, the application of dual-class shares in Chinese SOEs is also 
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beneficial. With reference to failed management buyouts
238
 of Chinese SOEs during the mid-
1990s to 2003, the root reason for the failure was the over-concentrated ownership in the 
hands of the management layer,
239
 the ‗one vote per share‘ principle is unable to provide 
minority shareholders with sufficient power to protect their interests. As a response, in order 
to arrange the pluralistic ownership structure in the SOEs flexibly, it is recommended that 
state organs should hold special shares with super-votes and the private shareholders hold 
preferred or common shares in those SOEs that have a close relationship with public welfare 
or state security.
240
 In such a kind of mixed ownership structure, the economic interests of 
institutional investors can be guaranteed by the preferred shares and in those special 
industries, meanwhile, the dual-class share will facilitate the state control.  
 
Against such policy background, the time is ripe to transplant the class share regime into 
Chinese company law which will significantly improve the efficiency of PE-held companies. 
Almost at the same time as the promulgation of the new proposal for the comprehensive 
reform of the Chinese market economy, the State Council released the first general regulation 
regarding class shares, namely the Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Carrying out the 
Pilot Program of Preferred Shares (2013)
241
 in which the fundamental legal framework of 
preferred shares was preliminarily established.
242
 As a pilot project in the legal reform 
relating to the Chinese private equity and venture capital industry, the basic functions of 
preferred shares such as preference in distributing dividends and liquidation are provided in 
this regulation,
243
 and some restrictions such as the prohibition of issuing participating 
preferred stocks
244
 are highlighted as well. Successively, a more detailed regulation of 
preferred shares was also issued by the CSRC in March 2014,
245
 according to which both 
private and public companies registered in China are eligible to issue preferred stocks. In 
terms of protecting the interests of preferred stockholders, the Measures for the Pilot 
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Administration of Preferred Stock (March 2014)
246
 entitles the preferred stockholders to the 
voting right in deciding a series of issues such as (i) the alteration of the provisions relating to 
preferred shares in the articles of association; (ii) a proposed capital reduction in the sum of 
more than 10% of the registered capital of the corporation; (iii) the mergers, separations, 
liquidations or alteration of form of the corporation; (iv) issuing preferred stocks and (v) 
other circumstances stated in the articles of association.
247
 Moreover, in the circumstances 
where the company refuses to disburse dividends to preferred stockholders in accordance 
with the terms in the articles of association or other agreements for three fiscal years 
cumulatively or two fiscal years consecutively, the preferred stockholders‘ voting right in the 
general meeting of shareholders shall be recovered as the same as other holders of common 
shares.
248
  
 
4.6.3.3  The Pros and Cons of Class Shares in the Chinese Private Equity Industry 
 
Both the cases discussed in this chapter and the legal institutions widely used in the private 
equity market in the UK, such as the shareholder‘s agreement and class share, show that the 
heterogeneity of shareholders in PE-held companies has been pervasive. The current on-
going pilot reform of preferred shares makes it possible to apply class shares in PE-held 
companies, by which the economic interests of PE investors and control power of the CEO-
founders can be well balanced. Again considering the NVC case, although the contractual 
spirit has been increasingly highlighted and emphasized in both the media and academia in 
recent years, the change of deep-rooted Chinese culture of the ‗rule of man‘ within a short 
period may be impractical. Providing the private equity and venture capital shareholders with 
preferred shares and the founder-controlling shareholders with common stock respectively 
can, to a large extent, counterbalance the interests in the company. Moreover, the 
prioritization of private equity and venture capital shareholders in the capital structure of the 
company will also encourage the management to consider and improve the level of corporate 
governance more prudently for the purpose of generating enough profit for dividend 
distribution.
249
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As regards the problem of control in VIE structures, the class share, especially the dual-class 
voting right, is also beneficial. In China, owing to the political concerns in some special 
industries, especially the media and education, foreign capital is still strictly prohibited. The 
breach of contract and the corporate governance failure in VIE structure actually reflect the 
intension to control power between the founder-controllers and foreign private equity 
shareholders on an overseas listing level. Consequently, VIE agreements are used as a hatchet 
with which the controllers may threaten the private equity and venture capital shareholders. 
Serving as a balance mechanism for heterogeneous shareholders in PE-held companies, the 
dual-class share may effectively mitigate the risk in the overseas-listed companies involving 
VIE structure such as AliPay and Sina.
250
 Specifically, if the founder-controllers can hold a 
special class of shares attached with super votes through which the controllers can firmly 
control the companies and be shielded from hostile takeovers or dilution in successive 
financing, the governance failure caused by the scramble of control in VIE structures can be 
mitigated. Although it is also true that the controllers‘ super votes may also impede the 
external investors from investing in the company, the very limited sources of financing in 
China‘s private economy will still drive Chinese entrepreneurs to welcome private equity and 
venture capital shareholders, rather than reject them from the start.  
 
Although the Company Law of China (2013 Revision) does not provide clear guidance on 
issuing dual-class shares,
251
 the related experimental applications have been launched in some 
overseas listed Chinese companies.
252
 By using the dual-class shares in public-listed 
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companies, the founder of the companies can strongly resist the dilution from both the 
follow-up financing provided by PE institutions and public investors after going public, 
which may be an advantage for the stability of company development and keeping the 
innovation ability of the core management team.
253
 However, there is no perfect legal system 
in the world; the dual-class share is also a double-edged sword. Firstly, the dual-class votes 
may shield the management from the pressure of the control market,
254
 which will reduce its 
positive effect in motivating managers to continually improve the level of governance. 
Secondly, the over-centralized ownership structure causes the ‗tunnelling behaviour‘ of the 
founder-controllers in PE-held companies which may be exacerbated by applying the dual-
class voting system. In this regard, the advantage is that it protects entrepreneurial 
management from the demands of ordinary shareholders. The disadvantage of a dual-class 
share structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management from the demands of 
shareholders.‘255  
 
As the countermeasures against the conundrum of dual-class shares, both the regulators and 
legislators of China should not only clarify the legitimacy of the dual-class share regime, but 
also impose necessary restrictions on the controlling shareholders and provide effective 
remedies for victim shareholders oppression occurs. On the one hand, in respect of self-
governance, it can be stipulated in the articles of association that in the circumstances where 
the portion of shareholding of the founder-controllers or management layer is below a 
threshold rate, the super votes attached to the class share automatically convert to one vote 
per share, the same as other common stocks. In this way, the deviation of the interests of the 
management layer and the company as a whole under the regime of dual-class share may be 
mitigated. On the other hand, the financial regulatory institutions such as the CSRC should be 
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authorised to exercise statutory power in investigating the legislative foundation of applying 
dual-class structures in particular companies listed on stock exchanges. As a related 
requirement, all the listed companies applying a dual-class share structure should disclose the 
relevant information in a timely manner, in respect of the accountability, track records of the 
controllers and the balance mechanism of interests of heterogeneous shareholders on a 
corporate governance level, otherwise the regulator may intervene in the use of dual-class 
shares in a given company.
256
 Last but not least, similar to the restriction on contractual 
freedom in drafting articles of association, medium and minority shareholders should be 
permitted to claim against the controllers to the courts where it is proven that a given 
behaviour of the holders of super-votes is not in the interest of the company as a whole.  
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Conclusion 
 
1 The Role of the State in Private Equity Governance and Development of the Laws of 
Business Organizations in China 
 
This thesis explores the legal solution to the agency problems in the lifecycle of the private 
equity investment in China from a cross-jurisdictional perspective. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this research, the agency problems generated from the separation of ownership 
and control widely exist in different business organizations. Based on neo-liberalistic 
ideology in Anglo-American academia during recent forty years, both the legal scholars and 
economists have widely agreed to regard and analyse the business organizations as outcomes 
of contractual freedom between the members or establishers and then the attention of the 
legal and economic analysts is being attracted from external regulation to internal governance 
strategies. China as one of the largest transitional economies in the world has positively 
pursued marketization reformation in its economy throughout the last nearly forty years. 
Nevertheless, the state control over the Chinese economy still exerts essential impact on the 
legal system of business organizations which is always at a core position of private equity 
industry. 
 
1.1 The State and Limited Partnerships in China’s Private Equity Market                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
As it has been repeated in this thesis that the limited partnership has been applied as the 
dominant legal structure to undertake private equity investments in both China and UK, the 
combination of owners (LPs)‘ limited liability protection and managers (GPs)‘ unlimited 
liability deterrence to a large extent can reduce the high risk in PE investment. Moreover, the 
transition mechanism of the limited/unlimited liabilities of LPs in the circumstance where the 
LPs participate in the management of the partnership enterprise effectively mitigates the risk 
of unprofessional decision-making and the carried interests as incentive mechanism properly 
align the interests of GPs and LPs. In a nutshell, the limited partnership structure can 
effectively reduce the agency costs between fund manager and investors of PE funds.  
 
In consideration of the state control over the PE industry, the legal system of limited 
partnerships in China however, experienced and experienced a path quite different from the 
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partnership law in UK. Since the most leading domestic PE firms (GPs) are those fund 
management companies incorporated by the large SOEs, the economic and shareholding 
relationships between these GPs and princeling families or interested groups of the Chinese 
government are quite complicated. As an aftermath, although the latest reform of China‘s law 
of partnership enterprises admitted the legal status of limited partnerships, it can be imaged 
that the realization of key managerial staff‘s liability in PELPs management (e.g. the 
establishment of individual bankruptcy system) is still impeded. In terms of the independence 
of PE firms‘ management, the political factors also to some extent hinder the improvement of 
the governance of PELPs. Indeed, the partnership law of China excludes the transferring rule 
of LPs‘ limited liability to unlimited liability in the circumstance where the LP(s) actively 
participate in the management of the fund. Actually, this research implicates that the lack of 
‗piercing LPs‘ veil‘ in Chinese partnership law is caused by the ex parte protection of the LPs 
having economic relationship with the SOEs. Overall, due to not only domestic investors‘ 
immaturity of drafting limited partnership agreements but also above political barriers to 
establishing a UK-style limited partnership regime, the protection for the LPs in China is 
relatively weak and LPs‘ unprofessional intervention in fund management has increased 
transaction costs in Chinese PE industry.  
 
1.2 The State-owned Capital and the Governance Structure of Private Equity 
Investment Trusts 
 
It is discussed in the second chapter of this thesis that a unified legal protection for China‘s 
private investment funds was not available until the latest five years. As an alternative way, 
the commercial trust was also applied for organizing PE and VC investments, by which 
domestic PE investors can be better protected by the CBRC.  Owing to the historical legacy 
of China‘s trust industry, the high flexibility of commercial trusts has been undermined by 
the state-controlled ownership structure of China‘s trust corporations. In specificity, as the 
professional experience and reputation of China‘s trust companies in PE market are both 
quite weak, the ‗zero loss promise‘ for the investors of PEITs has been adopted widely by 
most trust corporations as an effective marketing strategy. Consequently, the ‗zero loss 
promise‘ seriously hinder the fostering of market participants‘ ability to judge market risk 
and a large amount of state-owned capital is being improperly paid to the PE investors as a 
kind of ‗guaranty‘. Moreover, although the CBRC‘s regulations require the custodian banks 
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to independently supervise the performance of the trustee, the affiliated relationship of 
custodian banks and trust corporations has substantively disrupted the independence and 
objectivity of the custodian‘s supervision of the trustees of PEITs.  
 
In regard of the governance structure of China‘s PEITs, political influence is also 
considerable. Just as mentioned at the first chapter of this dissertation, the fiduciary duty 
system in China is quite weak, because the adjudication is firmly controlled by the CCP and 
administrative power, rather than professional judges. Therefore, the CBRC entitles 
beneficiaries with the voting right in decision-making process of PEITs, by which the 
disputes between trust corporations and beneficiaries are expected to be solved within the 
governance structure of PEITs. As a result, beneficiaries‘ control power behind the trust 
corporations in PEIT-involved companies cannot successfully comply with the disclosure 
requirement of China‘s securities regulations. Although in practice investors have developed 
several alternative approaches to remove the barrier to IPO of PEIT-held companies, the 
transactions costs are also remarkably increased. From the analysis the agency problems in 
China‘s PEITs, it can be seen that the initial relationship of the state (especially the 
shareholding relationship) and PE firms in a country may profoundly change the economic 
function of a certain type of commercial organization.  
 
1.3 The State Control of China’s Company Law Reform and the Corporate Governance 
Issues in PE-held Companies 
 
After analysing the relationship between the state control and governance of PE funds, the 
agency problems generated from the process of corporate governance of PE-held companies 
in China is also discussed in details in this research. In account of the initial condition of 
China‘s company law, since the promulgation of China‘s first Company Law in 1993, the 
impact of SOEs reforms are noteworthy and which directed the developing path of Chinese 
corporate governance. In the first place, it can be imagined that the highly concentrated 
ownership structure of SOEs can hardly tolerate a company law which encourages diversified 
corporate governance structure. Therefore, even up to now the class share regime is still not 
clarified by the company law of China. In terms of the corporate governance of PE-held 
companies, however, the class share system is essential in balancing the interests between the 
entrepreneurial controllers of the investee company and the PE shareholders. As reflected 
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from the case study regarding the conflict between the entrepreneurial controller and 
representative directors of PE funds, a large number of Chinese entrepreneurs have a very 
strong thought that the founder should always determine the management of the company. 
Consequently, the PE investor‘s interests are at the risk of the controllers‘ oppression. 
Because of the very deep-rooted influence of Confucian culture in China, it may be quite 
difficult to foster the spirit of contract and equality in Chinese entrepreneurship in short time, 
therefore the dual-class share system is highly expected to be adopted by the company law of 
China in expectable future.  
 
The state‘s influence on China‘s PE market also exists at the moment when PE-held 
companies are listed. Although the public stock markets were established as early as 1990, 
because of the high standard requirement of listing, currently the majority of Chinese listed 
companies are SOEs, rather than non-state-owned companies. The dramatic unbalanced 
interests pattern of listed SOEs and non-state companies in China‘ s stock market makes the 
transactions costs of listing application and approval is unaffordable for the SMEs, which 
eventually drives more and more PE/VC-sponsored firms choose to list on abroad stock 
exchanges. The VIE problem of foreign PE-held companies discussed in this research shows 
that the over-strict regulation of capital market may encourage the regulatory arbitrage at the 
expense of minority shareholders‘ interests in corporate governance. Specifically, in the VIE 
structure, the PE shareholders as the minorities may be continually threatened by controlling 
shareholders, as a result of the lack of class share system under China‘s company law. Once 
the majority shareholder tends to keep the control over the company after the investee 
company has been listed on the stock exchanges, he/she may breach down the VIE contracts 
at the expense of the PE investors‘ economic benefits. Overall, both the SOE-preferred stock 
markets in China and the special prohibition of foreign direct investment in particular 
industries have increased the risk in corporate governance of PE-held companies. It is not 
unreasonable that the particular industries such as online media and publishing may not be 
accessible to international PE investors in a short future, the VIE structure and the related risk 
between the majority and minority shareholders will continuously exist, therefore, the 
application of preferred share as a balancing mechanism between the controllers and PE 
investors may avoid collapse of corporate governance.  
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2   The Prospect of Legal Reforms of China’s Private Equity  
 
Based on the analysis of the agency problems in the process of governance of China‘s limited 
partnerships, trusts and PE-held corporations, there is no doubt that the state‘s influence on 
the future reforms for China‘s private equity legal system will also be essential. In other 
words, different degrees to which the authorities control the governance process, different 
paths of regime transition of the three commercial organizations in China‘s PE industry, 
which may shape a distinct landscape of the PE legal system from western countries.  
 
As discussed above, the primary goal of PELPs reform under Chinese legal system is making 
the personal liability system of partners work well. Although the latest wave of mixed 
ownership reform of the SOEs has been launched, limited to the unbalanced pattern in 
China‘s PE/VC market, the princeling-controlled GPs and LPs may still have the power and 
political priority in impeding the reform of the law of partnership enterprises. In respect of 
contractual autonomy of LPs and GPs, this thesis considers that the structured incentive 
mechanism can be gradually accepted and applied in the process of China‘s PE market 
development. As for the external regulation of China‘s PELPs, the regulatory reform of 
PELPs towards a transparency-focused system has been launched in recent years. The new 
investment fund law and regulation of private investment funds not only firstly clarifies the 
CSRC‘s official regulation over PELPs but also requires all PELPs in to file with the AMAC 
who plays the self-regulatory role in China as the BVCA in the UK. The AMAC as the 
unifying self-regulator of investment funds in China is entitled the power to develop detailed 
self-disciplinary rules and impose reputational sanctions on the GPs who violate the self-
regulatory rules.  
 
In terms of PE investment trusts, the prospect of China‘s PEITs also depends on the mixed 
ownership reform of the state-controlled trust corporations, by which the ‗zero loss promise‘ 
may be broken by diversified interest pattern at corporate governance level of the trustees. 
Specifically, the present pilot ownership reform of several selected trust corporations has 
shown that the unprofessional and lagging management of CIS (including PEITs) has pushed 
the CBRC to encourage non-state enterprises or institutions to invest in the trust corporations 
and dilute state control, by which the high quality investment decision-making experience 
may be introduced. In such a way, the competitiveness of PEITs in PE market can be 
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enhanced and more importantly, the ‗zero loss promise‘ will be rejected by non-state 
shareholders of trust corporations. As a consequence, in consideration of the investment 
security, the investigation and approval of qualified investors of PEITs will be stricter than 
before, which can reduce the irrationality of investors‘ decision-making. The last point, in 
contrast to beneficiaries‘ direct intervention in fund management, judicial adjudications 
settling the disputes between trustees and beneficiaries are able to provide more efficient 
remedies for the investors of PEITs, of course, such a development may take time. 
 
In order to improve the corporate governance of investee companies, the current pilot reform 
of preferred shares led by the CSRC has been functioning as a balancer of majority 
shareholders‘ control power and PE/VC shareholders‘ economic interests in the investee 
company. The current guidelines for applying preferred shares have established a platform to 
enhance contractual rights of PE investors and entrepreneurial shareholders for the purpose of 
reducing the transactions costs in corporate governance. It is evident that the reform of 
Chinese corporate governance is increasingly contractual throughout the recent revamps of 
the company law, the PE shareholders are being vested more power to bargain with the 
entrepreneurs and reach the balance at the starting point of contracting. In such a way, the 
corporate governance conflicts in the VIE structure can be defused. In respect of external 
protection, the judiciary office may develop a series of practical rules for drafting and 
amending articles of association, according to which the majority shareholders‘ power will be 
restricted and the court is able to provide remedies for the PE shareholders when PE/VC 
minorities are oppressed by the majority shareholders. Nonetheless, again, the high quality 
judicial practice in China may be a complex and time-consuming process of reform.  
 
3 The Transaction Cost Theory of Legal Transplantation: A Preliminary Framework 
 
This thesis aims at exploring feasible approaches for reducing the agency costs in Chinese 
private equity organizations. At the same time, the comparative studies of the investor 
protection mechanisms in three types of business organizations (limited partnership, 
corporation and trust) may provide another viewpoint of considering the legal transplantation 
between different jurisdictions, which may be especially relevant to institutional 
transplantations in transitional economies. In a methodological aspect, this theoretical 
hypothesis is mainly built up on transaction cost economics which may facilitate to 
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understand why a modification of a given form of business organizations may considerably 
impact its efficiency in an ‗importer country‘ and what the precondition is for successful legal 
transplantation of business organization laws.  
 
3.1   The Analytical Foundation 
 
Each main chapter of this work begins with a comprehensive analysis of the origins or 
functions of the given business organizations (e.g. limited partnership, trust and corporation), 
by which the viewpoint is emphasized that any given form of business organization is derived 
from a series of specific social demands in a particular historical background. For example, as 
illustrated in chapter 2, the social demand of a special organization form which could 
efficiently combine the wealth with low-level risk and professional managerial skills with 
high-level incentive and unlimited liability deterrence is the root origin of limited partnership 
in history. Similarly, the origin function of English trust in history was actually a legal 
creation for maintaining the value of household land, charitable funds or ecclesiastical assets, 
rather than commercial investment. As a result, the high-level liability mechanism and 
incentive mechanism were not as so necessary as that in limited partnership or commenda. 
This is the reason why the fundamental legal structure of English trusts is simpler than that of 
limited partnership. As for the corporation, the rise of institutional shareholder in modern 
corporate governance reflects a fact that the multi-level class of shareholding and governance 
structure can strike a balance among heterogeneous shareholders inside a corporation and this 
feature has remarkably expanded the corporation‘s scope of application in most industries 
with medium risk. Thus, any legal transplantation of a given form of business organization 
should respect its inherent economic functions. This functional analysis is adopted as the 
fundamental philosophy of the following doctrinal construction.  
 
3.2  The Internal Costs and External Costs in Protecting Investors 
 
The analysis of the investor protection mechanisms in British commercial law illustrates that 
the degree to which the protection mechanisms depend on external legal institutions (such as 
regulatory intervention, judicial review and self-regulation) generally has positive correlation 
with the degree to which the ownership and control of the owners of given business 
organizations. For instance, statistically the main body of the protective mechanism in 
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traditional law of trusts in England was formed on judicial practices during a long history, 
whereas the contractual autonomy of limited partnerships and corporations play a much more 
important role in decreasing agency costs in organizational governance.  
 
Based on above idea, the hypothesis of this theory can be summarized as: in an ideal 
capitalist market, the costs of protecting investors of business organizations can be classified 
into two categories, the one is called ‗internal cost‘ which refers to the costs generate from (1) 
the owner‘s labor in decision-making process in governance1 and (2) the owner‘s monetary 
contributions to the assets of the firm.
2
 The other type of costs is called ‗external cost‘ which 
refers to the costs generate from (1) external intervention by financial regulators
3
 and (2) ex 
post judicial remedies.
4
 Hence, quantitatively, the key definitions of ‗internal cost (IC)‘ and 
‗external cost (EC)‘ are expressed respectively as: 
 
                                                    IC= L+A                                                                      (A) 
and 
                                                    EC= R+J                                                                      (B) 
 
The detailed analysis of the economic implications and its relationship in legal transplantation 
will be discussed later. Prior to a theorization of above ideas, an experiential and comparative 
review of the IC and EC in each main type of organization will be necessary and helpful. 
 
3.3 The Distribution of Internal Costs and External Costs in Various Organizations 
 
For the convenience of illustrating and analyzing, the main types of business organizations 
are categorized into three groups by differentiating the degrees to which the ownership and 
control of investors‘ contributions in firms is separated, namely the partnership-like 
organizations, corporation-like organizations and trust-like organizations. The distributions of 
IC and EC in the following popularly applied organizational forms are specifically discussed. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Briefly, represented as ‗L‘. 
2
 Represented as ‘A‘. 
3
 Represented as ‘R‘. 
4
 Represented as ‘J‘. 
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3.3.1   The Partnership-like Organizations 
 
3.3.1.1  General Partnerships 
 
The general partnership does not have any separation of ownership and control and mostly it 
is used for organizing small-scale business. Thus in most cases, there is no need to cost 
regulatory resources for protecting the partners, instead, all the partners have to actively 
participate in decision-making process for guaranteeing their own interests in the partnership 
enterprise. In such a governance structure, the effectiveness of protection for each partner 
depends on the full range of contractual freedom and unlimited liability of each partner. In 
general partnerships, the residual claim and residual control over the firm assets are fully 
aligned.  
 
3.3.1.2  Limited Liability Partnerships 
 
As a special type of general partnership, the limited liability partnership (LLP) delimits the 
limited liability of no-fault partners and unlimited liability of partners in fault. Compared 
with the general partnership, the limited liability of partners in LLPs makes it possible that in 
most cases, although all the partners are unlimitedly liable for debts of the partnership 
enterprise if the debts are not triggered by the ignorance and wrongdoings of one or some 
certain partner (s). The law of business organization as a kind of ‗standardized contract‘ here 
imposes unlimited liability of each partner and clarifies the conditions triggering unlimited 
liability, which actually saves the negotiation costs of the owners and to some extent creates a 
potential dual class ‗residual claim‘ of all the partners. In terms of the residual control, all the 
partners can equally participate in management, as the same in general partnerships. LLPs are 
used in professional services such as law firms and accounting firms or real estate agencies. 
The high level requirements of each particular profession are commonly created by 
occupational or industrial associations, for instance, bar associations and certified accountant 
associations. Again, the strict personal liability on each partner in LLPs can consistently 
constrain each partner‘s opportunistic behaviors. Therefore, as a balance, the external 
protection costs in LLPs are relatively low by comparison with a standard partnership.  
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3.3.1.3  Limited Partnerships 
 
In limited partnerships, the partners own different portions of capital in the firm, however, the 
general partner as the managing partner is usually vested extra residual claim, namely the 
‗carried interest‘. 5  Limited partners as the majority of owners enjoy limited liability 
protection unless they actively participate in management. It is obvious that in comparison 
with general partnerships and limited liability partnerships, most owners (limited partners) in 
limited partnerships save the cost of decision-making in daily operation and management of 
the firm, simultaneously limited partners have to share a large portion of residual claim to the 
general partner as an effective incentive. If we say that the primary mechanism of reducing 
agency costs in general partnerships and LLPs is the unlimited liability, the incentive 
mechanism maybe plays a more significant role in limited partnerships. The combination of 
unlimited liability deterrence and high level incentive makes the limited partnership quite 
suitable for high risk investment such as private equity, venture capital and hedge funds. In 
terms of external protection, a well-sound self-regulatory system is necessary for spreading 
the reputation records of each managing partners, the high pressure of the market of 
managers in particular industry like PE funds plays an important role in reducing agency 
costs of limited partnerships. Obviously, the self-regulation and official regulatory system 
will cost higher social resources, as limited partnerships are commonly used in very risky 
fields.  
 
3.3.2   Corporation-like Organizations 
 
In this category of business organizations, the most significant feature is the medium-level 
separation of ownership and control. In most jurisdictions, the laws of companies 
differentiate unlisted and listed corporations, the former commonly has small number of 
shareholders and does not need a public market of capital, whereas the later form of 
corporation has a huge body of shareholders who can freely transfer their shares of the 
corporations in a public stock market. The distinctive ownership structures and connection 
with public interest determine different distribution of internal and external protection 
mechanism in the two sorts of corporations.  
                                                          
5
 It is commonly 20% of gross profit of the limited partnership which is particularly popular in private equity 
and venture capital funds.  
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3.3.2.1  Unlisted Corporations 
 
In a statistical sense, the members of the board are unnecessary to be shareholders of a 
corporation, although in unlisted companies, the directors commonly hold significant 
proportions of shares. This is the reason why we usually say that the legal nature of closed 
and unlisted corporations, especially the family-owned companies is a kind of ‗quasi-
partnership firm‘. From the analysis of PE-held companies, it is not difficult to see that the 
internal protection for the shareholders of close companies depends on the contractual 
provisions in the articles of associations or other contractual mechanisms like shareholders‘ 
agreements. In terms of the residual control, in most scenarios the director board is in charge 
of daily management of the firm and most shareholders do not spend too much time on daily 
decision-makings. The application of various financial instruments including but not limited 
to preferred shares, convertible bonds and covenants can strike a balance of residual claims 
between shareholders, however, such complicated contractual techniques will dramatically 
increase negotiation costs inside the firm. Therefore, in comparison with partnerships, the 
lack of ongoing control over the capital inevitably increases the risk of agency problems. 
Moreover, the complexity of the contractual provisions among heterogeneous shareholders 
needs stronger external protection, especially the judicial remedies as an important interpreter 
of the vagueness in ‗corporate contracts‘.  
 
3.3.2.2   Listed Corporations 
 
Although the basic principles and statutory structures of corporate governance are almost the 
same in unlisted and listed corporations, the external protection for shareholders of listed 
companies is much more important than that of unquoted firms. Firstly, the stock markets are 
established as a nationwide and official capital markets, it is obvious that maintaining an 
efficient and consistent regulatory system must cost a huge amount of monetary and human 
resources. Secondly, the entire process of public financing in stock market will involve lots of 
intermediaries, namely investment banks, stock brokers, law firms, accounting firms and 
rating agencies. Thirdly, for enhancing the protection for huge number of minority 
shareholders in public stock market, the collective lawsuits will cost higher expense of 
investigation and adjudication. The EC of shareholders of listed companies, therefore also 
includes the social capital paid to extra regulatory system of financial service providers. As 
211 
 
for the IC of listed corporations, the dispersed shareholding may give rise to ‗free rider‘ and 
‗rational apathy‘ and therefore, most shareholders of listed companies spend very low level of 
costs in corporate governance.  
 
3.3.3   Trust-like Organizations 
 
The last category of business organizations, namely the trust, has high level separation of 
ownership and control. Generally, the internal governance structure of trusts is much simpler 
than that of partnership-like and corporation-like enterprises. The original model of this type 
of organizations is the English trust which was initially used as charitable funds in modern 
era. It is acknowledged that the charitable trust is not the object of this theory, however, as 
one limit of the functions, the distribution of IC and EC in charitable trusts is relevant to the 
discussion. Business trusts also use the very similar governance and ownership structure of 
charitable trusts, but its governance structure may be modified slightly. In this section, the 
similarity is more than the differences of the two types of trusts, thus they will be discussed 
together.   
 
As shown in Chapter 3, the most significant feature of trust (both business and charitable 
trusts) is the full separation of ownership and control. The trustee commonly does not hold 
any residual claim of trust assets. Although in the sense of the common law the trustee is the 
‗legal owner‘ of trust assets, in an economic sense, however, the trustee should be regarded 
only as the manager instead of the ‗owner‘ of trust assets. The beneficiary does not have any 
power in the governance process of trust funds but fully enjoys the interests of trust assets. In 
other words, the residual claim is fully separated from residual control of trust assets. The 
slight difference between business trusts and charitable trusts is that firstly, in business trusts, 
the beneficiary (at the same time the investor as well) is obliged to pay management fees to 
the trustee, whereas the trustees of charitable trusts traditionally do not take fees from 
beneficiaries. Additionally, the contractual techniques in trusts are also simpler than 
partnerships and corporations, as most rules for restraining the trustee‘s behaviors are 
developed from judicial practice rather than contractual negotiation. Hence, investors or trust 
beneficiaries spend the lowest internal costs in protecting their interests.  
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The high-level mismatch between the residual claim and residual control remarkably increase 
the agency costs in trusts, therefore, the external protection is usually the only way of 
protecting and offering remedies for beneficiaries (investors). Therefore, it can be imagined 
that the burdensome activities in judicial and regulatory practices will cost mass social 
resources. That is to say, the EC of protecting investors of trust-like organizations is much 
higher than any other business organizations. 
 
3.4 The Economic Implications of Internal Cost and External Cost in Business 
Organizations 
 
3.4.1  The Theorization of the Distribution of the IC and EC in Business Organizations 
 
Pursuant to the analysis of the distribution of the two types of transactions costs in above 
three models of organizations, the correlation of IC and EC can be briefly expressed as two 
functions in Image I: 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Owing to the fixity of statutory form of organizations, the ‗carrying capacity‘ of transaction 
costs of each organizational form has its own limit. In other words, there should be: 
 
0 ≤ IC (p, c, t) ≤ α(p, c, t)                                          (C) 
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This inequation expresses the limits of internal costs for each of the three main types of 
organization as lying between zero and the limit (α) imposed by the legal regime controlling 
the structure and governance of the relevant organization. 
 
Similarly, as in idealistic model, the occupation of social resources in each sub-system (such 
as economic, legal, political and cultural systems) are limited and relatively fixed, by which 
the division of social labor will be sufficient and balanced. In such theoretical assumption,
6
 
the gross costs of investor protection of the regulatory and judicial sectors and self-regulatory 
system are not unlimited as well, namely: 
 
                                    0 ≤ EC (p, c, t) ≤ β(p, c, t)                            (D) 
 
This inequation sets the limits for external costs for each of the three main types of 
organization as lying between zero and the limit (β) imposed by the constraints (e.g. 
economic, political)  on investor protection and enforcement in any given jurisdiction. 
 
Image I theorizes the distribution of IC and EC in different business organizations and the 
above detailed analysis of specific types of business organizations to a large extent illustrates 
this theorization. The further issue is what the economic implications are for institutional 
transplantation. In order to answer this question, the following section investigates the 
economic connotations of the IC and EC in the three models of business organizations 
respectively and then tries to illustrate why the balance of IC and EC in legal transplantation 
of business organization laws is important.  
 
3.4.2   The Economic Implications of the Internal Costs of Protecting Investors 
 
According to the mathematical model of the internal cost (IC) inside business organizations 
(equation (A)), the labor (L) that investors contribute to decision-making or contractual 
negotiation among the parties and the monetary assets (A) which are contributed as 
incentives for their agents (managers) in the firm constitute the gross amount of IC. It is also 
                                                          
6
 This is only an ideal economic assumption, the distribution of the external costs in reality is actually much 
more complicated, which will be discussed later.  
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acknowledged that the capacity of carrying transaction costs in each given organizational 
form is fixed and limited (inequation (C)). Therefore, comprehensively considering above 
factors, in any organizational forms, the function of IC is an indifference curve:  
 
 
 
 
Image Ⅱ shows that in a general sense, the quantitative relation of the IC of partnerships, 
corporations and trusts can be simply expressed as below: 
 
                                                IC (t) < IC (c) < IC (p)                                                    (E) 
                                
Subject to the high-level closure of organizations, the risk generated from the intensive 
conflicts between owners and agents is not likely to overflow outside the separate system of 
business organizations, however, again, the carrying capacity of transaction costs in each 
organizational form has its limit. 
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3.4.3   The Economic Implications of the External Costs of Protecting Investors 
 
According to the equation (B) and inequation (D), the quantitative relation of the expenses of 
regulatory and judicial resources should also satisfy indifference curve, the mathematical 
express should be as the same as Image Ⅱ, namely: 
 
                                             EC (t) > EC (c) > EC (p)                                                     (F) 
 
In reality, however, the relation between R and J does not always satisfy the conditions of 
indifference curves, as the social systems outside the business organizations are opened, or 
we can use another term ‗coupling‘. If the regulatory and judicial systems fail to 
independently operate, for example, being controlled by politicians or interested groups, the 
EC will be imposed on other sub-systems of society.  
 
3.4.4   The Conservation of Gross Transaction Costs in Protecting Investors 
 
The emergence of different business organizations in economic history reflects the change of 
social demands and advance of division of social labor which essentially and continually 
promotes efficiency of market. Generally speaking, the emergence and development of 
partnership with unlimited personal liability is a response to the demands of enhancing the 
personal credit for attracting business. As Image Ⅰ shows, the distributions of transaction 
costs in limited partnership and unlisted companies are somewhat similar which actually 
reflects the social demands of limited liability protection for overseas or colonial ventures 
during the late medieval ages. As for listed companies and trusts, the nature of them can be 
regarded as a kind of legal institution for large number of passive investors who are risk 
averters and contribute small portion of capital, in which the layer of professional managers 
(trustees) formed.  
 
In a free market where economic activities are organized in spontaneous order, the above 
three types of business organizations can be regarded as specific legal instruments which 
efficiently facilitates heterogeneous financial activities of different stratifications. Lawyers 
and venture capitalists commonly are wealthy and well-educated people who have strong 
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ability to control and resist risk, the partnership-like business organizations may suit their 
demands in commercial activities. People from middle class may have sufficient capital to 
run their own business, but most of them are not experts in certain industries and can only 
afford medium level of risk. Hence, the statutory limited liability protection which are 
stipulated in corporate law and stronger external protection are needed. The rest of people are 
in middle and lower classes of the society who have relatively weak ability to resist risk and 
insufficient knowledge of investment or finance, then the trust fund and active judicial 
protection help them efficiently manage their wealth and create value. 
 
Accordingly, the curves in Image Ⅰ suggest that the gross costs (GC=IC + EC) of protecting 
different investors in each type of business organization should be equal, or called as 
‗conservation of transaction costs in protecting investors‘, which can also be expressed by an 
indifference curve (Image Ⅲ).  
 
 
 
 
This is an ideal and optimal situation of the legal and regulatory regime of business 
organizations which properly allocates social resources in a whole society and the law 
provides equal opportunities of wealth appreciation and accumulation for the people in all 
stratifications. Importantly, this theory tends to regard the models in Image Ⅰ and Ⅲ as the 
ideal results of legal transplantation across different jurisdictions, as in such situation, the 
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import of the legal and regulatory system of business organizations can benefit the 
destination country as a whole.  
 
Moreover, by using Image Ⅲ , according to the inequations (C) and (D), we can also 
generally calculate the threshold values of IC (p, c, t) and EC (p, c, t) respectively, namely: 
 
IC (t) ∈ (0,α(t) ),  IC (c) ∈ (α(t) ,  α(c) ),  IC (p) ∈ (α(c), α(p) )           (G) 
and 
               EC (p) ∈ (0,β(p) ),  IC (c) ∈ (β(p) ,  β(c) ),  IC (t) ∈ (β(c), β(t) )           (H) 
 
3.5   The Overflow Effects of Transaction Costs in Legal Transplantation  
 
This section will discuss 1) how the IC and EC are distributed in a transitional economy (such 
as China) and 2) what negative social impacts may be exerted on the importer jurisdiction, if 
the necessary legal regimes do not exist. Specifically, when the core legal regimes such as 
liability mechanism in partnership law or judicial intervention for trusts do not work well or 
even do not exist, the costs of protecting investors will overflow into other systems. This 
point may properly explain the problems in legal transplantation of the laws of business 
organizations in China and may provide some inspirations for further research.  
 
3.5.1 The Overflow of Transaction Costs between Different Business Organizations 
 
The economic implications of the inequation (G) and (H) provide a possibility when the IC or 
EC value of ‗organization A‘, for example, is increased higher or decreased lower than its 
value domain, the economic functions of it may be changed to ‗organization B‘. This 
phenomenon can be defined as ‗Transaction Overflow between Organizations‘. The 
transaction costs overflow effect may negatively impact the destination country and distort 
the market which can be well illustrated by several cases of China‘s PE legal system. 
 
As summarized in the third chapter of this thesis, the barrier to IPOs of PEIT-involved 
companies is rooted in a series of social factors in Chinese society. Firstly, the zero-loss 
promise as a distorted ‗guarantee‘ subverts the protective function of the courts. Secondly, 
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the affiliated relationship between trust corporations and custodian banks weakened the 
protection for trust beneficiaries. Therefore, such subversion of external protection (or, in 
transaction cost terms, a lowering of the expense of external protection) motivates the 
beneficiaries to 1) actively participate in decision-making of trust funds and to 2) re-invest 
their capital into a limited partnership for the purpose of IPO, in which beneficiaries have to 
grant 20% around carries to the general partner. As repeated many times in this theory, the 
economic efficiency of trusts to a large extent is realized by the trustee‘s independent and 
professional management. In the case of Chinese PEITs, however, the active managerial 
power and limited liability of beneficiaries have changed the institutional features of trusts to 
that of ‗quasi corporations‘. The nature of this case is actually the overflow of transaction 
costs from external system outside the organization to the internal system inside the 
organization, and consequently weakened the advantage of trust funds. 
 
Similarly, in the cases of corporate governance failure, which were discussed in Chapter 4, 
the lack of judicial standards controlling amendment of the articles of associations in 
companies granted an overly wide range of contractual freedom to shareholders. In other 
word, the internal cost was dramatically increased. Consequently, the disputes between 
venture capitalists as minority shareholders and controlling shareholders decreased the 
efficiency of corporate governance. Moreover, the lack of dual-class share system of Chinese 
company law gives rise to wide application of complex and high risk contractual instruments 
including VIE and VAM which considerably increased the tension between the shareholders 
inside the corporate organizations. The nature of such cases can also be seen as the change of 
institutional features of business organization caused by the overflow of transaction costs 
from the external system to the internal system. The overly wide range of contractual 
freedom in companies in fact changes the corporation to be more like a partnership: if the 
gross costs of contractual mechanism inside the firm breaks its limits of IC (p, c, t), then the 
governance mechanism of such business organization will collapse, such as the failures of 
VIE structure in China.  
 
3.5.2   The Overflow of Transaction Costs between Different Social Systems 
 
Even more, if the costs of external protection overflows too much into the organizations, the 
tension between the agent and principals are not fully absorbed by ending the operation of 
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business, but then may further overflow into other social systems including the political 
system (e.g. irrational and collective demonstration marches or strikes), mass media system 
(e.g. misleading of public opinion) and criminal prosecution system (e.g. violent incidents). 
This extra negative impact caused by legal transplantation may be called ‗Transaction Costs 
Overflow between Social Systems‘ which dramatically increases the tension and risk of other 
social areas and reduces the efficiency of the society as a whole.  
 
3.6   Potential Implications for Legal Transplantations of Business Organizations 
 
This theorization of the distribution of transaction costs in protecting investors of business 
organizations can be termed as ‗the transaction cost theory of legal transplantation‘. It is 
obvious that this innovation, based on the analysis of private equity investment presented in 
this thesis, is only a preliminary experiment of theoretical construction, the accurate legal-
economic (even mathematical) discussion is necessary and worthy. Based on the comparative 
case studies in this thesis, this theory may provide the following useful implications for the 
legal transplantation in practice: 
 
Firstly, no matter where the destination country is, the institutional transplantation of business 
organizations must respect the inherent economic structure of the given business organization 
in a capitalist economy, otherwise the transaction costs in organizational governance will be 
increased and consequently the efficiency inside the business organization will be negatively 
impacted.  
 
Secondly, the balance of internal and external protection mechanisms for investors of 
business organizations is important, legislators and policy-makers in the importer country 
should make every effort to guarantee that the regulatory and judicial system are capable to 
provide sufficient protection for the investors of each type of business organization, 
otherwise the failure of governance between the investors will increase the burden of other 
social systems and impact the efficiency of the society as a whole.  
 
Thirdly, it is inevitable that any transplantation of legal regimes may modify some legal 
features of business organizations for matching the social reality and culture of the particular 
destination jurisdiction. In this regard, suitable qualified investor regimes are significant, as 
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the reasonable control of market entry can to a large extent enhance the carrying capacity of 
transaction costs inside the organizations and mitigate the risk of governance failure.  
 
Last but not least, the diversification of business organizational structure will facilitate 
division of social labor, which is the foundation of an efficient and well-ordered economy in 
the modern era. Moreover, the equality of opportunity in wealth management is one of the 
universal values for modern human civilization. The insistence of diversified (instead of 
homogenous) organizational forms for commercial activities will be beneficial to common 
prosperity in the society.  
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